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FOREWORD

Standard difficulties exist regarding the treatment of Russian
history, and the approach adopted in this paper requires a short
explanation.

The Julian calendar, which was abandoned only in 1918,

was thirteen days behind the western one in 1917*

Since the Russians

themselves prefer to use the old style calendar in their works on the
revolution, that system of dating will be used consistently within the
text.

But citations from western sources, such as the New York Times,

will remain in conformity with the Gregorian calendar.
The system of transliteration will follow System II, cited in
J. Thomas Shaver, The Transliteration of Modern Russian for English
Language Publications (University of Wisconsin, 1967)*

Exceptions

will be made in the cases of well-known political figures, such as
Leon Trotsky and Alexander Kerensky, whose names have become
standardized in western usage.
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ABSTRACT

An investigation of Alexander F. Kerensky’s political activities
is of vital importance, for his public career affected perhaps the most
crucial period in modern Russian history; the years that spanned the
enfeeblement and collapse of tsarism, the February revolution of 1917*
and the Bolshevik seizure of power.

As a radical deputy in the State

Duma and then as a minister in the various provisional regimes that
attempted to guide the revolutionary state in 1917, he exercised an
increasing degree of influence upon political events.

Because of his

offices, personal inclination, and initial prestige, Kerensky managed
to dominate the Russian Provisional Government and, through it, to
determine state policy.
While Kerensky was a populist and a revolutionary, he was also a
fervent nationalist.

Because of his nationalism, he became the primary

advocate of political moderation as a means of preserving national
interests in the midst of war and still bringing to his country a demo
cratic, egalitarian order based on agrarian socialist principles.

In

pursuit of those aims, he distorted the interplay of political parties
and the course of the revolution.

His refusal to adopt a partisan

posture when the internal and external pressures upon the country de
manded such a stance contributed significantly to the Bolshevik victory

in October of 1917.Kerensky failed to recognize the dangers inherent in his
mediative policy because he underestimated the power of class interests
and overestimated the self-discipline of the population.

His populist

belief in the virtues of the people and his fiery patriotism combined
to blind him to the true depths of popular discontent.

Because he

expected too much of the revolution, and too much of the Russian
people, he relied upon his undoubted talent as a political tactician
to solve problems through the creation of coalition regimes; confusing
appearance with reality, he thought that parliamentary devices would
assure the effective cooperation of socialists and non-socialists.
He succeeded only in isolating the government from the populace and
antagonizing the parties on the Right and the Left.

Ultimately, the

results were political turmoil, attempted counterrevolution» the
disintegration of the army, spreading anarchy, and the seizure of the
state by an extreme leftist party, the Bolsheviks.

By October,

Kerensky's moderate policies were in such disrepute that his presence
within the government actually hindered efforts at resisting the
Bolshevik insurrection of October
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INTRODUCTION

The political and social conflicts of the Russian revolution
have been the subject of intensive historical scrutiny.

But despite

the attention devoted to the liberal and socialist forces that
struggled for mastery of the Russian state in 1917» the subject has
not been thoroughly covered.

The focus has generally been upon the

decisions and reactions of distinct political parties, such as the
Bolsheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Cadets, or popular revo
lutionary institutions such as the Petrograd Soviet and the AllRussian Congress of Soviets.1

To often, Alexander Kerensky and the

other moderate politicians who attempted to direct the state through
the mechanism of the Provisional Government have suffered neglect.
Their activities and goals have either been treated piecemeal or as
part of the general context in which specific groups operated.

As a

result, a certain distortion in emphasis has affected historical
treatments of the period.

That neglect is not justified, for the

iFor examples, see: E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution.
1917-1923 (New York, 1951-53); 0. H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of
Bolshevism (New York, 1953) and the sequel, The Sickle under the
Hammer (New York, 1963 ); A. M. Andreev, Soyety rabochikh i soldatskikh
deputatov nakanune Oktiabria (Moscow, 196 ?); W. G. Rosenberg, Liberals
in the Russian Revolution (Princeton, 197*0; B. M. Morozov, Partiia i
sovety v Oktiabr’skoi revoliutsii (Moscow, 1966 ); P. I. Sobeleva,
Oktiabr1skaia revoliutsii i krakh sotsial-soglashatelei (Moscow, 1968 );
P. Volubuev, Proletariat i burzhuaziia Rossii v 1917 godu (Moscow,
1964).
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leaders of the Provisional Government adopted concrete policies that
directly affected the course of the February revolution.

In the

process, they either created or aggravated many of the conditions
which the Bolsheviks successfully exploited.
The intention of this paper is to alleviate the present unsatis
factory situation by examining the political career of Alexander F.
Kerensky, initially the most influential figure within the new revo
lutionary state.Because of the special

circumstances of the February

revolution Kerensky, a radical deputy in the Fourth State Duma, rose
to a position of exceptional prominence ami authority.

As Minister of

Justice, Minister of War, and finally Minister-President of successive
cabinets, he was

at the center of events from February to October of

1917.

of his offices, personal inclination, and prestige,

By virtue

Kerensky won a position of dominance within the Provisional Government;
its membership and policies increasingly reflected his desires, and he
eventually became the primary determinant of its responses to revo
lutionary necessities.

Thus, an examination of his ministerial

activities provides sustained insight, at the cabinet level, of the
multifarious problems of provisional rule and the decisions taken to
meet those problems.
While Kerensky's ministerial role was significant in itself, his
relationship with the major socialist and liberal parties had an even
greater impact upon the outcome of the February revolution.

A skilled

political manipulator in unstable conditions and an ardent champion of
interclass cooperation for the realization of nationalistic goals, he
attempted to divert the revolution into channels compatible with the
extension of Russian power.

He was not alone in that effort; many

3
Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries and all Cadets, to varying
degrees, wished to pursue traditional state objectives in spite of the
revolution.

But Kerenslqr's chosen methods, which forced the Left and

the Right into a closer political association than they desired, had a
deleterious effect upon attempts to reconstruct the state.

The

resultant coalition cabinets, given the superficial appearance of
enhanced authority, were lured into aggressive policies that increased
class tensions and magnified the difficulties of waging war in a
revolutionary environments

At the same time, the interparty cooper

ation that Kerensky fostered had a tactical, qualified nature that was
inimical to the continuity of moderate programs.

His persistent

revival of non-party tactics after their manifest bankruptcy was
directly related to the radical upsurge in September and October of
1917, for it both antagonized those party politicians associated with
his efforts and compromised them in the eyes of the impatient populace.
Since Kerensky had such a pervasive effect on the political life
of the nation, a study of his activities offers a new perspective on
the interactions of the political forces that, in uneasy alliance,
vainly sought to impose their wills upon the revolution.

It also

contributes to a fuller understanding of the manner of their failure
and the resultant anarchic conditions that facilitated the Bolshevik
seizure of power.
Kerensky was so closely identified with the unfortunate outcome
of the February revolution that his role in its events provoked extra
ordinarily sharp reactions.

After all, the incapacity of the

Provisional Government to restrain radicalism had severe consequences;
as the former Minister-President noted in 1922, the establishment of

a communist regime in Russia carried enormous implications for the
future of his country and for the world at large.^

The failure of

political compromise became his personal failure, for he had been its
main advocate and had attempted to implement its techniques long after
Russia plunged into an environment of class warfare.

While eval

uations of Kerensky's leadership qualities and political decisions
have been almost uniformly unfavorable, the specific criticisms differ
according to the perspectives adopted.

To a great extent, KerensIgr

was judged as the Provisional Government was judged.
As could be expected, the communist attitude toward Kerensky is
one of implacable hostility.
soviet approaches.

V. I. Lenin set the tone for later

Identifying Kerensky as one of the "heroes of

falseness," Lenin noted that he was a "Right wing, so-called
socialist" whose policies did not "differ substantially from the
Cadets in anything." While "maintaining democratic appearances," he
was a Bonapartist pursuing reactionary policies "behind the backs of
the people."3

Joseph Stalin agreed that Kerensky provided a cover for

counterrevolution. While deluding the masses, Stalin claimed, he was
"standing guard over the interests of the landlords and capitalists,
resolutely protecting the latter against attacks by workers and
peasants.
Stalin.

Trotsky's assaults were more virulent than those of

Kerensky, the former Red army leader asserted, "had no

2A. Kerenskii, "Fevral* i Oktiabr'," SZ, IX (1922), 292.
3v. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 55 vols. (Moscow,
1960-65), XXXIV, 248.
*hJ. Stalin, The October Revolution; a Collection of Articles
and Speeches (New York, 1934), p. 12.
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theoretical preparation, no political schooling, no ability to think,
no political will."5 Moreover, his policies lacked the "force of
Bonapartism" while retaining "all its v i c e s . Soviet historians have
been careful to remain within that doctrinal framework, for their
writings on the period routinely identify Kerensky as a "socialist
compromiser" and a "disguised, counterrevolutionary" who led the
"agents of reaction" against the revolutionary masses.?
While those who defeated Kerensky had a vested interest in
destroying his reputation, the non-communist Left was scarcely more
charitable.

Victor Chernov, the leader of the Socialist Revolutionary

Party, admitted that Kerensky welcomed the revolution with "genuine
enthusiasm." But the veteran populist maintained that Kerensky was an
"overrated personality" whose obsession with compromise undermined the
social basis of provisional rule.®

Nikolai Sukhanov, a Left Menshevik,

offered a variant of Chernov's evaluation:
Kerensky was a sincere democrat. He believed in the truth and
the correctness of his line and hoped that his actions would
lead the country to the triumph of democracy. He was terribly
mistaken. A feeble politician, without schooling or the wisdom
of a statesman, he strayed into anti-democratic policies and,
as far as his influence was effective, buried himself and the
revolution.9
The political Right was even more vindictive than the Left.

5l . Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, trans. Max
Eastman, 3 vols. (New York, 1932), II, 183.
^Trotsky, II, 157?Morozov, 86; Soboleva, 92.
8v. Chernov, Pered burei, vospominaniia (New Yor’', 1953). P* 338.
9n . N. Sukhanov, Zapiski o revoliutsii. 7 vols. (Berlin, 1922),
I, 68.
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Vladimir Nabokov, a Right Cadet and one of Kerensky's colleagues in
the Provisional Government, dismissed him as a "fortuitous little man"
who suffered from the "mania of g r e a t n e s s . S . I. Shidlovskii, a
prominent Octobrist and the leader of the Progressive Bloc of the
State Duma, claimed that Kerensky was an "adventurer utterly unfit for
a large role in politics.

Perhaps the harshest evaluation was that

of the eminent Russian historian P. N. Miliukov, the head of the Cadet
Party.

Comparing Kerensky with Boris Godunov, whose policies led to

the Time of Troubles in the early seventeenth century, Miliukov
claimed that his political skills consisted of "thrusting himself
forward at the right moment."^

The former Minister-President,

Miliukov continued, "could never make a clear choice" and was paralysed
by "interminable hesitations between the Right and the Left."13
Western historians have tended to accept the verdict of
Kerensky's non-communist contemporaries. The standard chronicler of
the Russian revolution, William H. Chamberlin, maintained:
Just as some of Kerensky's traits predestined him for leadership
in the early phase of the Revolution, other qualities, inability
to think coldly and realistically outside of the haze of his own
glowing phrases, sentimentality that occasionally verged on
hysteria and led to alternations between extreme optimism and
extreme pessimism, capacity for self-hypnotism, marked him out

IGv. Nabokov, "Vremennoe Pravitel'stvo," ARR. I (1922), 35-36.
llS. I. Shidlovskii, Vospominaniia, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1923),
II, 128.
12p. Miliukov, Vospominaniia. 1859-1917. 2 vols. (New York,
1955), II. 262, 327.
13P. Miliukov, C. Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, Histoire de
Russie; reforms, reaction, revolution, 3 vols. (Paris, 1933J, III,
12797*
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for disastrous failure when the romantic illusions of national
unity were shattered on the hard facts of class antagonism.^
Donald W. Treadgold, a noted student of modern Russia, echoed
Chamberlin.

Kerensky-s weakness, he observed, was that "oratory

became a substitute for action."^5

T. H. Von Laue offered a slight

shift in emphasis; Kerensky, he felt, was the "first of the great
orators of revolutionary mass politics in the modern age."

Neverthe

less, Von Laue added, the "exalted quality" of his appeal was "devoid
of political r e a l i s m . P e r h a p s the most severe criticism of the
former head of state was advanced by 0. H. Radkey, the leading American
historian of the Socialist Revolutionary Party.

Kerensky failed,

Radkey asserted, because:
He was neither a socialist nor a revolutionary but a nineteenthor early twentieth-century radical of the French, or perhaps
even more, the British type, a St. Petersburg attorney who
consorted with the Left without accepting its ultimate
objectives. 1 ?
That opinion, advanced thirty-six years after the revolution, was
surprisingly reminiscent of the one held by V. M. Purishkevich, a
monarchist, in July of 1917.

Kerensky, Purishkevich argued, was a

"crystal pure man" who was "removed from the daily life of his own
land and did not realize it."-*-®

1**W. H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution. 1917-1921, 2 vols.
(New York, 1965), I, 150.
15d. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia (Chicago, 196*0, p. 35 .
16t . H. Von Laue, Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the
Russian Revolution. 1900-1930 (New York, 196*0, p. 118.
l?Radkey, Agrarian Foes, p. 463•
l®Speech of Purishkevich before a meeting of the State Duma,
cited in Izvestiia, July 20, 1917, p. 3*
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Those strongly negative views have not gone unchallenged.
Kerensky has vigorously defended his conduct; while conceding a lack
of "personal strength and ability," he claimed that the "main lines"
of his policy were "correctly traced." Only through a policy of class
cooperation, he insisted, could Russia have avoided "civil war and a
separate peace. "19

Robert P. Browder, who has worked extensively with

Kerensky, has come to his defense.

While admitting that the former

Russian statesman was unable to meet the challenges that were
presented to him, Browder argued:
Kerensky failed, not because he was weak-willed, emotional, or
politically inept. He was a moderate at a time aid place where
moderation was inappropriate. Kerensky displayed considerable
skill as a political raaneuverer and demonstrated an ability to
manipulate and compromise which, in normal circumstances, might
have been successful over a considerable period of time. But
he had to operate in abnormal times.20
None of these interpretations are entirely satisfactory.

While

Western historians have duly recorded Kerensky's activities, they have
consistently underestimated his actual impact upon the course and
outcome of the February revolution.

The primary cause of that attitude

is the undeniable fact that Kerensky's policies failed to meet the
needs of the country.

But as a result, there has been an unfortunate

tendency to assume that the Provisional Government, paralysed by
Kerensky's commitment to unrealistic political ideals, was unable to
have a direct influence upon revolutionary developments.

Accordingly,

^9a . Kerenskii, "Politika Vremennogo Pravitel'stva," SZ,
L (1932), 423.
2Or . Browder, "Kerenskji Revisited," Russian Thought and
Politics, ed. H. McLean, et al. ("Harvard Slavic Studies;" Harvard,
1957), IV, 433.
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historians have been disposed to acoept the corollary that in the main
the real political straggle proceeded independently of Russia's formal
leadership.21

In view of those misleading propensities, a reassessment

of Kerensky's role in the events of 1917 should proceed carefully and
comprehensively.

A logical point of departure would be an inquiry

into his pre-revolutionary career, where indications of his later
behavior might be found,
21por example, see the implied evaluations ©f the effectiveness
of the Provisional Government in: L. Schapiro, "The Political Thought
of the First Provisional Government," Revolutionary Russia: a Symposium,
ed. Richard Pipes (New York, 1969), p. 137; Carr, p. 103.

CHAPTER I

ALEXANDER KERENSKY'S PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CAREER

Alexander Kerensky was deeply influenced by his social origins,
and to a considerable extent his family position was a result of
changing conditions in Russia during the latter part of the nineteenth
century.

Kerensky's parents were commoners and would have remained in

relative obscurity in the Russia of Nicholas I.

But while the Great

Reforms of Alexander II did not abolish privilege, they did provide
increased opportunities for greater portions of the population.
Taking advantage of loosened political restrictions, the Kerensky
family obtained status equivalent to that of the gentry*
to prominence was service in the state bureaucracy.

Their route

Through it, they

acquired a social position somewhat comparable to the Noblesse de Robe
in old regime France.
Fyodor Mikhailovich Kerensky, Alexander's father, was primarily
responsible for that success. He had been born in 18k2 into the large
and impoverished family of a district (uezd) priest in Penza Province
(Gubemiia)

As the son of a clergyman, Fyodor was assured access to

a basic education.

But his attendance at the Theological Seminary at

lAlexander F. Kerensky Archives, the Humanities Research Center,
University of Texas, Austin, Texas, folio 75*
10

11

Penza and his later graduation from the University of Kazan were
achieved only through considerable effort; while noble birth was no
longer a requirement for entrance into a university, he had experienced
difficulty in financing his course of study.2

After acquiring a degree

in classical philology, Fyodor advanced rapidly.

Physically imposing

and exceptionally able, he held a succession of increasingly
responsible posts in the tsarist educational system.3
Early in his teaching career, Fyodor contracted an advantageous
marriage to Nadezhda Adler, a former student of his at the Radionov
Institute at Kazan.

An attractive and graceful woman, Nadezhda felt

at ease in her husband5s professional and social circles.

Her back

ground lent the necessary assurance; Nadezhda1s father, an army major,
directed the Topographical Division at the headquarters of the Kazan
Military District, and her maternal grandfather had been a wealthy
Moscow merchant.^
By the time of Alexander Kerensky's birth, on April 22, 1881,
his parents were prosperous and respected.

Fyodor Kerensky directed

two gymnasiums in Simbirsk and was firmly accepted into provincial
upper society.3 The family success continued, for in 1899 Fyodor
became the Director of Education in Turkestan, a position he held for

2Ibid.
3a. Naumov, Iz utsielievskikh vospominanii. 1868-1917. 2 vols.
(New York, 195^-5577 I. 36-38.
^Kerensky Archives, folio 75.
5lbid.

12
over twenty years.** At times, Alexander was to regret hi® prominent
origins; when later attempting to enter radical political circles in
St. Petersburg, he felt hampered fey his "bureaucratic descent. ”7
As could be expected of a political emigre. a certain wistfulness
accompanies Alexander Kerensky's childhood remembrances.

Nonetheless,

there can be little doubt that his early years in Simbirsk and
Tashkent were happy ones.

The Kerensky family enjoyed superior

governmen-Uprovided housing and could afford governesses, servants,
and nurses.®

Daily life possessed a stable core of routine amply

supplemented by excursions and social events;9 by his own account,
Alexander was surrounded by demonstrations of attention and affection.
Evidently, Fyodor Kerensky exercised a stabilising and bene
ficial influence upon his son.

Although Fyodor held traditional

attitudes and was conservative in outlook,11 he was intellectually
curious, catholic in his reading tastes, and impatient with bureau
cratic abuse.

As the Kerensky household combined a basic condiment

to the Imperial status quo with a somewhat sympathetic attitude
regarding reformist movements, Alexander's personal development
proceeded smoothly in a conventional but non-repressive atmosphere.

^A, Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, trans, G. Kerensky
(New York, 193*0. p. 62.
^Crucifixion, p. 119.
®Crucifixion, p. 56. Alexander had two sisters, Anna and
Yelina, and a brother, Fedya.
9lbdd.
lOKerensky Archives, folio 75.
llKerensky, Crucifixion, p. 58.

13
His father's background and interests assured educational progress.
Alexander had access to a wide rang® of political reading materials,
and Fyodor took an active interest in his scholastic work.

A

particular encouragement of proficiency in debate and composition was
rewarded; Alexander's oratorical ability later became a striking
political asset.12
Fyodor's attempts to provide security and stimulation were
remarkably successful, for Alexander could recall only one childhood
episode when he felt strongly that something was seriously wrong with
his country.

This was occasioned by his parent's discussion of Leo

Tolstoy's opposition to the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892; signifi
cantly, Fyodor's partial agreement with Tolstoy's criticism of
autocracy was not knowingly expressed in his son's presence.13
Alexander Kerensky's early years left a clear imprint upon his
character.

Of course, many of his beliefs were later altered.

Support

of monarchism, respect for the rites and ceremonies of the Russian
Orthodox Church, the acceptance of Russification, the acknowledgement
of social distinctions— these attitudes, to which Kerensky was exposed
automatically by reason of birth, were left behind.

While the form of

his beliefs changed, however, important elements remained.
Certainly, nationalism was one of Kerensky's enduring traits.
It was constantly on or near the surface and was easily recognized,
regardless of the socialist or internationalist vocabulary which he
sometimes adopted.

Iraki G. Tsereteli, a Menshevik leader and close

l^Kerensky Archives, folio 75*
13Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 60.

associate in 1917 , maintained that an "ecstatic nationalism" was
Kerensky's outstanding characteristic.1^

Victor M. Chernov, the head

of the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party, noted the force of that
quality and observed that it was tinged with a kind of "hystericalstilted inspiration."15

Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador

to Russia during the revolution, frequently commented on that attribute
and suspected that Kerensky's strong personal magnetism was linked to
his "patriotic fervour."16

Kerensky's speeches and writings revealed

a strong emotional commitment to his country, for he considered Russia
a "living body"17 created by the "blood and sweat of generations."1 ®
Political exile in 1918 did not alter his attitude.

During the Russian

Civil War, he urged the Western Allies to respect the "entire
territorial integrity of Russia" and advocated their "complete dis
interest" in Russian internal affairs.19

His patriotism also survived

the Bolshevik victory; when Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941,
he supported national resistance in a telegram to Joseph Stalin.

14i. g . Tsereteli, Vospominaniia o fevral'skoi revoliutsii .
2 vols. (Paris, 1963), I, 122 .
15v. Chernov, Pered burei, vospominaniia (New York, 1953)/ P* 338.
I6 sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic
Memories. 2 vols. (New York, 1923), II, 109.
17a . Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point (New York,
1965), p. 15.
IQgd, session 2 , special meeting, July 26, 1914, cols. 18-19*
l9Telegram addressed by Alexander Kerensky to Moscow by the Quai
d'Orsay. The V. A. Maklakov Archive of the Russian Embassy in Paris,
1917-1924, 4 boxes, Collection of the Hoover Institute at Stanford
University, box 1, accession no. 26003-937*
20Kerensky Archives, folio 149.
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An essentially religious outlook was another lasting quality.
Although Kerensky opposed bureaucratic formalism in the Russian
Orthodox Church, calling it "soulless officialism,"21 he remained
strongly drawn to certain native religious currents.

He has implied

that his belief in personal sacrifices for the people originated in
the Russian kenotic tradition,22 and he was so impressed by Vladimir
Soloviev's mystical writings that they later found secularized
reflection in his political statements.23
There were other legacies from Kerensky's early years.

Qualified

confidence in the effectiveness of legal opposition to tsarism,
reliance upon moral exhortation and example, acceptance of service
obligations to the state, and confidence in a personal capacity for
leadership were natural outgrowths of his family's prominence and
administrative background.
In view of his fundamental orientation, it is easy to understand
how Kerensky so quickly accepted the tenets of political radicalism
when he entered the University of St. Petersburg.

They did not involve

a serious break with old beliefs; Kerensky adapted them, shifted their
emphasis, and used them as a bridge to pass into new activities and
alliances.

Thus, a basis existed for his claim of being a revolutionary

while still in Tashkent.2**

2^Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 58.
22ibid. Kenoticism referred to a voluntary yielding of needs or
an "emptying" of personal qualities for the salvation of others.
23Kerensky, Russia, p. Jk. For example, see Kerensky's discourse
on truth in GD, session 2, meeting 4, October 23, 1913. col. 2^5*
2**Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 56.
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While Kerensky's radical political education dated from his
entrance into the law faculty at the University of St. Petersburg in
1899, he refrained, to a remarkable degree, from direct political
activity.25

Opportunities for such involvement existed, for student

disturbances continued from 1899 to 1904-, although at a diminished
rate compared with previous years.26

But he refused to associate with

specific political groups and remained a "rank and file" member of
disruptive student activities.27
one demonstration.

Kerensky took an active part in only

In the spring of 1901, at a gathering in support

of student rights, he condemned narrow personal goals and called for
union with the !ation in the struggle for political liberation.28
That first impulsive experiment did not turn out well.

He was

temporarily suspended from the university and released to the custody
of his father.29
behavior.

Fyodor Kerensky was not pleased with his son's

He told Alexander that he was still inexperienced and

immature and, while he could do as he wished later, he should concen
trate upon his studies until graduation.30
Alexander found his father's conditions easy to accept, for
25crucifixion, p. 77.
26fj. Cherevanin, "Dvizlienie intslligentsii do epoki 'doveriia'
kn. 3viatipolka-Mirskago," Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossi v nachale
XX-go veka, L. Martov, ed., 4 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1909), I, 262.
27Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 77.
28Kerensky, Russia, p. 26.
29lbid.
30Russia, p. 27.
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there were other outlets for his energies and a number of ways to
t

satisfy his present needs.

He claimed to have often felt an "inner

loneliness,"31 and he sought relief in an active social life.

Kerensky

rented a dormitory roon^-rather than an apartment away from campus— in
order to meet more people, attended theatrical productions with
friends, and enthusiastically joined literary discussion groups.32
Although successful in gathering a reliable circle of friends
and acquaintances, which included his future wife, Olga Baranovskii,33
Kerensky was not completely comfortable in his new environment.
Offended, as provincials often were, by the doctrinaire rigidity and
apparent conceit of Europeanized Russian students, he purposely empha
sized his Asiatic heritage.34

Kerensky asserted that he felt most at

ease in a Turkestani fraternity, and he became prominent in that
organization's activities.35
Kerensky also found solace in a carefully chosen curriculum,
enrolling in courses that supported his intuitive attitudes.3^

Nicolas

Losskii's idealistic philosophy and legalist Lev Pehazhitskii1s
emphasis on an innate sense of duty reinforced his system of values

3lRussja, p. 16.
32k . Breshkovskaia, Hidden Springs of the Russian Revolution;
Personal Memoirs of Katerina Breshkovskaia. ed. L. Hutchinson
(Stanford, 193l), p- 350.
33These included Olga's brother, Vladimir, a member of the Guards
Artillery, and her cousin Sergeii Vasil'ev, a fellow student.
3^N. Sukhanov, Zapiski o revoliutsii. 7 vols. (St. PetersburgBerlin, 1919), I, 47.
35Kerensky, Russia, p. 23.
36Russia. p. 29.
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and provided him with specific arguments against materialist doctrines,
and exposure to historians S. F. Platonov and Tadeus Zelinskii
encouraged his sympathy with democracy.37

By his graduation in 1904,

Kerensky had acquired a defeasible set of political views. They found
expression in his acceptance of the populist (narodnik) ideology, which
provided a suitable vehicle for his belief in the positive role of the
human will, his aversion to a pronounced class orientation, and his
commitment to democracy and political freedom.

He was also strongly

attracted to populism’s native roots and sympathy with the peasantry.3®
Personal motives prevented an immediate translation of Kerensky’s
populist beliefs into radical political action.

He had married

immediately upon graduation, and while his new wife, the former Olga
L'vovna Baranovskii, shared his political viewpoints,39 he recognized
new obligations and inhibitions.

Nevertheless, Kerensky did not

completely accommodate himself to tsarism.

He spurned an overly

close relationship with the autocracy by rejecting state service, and
he considered graduate woric in criminal law, which at least would have
permitted some obstruction of repressive tsarist policies. But a
clash with an influential law professor put an end to even that limited
oppositionist course.

Lacking alternatives, Kerensky decided to enter

private legal practice.40

3?Russia, pp. 30-34.
38Kerensky, Crucifixion . p. 104.
39she also shared his social eminence. Olga's father was a
colonel attached to the Russian General Staff (Stavka), and her
oaternal grandfather was V. P. Vasil*ev, a well-known Chinese scholar.
Kerensky Archives, folio 78.
40Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 104.
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In the fall of 1904, Kerensky applied for membership in the
St. Petersburg Bar Association.
experience.

He found it to be an instructive

Rebuffed because of his association with "higher bureau

cratic circles," he gained admission as a Junior Barrister only when
vouched for by lawyers holding appropriately anti-governmental views.^
According to his own testimony, Kerensky’s determination to acquire a
radical political reputation dates from that initial rejection.
Ashamed of his privileged past, he wished to atone for it by becoming
a "political lawyer" specialising in politically sensitive cases.
Unconditional acceptance by established radical lawyers was quite
difficult; as a step toward that end, he became active in the konsultatsiia. a legal aid organisation.
and endurance.

That decision required some courage

Kerensky deliberately ignored potentially profitable

family contacts and served a hard and obscure apprenticeship which
involved tedious work for small remuneration.^2
As it was largely prompted by embarrassment, Kerensky's initial
political activity was of questionable duration.

But the events of

January 9, 1905, in which he witnessed the Imperial Guards firing upon
a peaceful demonstration, made him an irreconcilable foe of tsarism.
"The part of an onlooker," he said later, "became quite unbearable
after the Red Sunday. n/+3 While he was in no position to lead, or even
significantly to shape, events during the 1905 revolution, Kerensky
still took an active part in protest work.

^Kerensky, Russia, p. 44.
^Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 107.
^Crucifixion, p. 107.

He joined a Bar Council
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committee formed to assist the victims of Bloody Sunday, and in the
October general strike he aided the Barrister's Union in disrupting
proceedings in the State Senate.^

Kerensky also took individual

action, breaking off relations with acquaintances in privileged circles
and seeking outlets for propagandistic

w o r k . ^5

jn November of 1905,

he associated with the Organisation of Armed Rebellion, headed by a
Socialist Revolutionary, N. D. Mironov.

Actually, that action was

less daring than it might seem; despite its grandiloquent title,
Mironov's group was rather harmless and confined itself to publishing
an illegal newspaper, Burevestnik (Stormy Petrel). Through that
medium, Kerensky attacked the autocracy and supported the projected
State Duma as a potentially disruptive influence upon the government.^
Apparently, Kerensky's hostility to tsarism had become so intense
that he attempted to enter the terroristic Battle Organization of
the SR Party; having previously dismissed terrorism as revolutionary
romanticism, he now wished to take part in the assassination of
Nicholas II.

In his latest memoirs, Kerensky asserted that his

contacts with the Battle Organization, Boris Moisenko and Boris
Savinkov, were willing to consider his application, and he was rejected
only through the direct intervention of the group's leader, Evgenii
Azev.

While Azev's motives were suspect— he was later exposed as an

agent of the tsarist secret police— he apparently advanced the quite
reasonable objection that Kerensky was inexperienced and therefore

^Crucifixion, p. 108.
^Kerensky, Russia, pp. 49-50.
46Russia, p. 59 .
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unreliable.
Kerensky's oppositional activity came to the attention of the
Okhrana (the state security police), and he was arrested when found
possessing manifestos of the Organization of Armed Rebellion.

Although

he successfully conducted a week-long hunger strike in protest against
procedural irregularities,**® Kerensky found imprisonment at Kresty
(the Cross) frustrating and pointless and possible conviction on
charges of treason frightening.

He was particularly resentful that

the Okhrana raid on his apartment had not been directed specifically
at his activities but had been part of a general search for an escaped
terrorist.^9
Outside events intervened in Kerensky's favor.

His imprisonment

coincided with the meeting of the First State Duma and, as part of a
limited and informal amnesty program, he was sentenced to several
years' banishment from major cities.50
improved the conditions of his release.

Once out of prison, Kerensky
Utilizing once-despised

4?Russia, p. 61. Neither Boris Nicolaevskii, Azev's biographer,
nor Boris Savinkov mention Kerensky's attempt to enter the Battle
Organization, although Nicolaevskii indicates that Azev often inter
vened in the screening of new applicants. V. M. Zenzinov, a close
friend of Kerensky's implies that Kerensky was known to the Battle
organization, but does not go into detail. See B. Nikolajewsky,
Azef the Spy: Russian Terrorist and Police Stool (New York, 1934).
p. 71; Boris Savinkov, Memoirs of a Terrorist, trans. Joseph Shaplen
(New York, 1931); V. M. Zenzinov, Perezhitoe (New York, 1953)» P* 114.
**®Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 118.
**9Kerensky, Russia, p. 68; Padenie tsarskogo rezhima; stenograficheskie otcheti, doprosov Jl pokazanii. dannikh v 1917 £• v
chrez vychainoi sledstvennoi komissli Vremennogo Pravitel'stva. ed.
P. E. Shchegoleva, 7 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad„ 1924-27), VII, 353*
50Padenie; M. Visniak, Dan* Proshlomu (New York, 1954), p. 127.
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aristocratic connections, he obtained from Senator Zvolianskii, the
director of the police department, an annulment of his sentence.

That

was accomplished with the understanding that he would avoid future
association with revolutionary groups and spend son® time with his
father in Tashkent.51
The consequences of Kerensky's prison experiences were tangible
and far-reaching.

He assumed a realistic attitude toward political

possibilities are! ended, experimentation with revolutionary illegality.
Convinced that the government had stabilized and consolidated its
position, he felt that work aimed at educating the Russian people and
solidifying their hostility to autocracy was the only remaining
alternative.52
ment

The means tothat end were now available, for

imprison

had erased the taintof his privileged past ami hewasaccepted

into the fellowship of the political lawyers.
Kerensky received his first important political case shortly
after his return to St. Petersburg.

In October, 1906, a legal group

headed by N. D. Sokolov requested that he replace them in the defense
of peasants accused of pillaging an estate near Reval (Tallin).53
While he had only a few days to acquaint himself with the relevant
documents, Kerensky had no difficulty in adopting a mode of defense.
In the tradition of the political lawyer, he gained the acquital of
most of the accused by attacking the brutal methods of retribution
applied by local authorities.5^ The successful outcome of the Reval

5lKerensky, Russia, p. 72; Padenie, VII, 35352Kerensky, Russia, p. 68.
53Russkie Vedomosti, August 26, 1906, p. 3*
5^-Kerensky, Russia, pp. 7^-75*
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trial launched Kerensky on an outstanding legal career and revealed
the exceptional oratorical ability that he would subsequently put to
vigorous use.
The Reval case also established a pattern which Kerensky followed
with great consistency until his entrance into the State Duma in 1912.
He specialized in controversial eases, travelling throughout the
Russian Empire at the standard fee of ten rubles a day and the price
of a second-class round-trip railway ticket.55
several advantages.

That course offered

It increased his familiarity with conditions in

many parts of the country, afforded opportunities for the gathering of
anti-governmental material, and enhanced his reputation as a defender
of liberty.

Furthermore, he m s able to focus attention upon short

comings in Russian society in an effective, if theatrical,

w ay.56

Kerensky's chosen path revealed a considerable degree of political
maturity, for through it he was able to attack social evils in a
strictly legal manner and to expose them through vivid and telling
examples.
By 1910 Kerensky was sufficiently well-known to attract the
favorable attention of L. M. Bramson and S. Znamenskii, leaders of a
populist party, the Trudoviks (Toilers).57

Numerically small, the

group was primarily composed of intellectuals dissatisfied with the
ideological rigidity of the SR's and the Constitutional Democrats
55Russla, p. 76.
56sir Bernard Pares, A Wandering Student: the Story of a Purpose
(New York, 19^8), p. 2*4-3.
57Kerensky, Russia, pp. 83-8*4-.
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(Cadets).5® The Trudovik Party had compiled an impressively radical
record in previous

Dumas59

hut was not of the extreme Left.

It

apparently consisted of men holding basically moderate views who, at
the same time, harbored easily-aroused sympathies with revolutionary
action.60

That essential duality made categorization difficult; it

was not certain whether the Trudoviks were a splinter from the Right
SR's or the Left Cadets.63While the Trudoviks never realized their potential (they had
only ten members in the Fourth State Duma), they did represent an
alternative to the major political parties.

They emulated the SR’s in

advocating land nationalization and considered themselves populist in
orientation.62

But at the same time, they courted industrial workers

and had a noticeable influence in some urban areas.63
with liberalism was also evident.

Their affinity

They valued constitutionally

protected political rights such as freedom of speech and assembly,
seeing in these guarantees a way to further political reform, and were
willing to embark upon parliamentary maneuvers aimed at creating an

58For an evaluation of Russian political parties, see the
Maklakov Archive, Box 1, accession no. 26003-937. number 24.
59p. Maslov, "Narodnicheskie partii," Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie.
Ill, 121.
60s. I. Shidlevskii, Vospominaniia, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1923). II,

127.
63-Tsereteli, I, 217; V. A. Maklakov, The First State Duma;
Contemporary Reminiscenses, trans. Mary Belkin (Bloomington, 1964),
p. 120; Maklakov Archive, Box 1, accession no. 26003-937, number 24.
62y.

Maklakov, Iz vospominanii (New York, 1954), p. 365 .

63Maslov, "Narodnicheskie partii," p. 147.
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effective coalition of progressive and radical parties in the Duma. 6^
The Trudovik's political elasticity appealed to Kerensky.

He

had previously identified with the SR's, but had teen disappointed in
that party's decision to boycott the elections to the State Duma and
had found its leadership overly doctrinaire.65

He did not feel so

confined within the Trudovik Party* for its membership shared hip pro
fessional background ami attitudes ami was susceptible to his leader
ship.^

Finally (this, to Kerensky's mind, was probably the Trudovik's

greatest attraction), they afforded him an opportunity to gain entrance
into the State Duma.

Liberals saw that institution as a path to the

creation of a limited monarchy on the English model and placed great
stress on numerical majorities ami party platforms; Kerensky viewed it
as a podium from which to attack the government and, perhaps, as an
eventual focal point of

r e v o l u t i o n . 67

He readily accepted an offer to

stand as a candidate in the upcoming Fourth State Duma, and in the fall
of 1912 won election as an unopposed delegate from Volsk, a district
capital of Saratov Province.68

6^A. Martinov, "Konstitutsionno-demokraticheskie partiia,"
Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie. Ill, 48.
65v. Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii; fevral♦skoi
revoliutsiia (New York, 1934), p. 212.
^^Shidlovskii, II, 12?; Maklakov Archive, Box 1, accession no.
26003-937, number 24. Miliukov observed that the Trudoviks "waited
for their leader— a vacancy later filled by A. F. Kerensky, who did
whatever he wished." P. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, 1859-1917, 2 vols.
(New York, 1955), II, 14.
67g d . session 1, meeting 6, December 3, 1912, cols. 182-184.
68q d . session 1, meeting 3, November 23, 1912, col. 29. At this
time, Kerensky also entered the masonic movement. While conclusions
must be tentative, it appears that Russian Masonry had a pronounced
political complexion. Representatives from a wide political spectrum
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A badly mishandled miners' demonstration provided Kerensky with
a unique opportunity to participate in the State Duma's activities
before his election to that body.

On April 4, 1912, local authorities

at the Lena gold fields in Irkutsk panicked in the face of mass unrest
and allowed troops to fire upon assembled workers; as a result, the
incident was transformed into a massacre which claimed 340 victims. *>9
The central government compounded the error, for in response to Duma
demands for an explanation?0 the Minister of the Interior, N. A.
Maklakov, supported the use of force.

"The crowd," Maklakov insisted,

"lost self-control and moved toward the troops. There was no choice
but to fire."

In an inflammatory conclusion, Maklakov provocatively

added, "This is how it was in the past, and how it will be in the
future."?■*■ Because of the Interior Minister's performance, the Duma
ignored a governmental investigation into the matter and appointed
Kerensky to head its own commission of inquiry.
Kerensky accepted the appointment with obvious enthusiasm.?3
His investigation, unexpectedly aided by officials in the provincial

were members, indicating that the organization provided a medium
through which opponents of tsarism could work together. See Miliukov,
Vospominaniia, II, 332-333; Kerensky, Russia, p. 88.
n . Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo; vospominaniia, 1903-1919
£g., 2 vols. (Paris, 193377 11757.---- ------- ------------ ------

7Opor an example, see Alexander Guchkov's speech in GD, session
5, meeting 99, April 9, 1912, cols. 1674-1675*
7lGD, session 5, meeting 102, April 11, 1912, col. 1953*
72a . Kerensky, "Russia on the Eve of World War One," Russian
Review, V (Autumn, 1945), 27; Evidence of M. V. Rodzianko, Padenie.
VII, 171.
73Shidlovskii, II, 126.
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administration, 7**- revealed flagrant exploitation by mine owners and
incompetence on the part of the local army commander.

The government,

embarrassed and unable to defend itself adequately against the accusa
tory material compiled by Kerensky,75 moved to rectify conditions.
The company's monopoly was abolished, the administration was re
organised, and the miners were provided with better food, housing, and
working
moment.

conditions.76

The Lena goldmining case occurred at a timely

Kerensky's able performance, which attracted nationwide

attention, allowed him to enter the Duma with an enhanced political
reputation.77
Almost from its convocation in November 1912, deputy Kerensky
was a fractious influence in the Fourth State Duma.

His first speech

was violently critical of Duma politics, for Kerensky accused the
deputies to his Right of trying to "worm their way into power" and
observed that success would result only in the replacement of one form
of privilege with another.^

As would frequently occur in the future,

his maiden speech was cut short after degenerating into an acrimonous
exchange with the conservative Duma President, M. V.

Rodzianko.79

7^*Sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy: a Study
of the Evidence (New York, 1939), p* 155*
75Kokovtsov, II, 57; Shidlovskii, II, 126.
76Kerensky, Russia, p. 82.
7?Padenie, VII, 353; Pares, Fall, p. 155•
78q d , session 1, meeting 6, December 3, 1912, cols. 182-184.
79lbid.; the editors of Russkie Vedomosti observed that Kerensky
frequently displayed a "mutinous disposition." Russkie Vedomosti.
June 10, 1914, p. 2.
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Thus, Kerensky established his position at the very outset of his Duma
career.

He refused to tolerate compromise if it was directed toward

partisan ends; the nation, not specific parties, should be the
beneficiary of political action.
In pursuit of that goal, Kerensky willingly took part in dis
ruptive activities in the Duma.

An example of that tactic occurred in

April, 1914, when deputy Nicholai Chkheidze, a leading Menshevik,
created a sensation hy predicting the imminent arrival of a republic.®®
In a strong reaction, the Right wing of the Duma introduced a "freedom
of speech" bill aimed at restricting opposition deputies. An attempt
hy moderates on April 22 to evade conflict by advancing discussion of
the current budget failed, for the maneuver provoked a disorderly Left
demonstration in which Kerensky played a leading role.

Chants of

"freedom of speech" paralysed proceedings, and order was imposed only
through the ejection of thirty Left deputies, including Kerensky, and
their suspension from the Duma for fifteen m e e t i n g s . T h e return of
the barred deputies on May 7 was almost as tumultuous as their
eviction.

Amid great disorder, Kerensky read a prepared statement

which condemned expulsion and praised the explosive revolutionary power
of 1905. 82
Kerensky's impatience with the Duma majority stemmed from a
conviction that it was unrepresentative and reactionary.

Accordingly,

he refused to take an active part in legislative activity and used his

8%ovoe Vremia, April 18, 1914, p. 2.
81GD. session 2, meeting 62, April 22, 1914, cols. 792-798.
82GD. session 2, meeting 77, May 7, 1914, cols. 114-118.
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position mainly to influence public opinion through inquiries.®3

A

pale, slender young man— he was only 31 years old when he entered the
Duma— with great aplomb and a compelling manner,^ Kerensky gained a
deserved reputation for being direct and fearless in debate.®5

His

intensity won involuntary respect from all sections of the Duma and in
a subtle way set him apart from prominent Left deputies such as N. S.
Chkheidze and Matvei I. S k o b e l e v . I n part, Kerensky's distinction
was due to an unnerving eloquence; he was a powerful and imaginative
speaker, and when inspired reached a passionate fury that threatened
to sweep everything before it.®?
While Kerensky's talents were generally recognized, he exercised
a continuous influence only upon those holding liberal or radical
views.

Even then, he looked beyond the framework of the State Duma.

The Octobrist deputy S. I. Shidlovskii correctly observed that the
Left-Center was always making new interparty agreements with Kerensky,
but Shidlovskii revealed a severe parliamentary bias in a further
comment that these efforts were of no significance.®®

Uninterested

in establishing limited and temporary working compromises, Kerensky
attempted to transcend ideological barriers, forge the narodnik
parties and their allies into a great populist movement, and prepare
®3shidlovskii, II, 12?.
®^"Scott Diary," June 17, 1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Division
of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washington D. C., Box 71.
Spares, Fall, p. 154.
^Shidlovskii, II, 12?.
8?Chemov, Rozhdenie, p. 335; Visniak, p. 229.
^Shidlovskii, II, 127.
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for the revolution.

He adhered to that non-partisan policy in the

face of great temptation.

In 1914, Kerensky refused a request from

the Central Committee of the SR Party that he act as their spokesman
in the Duma because acceptance would hinder his attempts at political
unification.
Kerensky continued his organizational work in frequent and
rapid trips throughout the country.

His provocative speeches before

cooperatives, trade unions, and labor clubs attracted the attention
of the Okhrana. and their reports noted the regularity with which he
met politically unreliable individuals and groups.90 Association
with the energetic radical deputy could prove dangerous; in the summer
of 1914 a meeting of primary school teachers in Ekaterinburg
(Sverdlovsk), at which he spoke, was raided.

Kerensky found protection

in his Duma status, but 150 others in attendance were arrested.91
Kerensky's confidence in parliamentary immunity was justified,
for it had survived severe testing during the famed Beilis trial of
1913.

That case, in which a Jewish youth, Menakhil-Mendel Tev'ev

Beilis, was accused of the ritual murder of a Christian child, aroused
great controversy within Russia and abroad.

The government exposed

itself to charges of anti-semitism and distortion of evidence, and
Kerensky actively exploited the

i s s u e . 92

While not officially engaged

in the trial, he assisted in the successful defense of Beilis through
89Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. I63.
9QAssorted Okhrana reports, Kerensky Archives, folio 81.
9lRusskie Vedomosti. July 3* 1914, p. 4.
92Evidence of A. B. Liadov, Padenie, VII, 271; GD, session 2,
meeting 4, October 2 3 , 1913, col. 245.
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advice and legal work.93

Beilis1 acquittal represented only one stage

of the conflict, for on October 23, 1913. Kerensky moved a resolution,
adopted by the St. Petersburg Bar Association, which protested against
the propagation of racial hatred. 9**- The government, infuriated by its
defeat and humiliation, brought charges of slander against the signers
of the Bar petition.

As mover of the resolution, Kerensky was

sentenced to eight months1 imprisonment and denied the right to seek
o f f i c e . 95

Fortunately, a prolonged public outcry altered the verdict;

the sentence was suspended and Kerensky retained his Duma seat.^
When war was declared in 1914, Kerensky suspended harassment of
the autocracy.

He was susceptible to patriotic enthusiasm, but his

altered tactics also resulted froma reassessment ofpoliticalchances.
Unable to anticipate the future incompetence and reactionary nature
of the government, Kerensky felt that military strains would force
fundamental democratic

r e f o r m s . 97

His shift toward a pro-war liberal

position did not lead automatically to the inter-party cooperation that
he expected.

The liberal groups had also veered to the Right in

insisting on unconditional support of tsarist

e n d e a v o r s , 98

and Kerensky

remained as isolated as before.
Accordingly, delicate phrasing was required for an acceptable
declaration at the Duma special meeting of July 26, 1914, called to

^5RUSskie Vedomosti. June 4, 1914, pp. 2-3*
94Russkie Vedomosti, June 7, 1914, p. 3»
95padenie, VII, 35396Russkie Vedomosti. June 10, 1914, pp. 2-3.
97Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 214.
98g D, session 2, special meeting, July 26, 1914, cols. 24-25.
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deal with the outbreak of war.

Kerensky wished to retain links with

the Left and, at the same time, open possibilities for cooperation
with the liberal parties.

Plans for a unified Left statement, which

he was to read, proved incompatible with his desires; he was willing
to condemn the origins of the war, but he refused to countenance
serious reservations regarding national defense.99

Kerensky's July 26

address, delivered solely in the name of the Trudovik Party, was a
skillful blending of radical phraseology and nationalistic sentiments.
Observing that there were "no enemies in the laboring classes," he
blamed the outbreak of war upon an alliance between Europe's privileged
groups and the governments that represented them.

"The war would not

have occurred," he continued, "if democracy, liberty, equality, and
fraternity" had been real forces in the community of nations.

None

theless, aggression must be opposed, and he expressed confidence that
the "great elemental force of Russian democracy would offer a
determined and successful resistance to the enemy. . . . "

Signifi

cantly, Kerensky refused to identify the government with the nation.
Defense of the country, he maintained, would win release from its
"terrible shackles."100

His attitude toward financing of the war

revealed a similar mixture of doctrine and patriotism.

He refused to

vote for war credits,1°1 stating that the working classes were forced
to bear the brunt of taxation.102

But he acted in the certain

99Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 211.
IOOg d , session 2, special meeting, July 26, 191^-, cols. 18-19.
lo:Lrsereteli, I, 217.
102g d , session 2, special meeting, July 26, 191^, cols. 18-19.
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knowledge that the requested credits would be approval and later
revealed that his position reflected the Trudovik attitude rather than
his own.l°3
Kerensky was soon disappointed in his hopes that the State Duma
would become an effective agent of democratic reform.

When the

government cited the exigencies of war in intensifying reactionary
policies, the parties to Kerensky’s right refrained from protest and
adhered to a policy of "sacred union" with the Crown. 1°** The passivity
of Duma liberals became unmistakable following the arrest of the
Bolshevik faction in the State Duma in November 191*4-.

Paul Miliukov,

the noted Cadet leader, and I. N. Efremov, an influential Progressist,
were willing to join Kerensky and Chkheidze in an informal inquiry in
Rodzianko's

o f f i c e . ^05

Nevertheless, Kerensky failed to provoke debate

on the issue in the next Duma session.

In direct response to

Kerensky's fervent declaration that he "could not stand by uncriti
cally, "106 Miliukov stated that the Cadets would not join struggles
against the government.1®?
Continued governmental incompetence forced the Duma liberals to
abandon their position of non-interference. Gradually accumulating

1Q3GD, session3, meeting 2,

January 28, 1915, col. 151.

lO^iliukov, Vospominaniia. II, 190; P. Vinogradov, The Russian
Problem (London, 191*0, p. 37~
105A. E. Badaev, Bol1sheviki v Gosudarstvennoi Dume (Leningrad,
1930), p. 349.
106g d , session3, meeting 1,

January 2?, 1915, cols. 44-45.

10?GD, session3, meeting 1,

January 27, 1915, col. 50.

y*
evidence of serious mismanagement in transport and munitions was
dramatically confirmed toy military disasters in Galicia in the spring
of 1915, 1<3® and the Cadets responded with demands for reform and
reorganization.109 Moderates and some conservatives followed the Cadet
lead; in August 1915 the Progressive Bloc, containing two-thirds of
the Duma membership, m s formed. 13-0 The Bloc's platform, which
included creation of a ministry enjoying public confidence, adminis
trative respect for legality, religious and political amnesty, freedom
for trade unions, and increased rights for national minorities,111
closely resembled proposals Kerensky had advanced at the outbreak of
the war.112
But Kerensky was no longer satisfied with reformist tactics.
The events that revived political criticism in others caused him to
resume a radical posture.

Of course, he welcomed the appearance of

the Progressive Bloc and promised cooperation, but he remained outside
it.113

An unexpected prorogation of the State Duma on September 3.

1915, provided an excellent opportunity for his return to pre-war
methods.

While indignation at the Ukase of Prorogation was general,

lOfiEvidence of A. I. Shingarev, Padenie, VII, 21-23; Evidence
of Miliukov, Padenie. VI, 309-310*
109N. Lapin, "Kadety v dni galitsiikogo razgroma," KA, LIX
(1933). 120-123.
H°N. Papin, "Progressivnyi blok v 1915-1917 gg.," KA, L (1932),

117.
UlMiliukov, Vospominaniia. II, 219-220.
112Kerensky, Russia, p. 129.
113Shidlovskii, II, 44.
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Bloc deputies agreed to moderate their expressions of resentment.
Kerensky, though, took part in a very disorderly Left demonstration.
He attempted to obtain a refusal of submission to the prorogation and,
in an access of zeal, even demanded that the Duma declare itself a
Constituent

Assembly.

As could be expected, his proposals generated

great excitement and it was some time before the proceedings could be
brought to a decorous

close.

Kerensky's return to the forefront of the Duma Left was brief,
for illness at the end of 1915 caused his temporary withdrawal from
active politics.

He had rarely been in vigorous health, but a serious

operation forced him into seven months of convalescence at the Grankula
Sanitorium near Helsingfors (Helsinki), Finland.H ?

His recovery

coincided with a major Muslim uprising in Turkestan, and his investi
gation of that occurrence delayed his return to St. Petersburg until
late September, 1916.-^®
Upon his arrival at the capital, Kerensky found a drastically
changed political atmosphere.

During his absence support of the

Imperial family and the government had seriously eroded, and various
proposals for a coup d'etat were beginning to circulate in the Duma

H^Evidence of Rodzianko, Padenie. VII, 153 •
115GD, session *«-, meeting 16, September 3, 1915, col. 1208;
M. N. Rodzianko, The Reign of Rasputin; an Empire's Collapse, trans.
Catherine Zvegintzov (London, 1927), p. 15A; Evidence of Rodzianko,
Padenie. VII, 153»
116g d , session A, meeting 16, September 3, 1915, col. 1208.
117Testimony of Fromkin, Kerensky Archives, folio 68.
118m . N. Pokrovskii, "Politicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune
fevral'skoi revoliutsii v zhandarmskom osveshchenii," KA, XVII
(1926), 29.

and the army commando ^ 9

While his radical reputation kept him at the

fringes of such conspiracies, h® m s occasionally approached for
expressions of general support.

10 f )

w

Kerensky was not opposed to a

palace coup, and made preparations to influence public opinion in that
event,121 but he had little faith in concrete results.122

He looked

beyond the privileged groups to the nation, preserving confidence in
"powerful forces that would not remain passive. I,123
The waning months of the Tsarist Empire were filled with his
attempts to awaken those "powerful forces."

He multiplied clandestine

contacts with workers groups and, through his wife's cousin, Sergei
Vasil'ev, gained influence with young officers in the St. Petersburg
garrison.121*- Kerensky supplemented these covert activities with major
anti-governmental assaults in the State Duma.

On November 1, 1916, he

expressed opposition to the inclusion of B. V. Sturmer and A. D.
Protopopov in a reconstructed ministry by instigating a Left protest
which prevented Council President V. F. Trepov1s reading of the cabinet
declaration. ^ 5

At the same session, he preceded Miliukov's famous

"treason or stupidity" speech with one even more violent, during which

119Evidence of Rodsianko, Padenie. VII, 152.
120Evidence of S. I. Beletskii, Padenie. IV, 490; Kerensky,
Russia, p. 147.
i21^, Kerenskii, "Korotkaia pamiat," Izdaleka, sbomik state!
(Paris, 1922), p. 165.
122p0krovskii, p. 3 0 .

IZJgd , session 5, meeting 20, February 15, 1917, col. 1359*
124Evidence of Beletskii, Padenie. V, 241.
125Evidence of Miliukov, Padenie. VI, 3^9»
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he labeled the new ministers "cowards" and "betrayers."12®

His

strenuous opposition, which included an investigation into Grigorii
Rasputin's

i n f l u e n c e , 127

alarmed the government.

By December,

Protopopov, the Minister of the Interior, had decided to "really get
Kerensky," and was prevented only by Nicholas II9s refusal to approve
an order of arrest.12®
Protopopov88 hostility was justified, for in mid-December
Kerensky openly began to advocate revolution.

On the thirteenth of

that month, in defiance of government wishes, he publicised suppressed
motions of the Moscow Congresses of the Zemstvo Union and the Union of
Towns which called for a change of cabinet and the formation of a
ministry responsible to the Duma.

While adding that adoption of these

motions would contribute to the "salvation of the country," he urged
a more drastic solution.129
three days later.

Kerensky returned to the same theme

Citing the example of an unwilling French revo

lutionary, Count Honors Mirabeau, he suggested that events were
forcing the Duma toward revolutionary activity.13®
The State Duma went into recess on December 17, 1916.

By the

time of its reconvention on February 14-, 1917, conditions seemed to
have reached their "last limits."131

Rasputin's assassination on

126q d , session 5, meeting 1, November 1, 1916, cols. 29-34.
127Evidence of Beletskii, Padenie. IV, 419.
128Evidence of

Beletskii, Padenie. V, 249.

129GD,

session 5, meeting 15, December 13, 1916, cols. 1095-98.

13QGD,

session 5, meeting 18, December 16, 1916, col. 1222.

131GD,

session 5, meeting 20, February

15, 1917, col. 1345.
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December 19 had only intensified governmental repression; labor groups
were disbanded and their members arrested,^32 and in an ominous move
the Petrograd Military District was separated from the Northern front
and its commander. General S. S, Khabalov, was granted extraordinary
authority.!33

Industrial strikes were increasing, and a serious food

shortage afflicted the army and major c i t i e s . T h e Duma itself was
acutely threatened, for Nicholas II, particularly antagonized by
Kerensky's December performances, was actively considering an order of
dissolution.135
These disturbing developments provoked Kerensky, on February 15,
into the most dramatic and violent speech of his political career.

In

an emotional appearance before the uneasy Dun©, deputies, he charged
that the futility of Rasputin's assassination had proven the "forces of
darkness" to be an illusion.

The blame for Russia's present

catastrophe did not lie with the government, for its membership came
and went "like shadows."

The true source of Russia's ills, the "root

of evil," was "personal rule."

The Duma, Kerensky continued, must

abolish the "medieval regime immediately, at all costs," or events
would pass into the hands of more "energetic forces."
he cried.

"Look upward,"

"See the lightning, here and there, beginning to lace the

skies of the Russian EmpireJ"136

In a passage prudently stricken from

132chemov, Rozhdenie, p. 17^.
133Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 285.
13^GD, session 5, meeting 20, February 15, 1917, cols. 13*0-^5.
135Evidence of Beletskii, Padenie. IV, ^91*
136g d , session 5, meeting 20, February 15, 1917, cols. 1353-59*
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the official records by Rodzianko, Kerensky concluded with a reference
to Brutus in a thinly-disguised plea for the Tsar's assassination.-*-37
Kerensky was unable to move the Duma into a revolutionary
position; as Shidlovskii, the Chairman of the Progressive Bloc, had
predicted, it preferred even a discredited monarchy to the dangers of
revolutionary upheaval. ^-38 on February 23, when riots were already
beginning in the capital, Kerensky declared himself at "the very limits
of patience."

The Duma, he stated angrily, was "exclusively

preoccupied with its own troubles" and was indifferent to the "tragedy
in the streets."^39
Ironically, Kerensky contributed to the Duma's preoccupation.
His February 15 address infuriated the Court and the cabinet, and an
attempt was made to obtain verbatim transcripts of his recent speeches.
The government was frustrated by the obduracy of Rodzianko, who
provided Prince N. D. Golitsyn, Trepov's successor, with altered copies
of the requested speeches. The bulky, irascible Duma President also
denied the occurrence of obvious changes and omissions and refused to
rescind Kerensky's parliamentary immunity.^0 The government, which
had intended banishment or trial for treason, contented itself with a
refusal to allow Kerensky's speeches in the newspapers.l^l
While Kerensky's dramatically defiant gestures exposed him to

13?Evidence of Prince N. D. Golitsyn, Padenie, II, 261.
138pokrovskii, p. 29.
139gd, session 5, meeting 23, February 23, 1917, cols. 1649-58.
l^Evidence of Prince Golitsyn, Padenie. II, 162.
l^lEvidence of V. A. Apushkii, Padenie. II, 220-221.
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obvious danger, they were undertaken with judicious calculation.

He

fully realized that the Duma could neither initiate nor survive
revolution, 14-2 but he also felt that outside forces could prod it
into constructive action.

To his mind, the Duma contained elements

indispensable to the composition of a future government; political
organization and administrative expertise were concentrated in it, and
at least the illusion of continuity and legitimacy— important to the
popular acknowledgement of authority— could be fostered through it.
Also, Kerensky believed that compromise and mutual adjustment, so
essential in an unsettled period, could be expected from parties in
the parliamentary tradition. *43

in a characteristically theatrical

manner, he attempted to rivet the nation's attention on the Duma and
to force recognition of its potential.

In that way, he hoped to

preserve its possibilities as the nucleus of a new order.
In important respects, Kerensky's revolutionary actions were
logical extensions of his Duma policies.

He consistently pursued

nationalistic and democratic aims and— while this was frequently
obscured during his ideological struggles with the autocracy— attempted
to achieve them through unification and conciliation. -*-44 Kerensky
always cherished the vision of an alliance of liberal and socialist
forces dedicated to the reconstruction of Russia, and he tried to
dissolve doctrinal barriers by stirring appeals to national interests.

142p0jCrovskii, p. 30.
143A. Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky's Own Story of the
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927;, pp. 3-4.
144y„ b . Stankevich, Vospominaniia, 1914-1919 (Berlin, 1920),
p. 19.
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His criticism, in May of 1915, of Miliukov's opposition to the
formation of special councils to facilitate military organization was
typical: he accused the Cidets of taking theoretical considerations
(in this case, cooperation with discredited ministers) as their
starting point, repudiating useful things not in accord with their
assumptions.1^5

His intolerance of doctrinal rigidity seemed greater

following the collapse ©f tsarism, but that was a response to
broadened opportunities rather than a change in methods or convictions.
Misconceptions regarding Kerensky's values and goals hindered
awareness of this basic continuity and encouraged misunderstandings.
Most of the revolutionary leadership had, since the turn of the
century, engaged in unceasing interparty struggles and had, in the
process, evolved rigid and mutually exclusive positions.

While willing

to take part in tactical accommodations, these party veterans extended
their conflicts into the revolutionary period in attempts to impose
their particular wills upon the new situation.

Since it was assumed

that Kerensky would do the same, his shift from mutinous obstructionism
to non-partisan compromise baffled and ultimately alienated potential
allies.

Miliukov sought an explanation in "self-glorifying

obtrusion,

Tsereteli suggested "giddiness with popularity, "-^7

and Chernov saw the sudden embracing of a "mission."1^8
These evaluations were inadequate.

■^^Rodzianko, Reign, pp. 134-135*
^^^Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 327.
l^Tsereteli, I, 121.
1^8Chemov, Pered burei. p. 338.

Tsarism had nourished and
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sharpened Kerensky's polemical intransigence; the collapse of Imperial
Russia ended it and stripped away the radical patina that had coated
his behavior.

A somewhat more accurate interpretation was advanced by

Nikolai N. Sukhanov, a close acquaintance and eventual Menshevik, who
felt that Kerensky was the "consummate middle-class radical. " ^ 9
Indirect support for Sukhanov's view came fro® Pitirim Sorokin, an
eminent sociologist and Kerensky's personal secretary in the Second
1
Coalition, who exclaimed in 1917: "Who are we, but Russian
Girondists.'"1^
Yet neither "Girondist" nor "middle-class radical" sufficiently
described Kerensky's political orientation.

As his Duma career

adequately demonstrated, he was a nationalist, a populist, and a demo
crat.

While those beliefs were not mutually exclusive, and while he

certainly tried to promote all of them, circumstances determined which
one predominated at any specific time.

Under the imperatives of the

First World War, Kerensky's nationalism became his salient character
istic and he tended to subordinate other concerns to the realization
of national goals.

In practice, the result was a provisional commit

ment to political moderation and class cooperation as the best means
of simultaneously protecting the country and the revolution.

To the

extent that his Duma theatrics obscured those attitudes, Kerensky
entered the Russian revolution under false pretenses.

^Sukhanov,

51-

^Op. Sorokin, Leaves from a Russian Diary (New York, 1924),
P. 93-

CHAPTER II

KERENSKY AND THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

When the Russian monarchy collapsed in February of 1917, the
forces that had undermined it survived in aggravated forms.

While

a violent revolution could normally be expected to eliminate those
issues that provoked its outbreak, the special circumstances of
Imperial defeat produced a different result.

Force had been present,

but it had been neither well-coordinated nor decisive; the Romanovs
had been dethroned only because vital segments of the state apparatus,
the military, and society refused to rally in support.

The February

Days represented little more than the sudden crumbling of a feeble
and despised regime in an outward direction from an unsupported
center.

Shorn of defenders, tsarism discredited only itself by its

fall; there were few victims and no claimants with a clear title to
power.

There was also no consensus regarding future policies.
The coincidence of war with revolution assured that the Tsar's

successors would inherit a welter of obstinate problems, and the
particularly inconclusive nature of the revolution, which left
competitive groups intact and motives clouded, increased the burden of
that legacy.

Simplification was impossible as long as politically

viable groups opposed each other on vital issues such as the recon
stitution of authority, war, or foreign policy.

It was obvious that

kh
Russia faced a difficult transitionary period, for revolutionary goals
awaited definition and the strength of hostile forces was still
untested.
The locus of that gathering conflict was the Tauride Palace,
whose wings housed the State Duma and its ©merging rival, the Petrograd
Soviet.

But there was great confusion within that new center of power,

for the revolution disconcerted its first inheritors and produced in
them an initial inability to master events.

Hesitation was most

apparent among moderates and liberals, who had anticipated an orderly
ascension to state power and observed outbreaks in the streets and
military barracks with dismay.

Unable to identify fully with rebellion

and fearing the consequences of either failure or success, the Duma
seemed incapable of independent action.^

Socialists, of course,

welcomed the revolution, but they were also hindered by various
considerations. They suffered from the absence of exiled party leaders
and, as doctrine forbade the immediate exercise of formal authority,
were uncertain of the precise attitude to assume toward the Duma.
Furthermore, their necessary alliance with privileged groups was
extremely fragile, and they feared the disruptive effects of provo
cative unilateral decisions.^

The composite result was a temporary

extension of the political vacuum created by the disappearance of the
state.

Sudden inheritance of responsibility under the pressure of an

external enemy, the latent threat of civil strife, and prevailing
•*M. V. Rodzianko, "Gosudarstvennaia dumi i fevral 'skaia
revoliutsiia 1917 goda," ARR, VI (1922), 57.
Sukhanov, Zapiski o revoliutsli, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1922-23),
I, 95-
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confusion combined to check the momentum of the revolution.
That condition of partial arrest m s perpetuated and eventually
institutionalized by a series of maneuvers and political coups executed
by Alexander Kerensky.

Possessed of a rare freedom of action derived

from popular acclaim and strongly held convictions, he manipulated the
Duma and the Petrograd Soviet, asserted control over centrifugal social
forces, and struck a political balance which inhibited conflict.

Yet

the resulting situation was artificial, for it required constant
adjustment and a dampening or deflection, rather than a resolution, of
antagonisms.

Kerensky's policies were often disingenuous and

ultimately unsuccessful, but as long as they endured, liberals and
socialists held to a relationship which possessed some resiliency and
allowed a measure of interim government.
While Kerensky was unable to foresee either the future
complications of the revolution or his prominent role within it, he
had expected the eventful developments that occurred in Petrograd
toward the end of February.

On the evening of February 22, he had been

informed of the impending strikes by a deputation of workers from the
Putilov Works which visited him at the editorial office of Sevemye
Zapiski (Northern Notes).

Addressing Kerensky as "citizen deputy,"

the Putilov delegates stressed the exclusively political nature of the
movement they were about to initiate.3 As discontent was endemic in
the Vyborg district, Kerensky knew that a new round of strikes would
not, in itself, be unusually significant.

But ebbing support in the

3V. Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," NZ, XXXIV (1953), 196-197.
Zenzinov, an influential Socialist Revolutionary, arranged the
interview between the Putilov delegation and Kerensky.
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army command, the Duma, court circles, and the Petrograd garrison had
so weakened the government that a recrudescence of internal pressure
clearly contained revolutionary potential.
A significant broadening of popular unrest required the con
currence of military units stationed in Petrograd, and Kerensky was
increasingly optimistic that their cooperation would be forthcoming.
While representatives from all the major parties had established links
with the garrison,^ none seemed to have enjoyed success comparable to
his in acquiring information or in maintaining an effective conspira
torial network.5

Through his contacts, which included popular officers

such as V. B. Stankevich, M. N. Petrov, and Sergei Vasil'ev, Kerensky
was able to minitor and to influence the political radicalization
occurring in the barracks.

The results were encouraging.

In his

opinion the garrison, no longer politically reliable, was likely to
sympathize with mass demonstrations and was capable of being directed
toward at least an abridgement of autocratic rule.

Accordingly, his

practical activities were aimed at ways to organize and to guide the
soldiery in the event of insurrection.6
While Kerensky retained confidence in the imminence of revo
lution, he seriously underestimated the importance of the February 23
movement. In part, he discounted it because intervention by the

^Sukhanov, I, 83*
^Evidence of S. P. Beletskii, Padenie tsarskogo rezhima; stenograficheskie otcheti, doprosov i pokazanii. dannikh v 1917 £• v
chrezvychainoi sledstvennoi komissii Vremennogo Pravitel'stva. ed.
P. E. Shchegoleva, 7 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1924-27), V, 241.
6v. B. Stankevich, Vospominaniia, 1914-1919 (Berlin, 1920),
pp. 64-65-
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Petrograd garrison appeared unnecessary.

The industrial strikes that

had been predicted materialised, hut their significance was obscured
by a nearly simultaneous demonstration over food shortages.?

As the

scarcity was more artificial than real (the result of a temporary
breakdown in transportation and distribution), a restoration of order
was expected through routine police and administrative procedures.®
Three days of uncontrolled riots, increasing fraternization between
soldiers and civilians, and an abortive mutiny by the Pavlovskii
regiment were required for Kerensky to recognize the gravity of the
situation.9

Even then, the full implications of the disorders escaped

him, for he considered only the possibility of limited concessions
from the monarchy in the shape of a reorganized ministry or, at most,
the transformation of the Duma into a true parliament.-*-®
There was a simple explanation for Kerensky’s passivity through
February 25; along with other Left politicians, he had been discouraged
by the anarchic temper of the crowds.

The demonstrations were

disorganized, lacked clear purpose, and resisted discipline.-*-*■ He
later admitted that the "moment of collision" had appeared sooner than
anticipated,I2 and others were more explicit.

Vladimir Zenzinov,

^Evidence of General S. S. Khabalov, Padenie, I, 183*
®Novoe Vremia. February 24, 1917, p. 5*
9b. G., ed., "Fevral1skie revoliutsii i okhrannoe otdelenie,"
Byloe, no. 1 (29), January, 1918, 168-170.
l®Sukhanov, I, 31 •
llEvidence of Khabalov, Padenie, I, 195*
12a . Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky's Own Story of the
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927), p. 105.
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a Socialist Revolutionary, observed that "an organized political force
did not exist in Petrograd at that time,"*3 and the radical journalist
Sukhanov, who remained in constant touch with major socialist organ
izations , felt "unable to influence events in any

w ay.

"24

In the

absence of leadership, little more could be expected than minor govern
mental concessions followed by a dissipation of revolutionary energy.
It was not until February 26 that Kerensky became convinced that
Petrograd was indeed on the verge of revolution.

He had spent a

frustrating morning in the Tauride Palace, vainly attempting to
persuade the Duma to abandon its loyalist stance,2-5 when Stankevich
arrived with an urgent message: the Preobrazhenskii regiment (which
had quelled the Pavlovskii mutiny of the previous day) was preparing
to revolt, and its officers appeared willing to accept the authority
of the State

Duma.

26

Such an occurrence would entirely transform the

situation, and Kerensky, at a gathering of Left representatives at
his apartment that evening, felt justified in asserting that the "wave
was rising" and that they should expect "decisive events."27
The meeting ended unsatisfactorily, for several of the partici
pants were convinced that Kerensky's optimism was unfounded.

There

were, in fact, valid grounds for pessimism since Petrograd had
temporarily reverted to governmental control.

February 26 had been a

23Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 208.
24sukhanov, I, 46.
15Evidence of D. N. Dubenskii, Padenie, VI, 394.
I6stankevich, p. 6527Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 210.

^9
Sunday, and the factories in the Vyborg district, the principal
industrial area, were closed and unavailable as gathering places for
demonstrations . Furthermore, Nicholas II had finally directed General
Khabalov to suppress disorder by all available m e a n s , a n d crowds
that did form were dispersed by gunfire from the Imperial Guards and
from special gendarme units armed with automatic weapons.^

Under

those conditions, it was not surprising that K. K. lurenev, a Bolshevik
sympathizer who claimed to be in close touch with worker sentiment,
called Kerensky's conclusions "exaggerations" and dismissed his desire
to force events as "hysterics."20
Kerensky was quickly vindicated.

On the following day,

February 27, the Petrograd garrison mutinied and joined the street
crowds. Begun by the training detachment of the Volinskii regiment,
which was immediately joined by the Preobrazhenskii, Litovskii and
Moscow regiments, the rebellion either encompassed or immobilized
almost every military unit stationed in the capital.21

By the early

afternoon arsenals, prisons, and the Fortress of Peter and Paul were
in the hands of the insurgents, and loyalist forces were confined to
the vicinity of the Winter Palace and the Admiralty building.^2

a

revolutionary situation now prevailed and it required only a directing
center to become self-sustaining.
^Evidence of Khabalov, Padenie, I, 190.
19Evidence of Rodzianko, Padenie, VII, 159*
20zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 210.
21v. Victoroff-Toporoff, ed., La premiere annee de la
revolution russe (Berne, 1919), p* 33*
22Evidence of Khabalov, Padenie, I, 203.
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Kerensky was determined that the State Duma exercise such a
function, and he was singularly qualified to accomplish that task.
Possessed of an impeccable radical reputation and great popularity,
Kerensky was the most influential political figure in the capital.^3
The revolution had provided him with an intense sense of release and
a concommitant ability to act;2** within the emotional context of the
February Days, that combination of passionate enthusiasm and personal
fame was overwhelmingly effective.

By articulating, and thereby

representing, a particularly nationalistic and idealistic interpre
tation of the revolution, he was able to mold the still inchoate
aspirations of the population and to transmit to them "tremendous
shocks of moral electricity."25

Kerensky directed these considerable

talents toward the Duma in order to adapt it to the needs of revolution
and to force its assumption of state responsibility.
The Duma complied reluctantly and only under constraint.

When

Kerensky arrived at the Tauride Palace on the morning of February 27,
he found the deputies prepared to obey a governmental ukase of
prorogation,26 and despite support from N. V. Nekrasov, I. N. Efremov,
and Chkheidze, his arguments against submission were unavailing.2?
Kerensky bitterly resented the Duma’s acquiescence to prorogation,

23v. Chernov, Pered Burei, vospominaniia (New York, 1953).
P» 330.
2^1. G. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia o Fevral'skoi revoliutsii,
2 vols. (Paris, 1963 ), I, 121.
25v. Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii; fevral'skoi
revoliutsiia (New York, 193*0, p. 333*
26Evidence of Rodzianko, Padenie, VII, 160.
27Evidence of Dubenskii, Padenie, VI, 39^-
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considering its decision "tantamount to . . . political suicide at
the very moment when its authority was at its height."28
Yet a passive stance m s understandable, for to the majority of
the Duma deputies there were no satisfactory alternatives.

Active

support of the government was impossible on ideological and practical
grounds, while adherence to the revolution raised great dangers.

The

deputies hesitated to support a movement over which they had no
control and which, if defeated, would embrace them in its ruin.

Under

the circumstances, delay "until the character of the disturbances
became clarified" was an attractive option.29

Admittedly, the Duma's

submission was not unqualified; Rodzianko protested the prorogation
vigorously to Nicholas II by telegram,30 and the Council of Elders
(composed of the various Duma party leaders) agreed to call an
informal, unofficial session in an adjoining hall.31

Still, those

tactics were unsatisfactory; if they guaranteed the continued existence
of the Duma as a functional political body, the fact remained that it
was reduced in status to a gathering of private citizens.
deputies were not allowed to temporize.

But the

During the course of the day

several developments, most of which Kerensky contrived, set them upon
an irreversibly revolutionary course.

28a . Kerensky, Russia and History8c Turning Point (New York,
1965), p. 196.

29p. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, 1859-1917. 2 vols. (New York,
1955), II, 292 .
3(>Evidence of Dubenskii, Padenie. VI, UOk;"Fevral'skaia
revoliutsiia 1917 goda," KA, XXI (1927), 6.
31s. I. Shidlovskii, Vospominaniia, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1923), II,
52.
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The first of those events was the appearance before the Tauride
Palace, at about 2:00 p.m., of large detachments of soldiers from the
Preobrazhenskii regiment.

Kerensky had attempted to move troops in the

direction of the Duma since the early morning,32 and upon their tardy
arrival he charged them with its defense.33

The presence of mutinous

troops on the grounds of the Tauride Palace did not immediately have
a decisive effect, for the Council of Elders continued to resist
demands of solidarity with the revolution.

Indeed, Kerensky1s

arbitrary decision to summon the garrison provoked substantial alarm
and resentment; N. V. Savieh, an Octobrist, responded typically in
protesting that a wmob cannot hand us authority,”3^ and Vasilii
Shul'gin, a Progressive Nationalist, expressed an earnest wish to
address the intruders with the "flaming tongues of machine guns.
Nevertheless, the now compromised deputies were imbued with an
increased sense of urgency.

Rodzianko regretfully abandoned his ex

clusively loyal position and agreed to the creation of a special
committee which, if required, could assume governmental power.36
That need soon arose, for Kerensky so entangled the Duma with
the revolution that participation in it proved unavoidable.

A striking

example was the seizure and confinement in the Ministerial Pavilion of
32y. Zenzinov, Iz zhizni revoliutsionera (Paris, 1919), p. 8?;
Kerensky, Catastrophe, pp. 1-2.
33V. Shul'gin, Dni (Belgrade, 1925), p. 162.
31*Minutes of an unofficial meeting of the Duma, R. Browder and
A. Kerensky, eds., The Russian Provisional Government. 1917; Documents,
3 vols. (Stanford, 1961 ), 1, 46.
35Shul'gin, p. 163.
36Evidence of Miliukov, Padenie. VI, 352.
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cabinet members and lesser functionaries of the tsarist regime.
Kerensky organized the search for governmental officials,37 and when
they were located he personally arrested them in the name of the State
Duma "until the creation of the Duma's Provisional Committee."38

in

doing so, he went against the expressed desires of many deputies; when
I. G. Shcheglovitov, the President of the State Council, was brought
in, Kerensky overrode attempts to treat him as a guest and insisted,
against scandalized opposition, upon placing him under guard.39 a
similar procedure was followed with A. D. Protopopov and V. A. Sukhomlinov, and Kerensky expanded his activities by confiscating funds and
state documents.^9

Resentment among deputies continued to smolder:

when the bewildered, hastily dressed ex-minister V. N. Kokovtsov
appeared at the Duma in the custody of enthusiastic students, he was
told to "leave all this nonsense alone and go home before Kerensky sees
y o u . B u t as the evening progressed, it became generally accepted
that tsarist officials should be placed in Kerensky's keeping.^2
The de facto Minister of Justice acted primarily from expediency,
for he later observed that the release of those arrested would have
"given rise to a profound distrust of the Duma among the masses" and

37Evidence of M. A . Beliaev, Padenie, II, 226.
3%iliukov, Vospominaniia. II, 296.
39Rodzianko, "Gosudarstvennaia duma," p. 66.
^^Evidence of Protopopov, Padenie. IV, 55*
**iV. N. Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo; vospominaniia. 1903-1919
£g., 2 vols. (Paris, 1933TT If P r t ® : ------------------------------------------^Evidence

Beliaev, Padenie, II, 226.

therefore would have been "sheer madness."1^
approval, but for quite different reasons.

His measures won eventual
Kerensky's fervent

declaration that the "State Duma does not shed blood" caught the
popular imagination,1*1*’ and it became widely felt that he had averted a
serious outburst of excesses.

David Francis, the American ambassador,

was impressed by the relative lack of bloodshed during the February
Days and declared: "Too much credit cannot be given Kerensky for his
conduct" in the containment of v i o l e n c e . V a s i l i i Shul'gin, a fiery
conservative who had always felt a strong antipathy for Kerensky,
exclaimed that "He was magnificent,

and Nikolai Makeev, a Socialist

Revolutionary active in Zemstvo affairs, overheard assertions in Moscow
that Kerensky's name would be "written in letters of gold on the
tablets of history" for his rejection of vindictiveness
Kerensky also succeeded because of confusion and demoralization
among his Duma associates.

Most conservatives had absented themselves

when the disorders began, and those that remained felt unable to
oppose him.

"We were powerless," Shul'gin recalled.

"What did we

understand?Stankevich, who was struck by the bafflement of Duma
members as they tried to cope with the flood of workers and soldiers
in the Tauride Palace, concluded that while the deputies "created the
^Kerensky. Catastrophe. p. 17.
^Shul'gin, p. 171.
1*5d . Francis, Russia from the American Embassy: April, 1916November. 1918 (New York, 1921), p. 86.
^Shul'gin, p. 171.
^7N. Makeev and V. O'Hara, Russia (New York, 192$), p. 18*4-.
^SShul'gin, p. 168.
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atmosphere that called forth the explosion, they were completely
unprepared for such an explosion."^9

Assured the obedience of the

"pure public" and thus unaffected by the general paralysis within the
Duma, Kerensky automatically acquired a dominant position within it.^O
Accordingly, his ardently revolutionary speeches to the crowds before
the Tauride Palace,51 his seizure of foreign office materials,52 and
his independent decision to send revolutionary detachments against
Okhrana offices53 provoked only helpless expressions of frustration
and dismay.

The anomalous character of the Duma had often been recog

nized, but its feebleness had never been so manifest as when Kerensky
forcibly associated it with the dissolution of the old order.
While Kerensky had included the Duma in the revolution, he had
failed to move it into a position of active leadership.

That was

finally accomplished on the evening of February 2? by the creation of
the Petrograd Soviet by revolutionary workers and soldiers.

The

implications were clear to every deputy: power had to be seized before
it was usurped by "some scoundrels in the factories."^

The Council

of Elders reacted to the threat by activating the previously proposed
Provisional Committee of the Duma, and with the exceptions of Kerensky
and Chkheidze selected its membership from the parties of the

^stankevich, p. 71.
50shul'gin, p. 169.
51Shidlovskii, II, 55*
52Evidence of Protopopov, Padenie. IV, 55•
53Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 220.
5^Shul'gin, p. 179*

Progressive Bloc.55

Ostensibly, the powers of the Provisional

Committee were limited to the restoration of order and the promotion
of contacts with various public groups.56

gut that was only a cautious

formula, designed to protect the Duma from retribution in the event of
successful counterrevolution and to afford a degree of flexibility if
the revolution prevailed.

The real aims of the committee, as its

members fully realized, were the assumption of state power and the
corresponding diminution of Soviet authority.57
Despite the conviction that the Soviet's ascendency had to be
forestalled, the Provisional Committee could not issue a direct
challenge to that rival institution.

As Kerensky observed, because

the Soviet represented the first "primitive social and political molds
into which the molten revolutionary lava began to flow and cool off,"
opposition to it would have been opposition to the revolution itself.
He could also have added that such a course would have been suicidal.
Although its elections had been irregular, the Soviet was far more
representative of the population than was the Fourth Duma, and its
standing among the workers and soldiers in Petrograd was unassailable.
55l . Gaponenko, et al., eds., Velikaia oktiabr1skaia sotsialisticheskaja revoliutsiia; khronika sobytii, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1957), I, 9»
The composition of the Provisional Committee was as follows: M. V.
Rodzianko, A. F. Kerensky, N. S. Chkheidze; V. V. Shul'gin; P. N.
Miliukov; M. A. Karaulov; A. I. Konovalov; I. I. Dmitriukov; V. N.
Rzhenskii; S. I. Shidlovskii; N. V. Nekrasov; V. N. L'vov; Colonel B.
Engel'hardt.
56sbomik ukazov i postanovlenii Vremennago Pravitel'stva,
2 vols. (Petrograd, 1917), I,
57Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 293; A. V. Peshekhonov, Pervyia
nedeli; iz vospominanii o revoliutsii (Riga, n.d.), p. 263.
58Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 111.
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The conclusion was inescapable; in order to consolidate power, the
Provisional Committee had to reach a suitable accommodation with its
rival.59
A temporary adjustment of relations was possible, for the Petro
grad Soviet's hostility to the middle classes was tempered by the
imperatives of socialist theory.

The classic Marxist attitude, which

considered tsarist Russia an essentially feudal state and insisted
that a socialist government could only replace a future bourgeois
regime, turned the Soviet's leadership against an outright assumption
of state responsibility.
influence.

Tactical considerations also exerted an

The Soviet was convinced that it did not command sufficient

strength tc maintain a purely socialistic government and feared that
such an effort would drive the liberals into an alliance with tsarism.
But if the liberal parties assumed formal power, a wedge would be
driven between tsarism and its former allies and revolutionary gains
would be p r e s e r v e d . T h e r e were other grounds for the Soviet's
evasion of direct governmental responsibility: only the middle classes
possessed the administrative expertise necessary to a well-ordered
state; as a result of persecution, the socialist mentality was negative
toward authority; and the spectre of directing a war government was an
ideological nightmare.
The acknowledgement of such contradictory needs could produce
the Soviet's sanction of a government drawn from the Progressive Bloc

59Evidence of Rodzianko, Padenie, VII, 159*
60v. I. Lenin, Sochineniia, 42 vols. (Moscow, 1949), XXIII,
305-307.
61l . Trotsky, The Russian Revolution (New York, 1959), p. 165*
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of the Duma, but it could not guarantee stability.

While the Soviet

demanded a condition of "dual power," in which it could yield formal
authority and still retain the ability to block actions detrimental to
its interests,82 the Duma leadership was determined eventually to
solidify its position at the expense of its rival.83

Both sides, then,

considered the existing class truce to be partial and temporary.

The

socialist leadership tolerated liberalism as a historically .necessary,
but transitory, political force to be exploited, and the Duma sought
socialist cooperation only in order to "sheathe the Soviet knife."8^
If the events surrounding the October insurrection provide a reliable
guide, the rigidity built into such an arrangement would surely have
produced a rapid deepening of antagonisms and the eruption of civil
war.
Kerensky was determined to prevent that result, and his per
sistent attempts to eliminate dual power spanned the length of the
February revolution.

He proceeded from the assumption that the revo

lution could be consolidated through a union of liberal and socialist
forces, without class warfare, and by the utilization of parliamentary
mechanisms.

The State Duma, the primary source of leadership, would

remain sensitive to national interests, and the Soviet would provide
the medium through which popular support of the government could be
organized and expressed.

There were indispensable conditions to such

an arrangement: the opposing centers of power had to face each other

8%inutes of the March 2 session of the Petrograd Soviet,
Izvestiia, March J, 1917, p. 4.
83Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 321.
8i4'Evidence of Rodzianko, Padenie, VII, 159*
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from positions of equality, and the resulting government required a
grip upon the Left in the form of socialist ministers.65

Under the

circumstances, those ends could only be realized at the expense of the
Soviet.

Kerensky's methods were Machiavellian; as he had enmeshed a

recalcitrant Duma in the revolution, he began to enmesh the Soviet,
to its detriment, in a partnership with the Duma.

Within a remarkably

short interval, he twisted the relationships between the liberal and
revolutionary forces into a tangled knot of interdependence.66
Kerensky's purposeful manipulations were evident in two minor,
but suggestive, developments on February 27.

The first of these was

his success in physically associating the Soviet with the State Duma.
Acting from a characteristic appreciation of symbolic effect,67 he
arranged premises for the TsIK (Petrograd Soviet Central Executive
Committee) in the Duma Budget Committee

r o o m . 68

The Tauride Palace

might still be divided into "right" and "left" wings, but proximity
implied unity.

It is significant that the later Provisional Govern

ment moved to the Marinskii, and then Winter, palaces only after
achieving a degree of independence from the "democracy." A second
revealing incident was Kerensky's fusion, under Duma leadership, of

65a . Kerenskii, "Politika Vremennogo Pravitel'stva," SZ, L
(1932), 419.
66chernov, Rozhdenie, p. 254.
6?V. A. Maklakov, The First State Duma; Contemporary
Reminiscenses, trans. Mary Belkin (Bloomington, 1964), p. 174; see
Kerensky's discussion of the value of symbols in: A. F. Kerenskii,
"Patrioty svoego Korolia," Izdaleka, sbomik statei (Paris, 1922),
p. 103 .
68a . Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, trans. G. Kerensky
(New York, 1934), p. 244.
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the committee charged with the revolutionary defense of Petrograd.
Among the first acts of the TsIK had been the hurried formation of a
rudimentary military staff to organize the Petrograd garrison,^9 and
the thoroughly alarmed Provisional Committee quickly followed suit.70
Relying upon his personal influence, Kerensky managed to unite the
two bodies into a new Military Commission of the State Duma, to win
a place for himself within it, and successfully to promote the
appointment of Colonel Boris A. Engel'hardt, a Duma deputy, as its
c h a i r m a n . W h i l e the Soviet brought superior resources into the
union, Colonel Engel'hardt was able to subordinate the commission
the Provisional Committee.

to

By March 1 the imbalance was so evident

that the outmaneuvered Soviet, citing the "menacing" attitude of the
Military Commission, urged an expansion of its membership to include
representatives from the lower military

r a n k s . 72

Although the

emergence of the Provisional Government on March 2 made the commission
obsolete, it had, during a critical transition period, contributed to
the authority and security of the liberal forces.
As the essentially anti-Soviet nature of Kerensky's measures
escaped general notice in the turmoil of the revolution, he was able
on February 28 to continue his political ascendancy with a timely
change of membership from the minuscule Trudovik Party to the more
69»pevral'skaia revoliutsii v Petrograde," KA, XLI (1930).
6370Rodzianko, "Gosudarstvennaia duma," p. 64.
71Sukhanov, I, 88.
72Minutes of the March 1 session of the Petrograd Soviet, cited
in Izvestiia, March 2, 1917, p. 1.

powerful SR Party.73

His action, aimed at acquiring increased leverage

with revolutionary groups, resulted in his immediate election to the
vice-chairmanship of the
truly enviable position.

TsIK.74

By February 28 Kerensky occupied a

As a member of the Soviet Presidium, the

Provisional Committee of the State Duma, and the Duma Military Commis
sion, and with the streets reverberating with demands for his appear
ance, he was the most influential political figure in the revolution.
Kerensky was aware of his unique status.

"Everyone," he recalled,

"seemed to treat me in a manner subtly changed, different, as though
some special power were in my hands, some peculiar influence with the
stormy masses."75
But regardless of his standing, and despite his assiduous
efforts, Kerensky failed to reverse an increasing trend toward the
formalization of dual power.

Party doctrine could not be overcome,

for by February 28 the TsIK had firmly decided to oppose direct
socialist participation in the projected Provisional Government.
the situation was not entirely hopeless.

Yet

Considerable wavering had

occurred during the course of the floor debates, and some delegates
had even tried to justify their attitudes by referring to the sudden
appearance of an unwritten constitution in which the liberal parties
provided a ministry responsible to the Soviet "legislature."76 While
such arguments were too specious to merit consideration, they did

73Mark Vishniak, Dan proshlomu (New York, 1955). P* 284.
74oaponenko, I, 8.
75Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 259*
76s. P. Mel'gunov, Martovskie dni 1917 goda (Paris, 1961),
p. 401.
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indicate a certain confusion and elasticity in outlook of which some
advantage could be taken.
Kerensky initially responded to the Soviet's decision with a
renewed attempt to buttress the position of the political Right.
Accordingly, he encouraged Rodzianko's February 28 proposal of an
extraordinary convocation of all previous Dumas— since the first two
had been selected by general franchise, he thought the resulting
popular support might limit the Soviet's interference with an official
government.77

But the Cadets spumed that approach, maintaining that

the assembling of bodies with no present claim to power was a legal
istic absurdity.78 Miliukov's party evidently refused to accept the
implications of the revolution and persisted in acting as if parlia
mentary modes and traditional state forms still retained validity.
Justifiably dismayed by the "academic" attitudes of these "bookish
men,"79 Kerensky became convinced that only unilateral action could
break the impasse between the Duma and the Soviet.
The solution was obvious; Kerensky would have to defy the TsIK's
injunction against socialist participation in the new government.

He

was in a position to do so, for along with Chkheidze he was assured
the offer of a portfolio in the projected cabinet.80

He could accept

that post and as a member of the Soviet Presidium demand a hearing
before a plenary meeting, where opinion was more malleable and ideology

77sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy; a Study
of the Evidence (New York, 1939) > P» 448.
78^iliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 303.
79Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 249.
80shul'gin, p. 168.
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more diluted than in the TsIK.

The matter carried considerable

personal risk, and Kerensky proceeded cautiously.

On March 1 he

avoided attending the desultory Soviet debates concerning coalition,
for their outcome had already been determined and he would only have
compromised himself by participating in them.81

Instead, he questioned

several close friends about the advisability of entering the projected
regime as a self-proclaimed representative of the socialistic parties.
To his dismay, the responses were not wholly encouraging— Zenzinov was
in favor, but Sukhanov and Stankevich expressed grave reservations
about the wisdom and effectiveness of such a course.82

Kerensky was

obviously vexed by the decision he was weighing; that night, at a
conference between the delegates of the TsIK and the Provisional
Committee called to determine the platform of the future government,
he remained "sunk in sullen meditation" and refused to enter the
discussions.83
As Kerensky anticipated, the position of Minister of Justice was
offered to him on the morning of March 2.

He accepted that afternoon

and proceeded to a plenary session of the Soviet, determined to win
its approval and to retain his vice-chairmanship within it.

In a

8!chemov, Rozhdenie, p. 251.
82zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 228; Stankevich, p. 70; N. N.
Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917; Eyewitness Account, ed and
trans. Joel Carmichael, 2 vols. (New York, 1962), I, 101.
83Sukhanov, Revolution, I, 118. Among the points agreed to were:
the convocation of a Constituent Assembly which would determine the
final form of government; freedom of speech, press, and assembly;
abolition of all class, nationality, and religious restrictions;
amnesty for political or religious crimes; the organization of the
army on the basis of self-government; and the retention in Petrograd
of those military units that took part in the revolution.
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brilliant and emotional speech, during which he declared himself the
"spokesman of the democracy" to which other ministers had to be
"particularly considerate," Kerensky gained the enthusiastic support
of the majority of the delegates.

The Soviet's confirmation had

taken the form of an extended ovation and had not been reaffirmed by
an official vote.

But Kerensky's victory had been incontestable, and

the TsIK accepted his action as a fait accompli even though its
posture toward the new government had been seriously c o m p r o m i s e d . A
Socialist Revolutionary party conference that followed the Soviet
plenary session offered the new Minister of Justice the public endorse
ment that the TsIK withheld.

Describing him as the "defender of the

people's interests and freedom," it welcomed his entrance into the
Q/r

government and "approved everything" that he had done.00
Although he emerged with a personal triumph, Kerensky's defiance
of the TsIK had really been a desperate attempt at salvaging the
remnants of his non-partisan (nadpartiinost') program.87

He had failed

to establish institutional barriers against dual power, and as an
alternative accepted the difficult position of mediator between the
Soviet and the central power.

Nevertheless, much had been rescued.

He was the conscience of the Provisional Government, the recognized
"eye of the democracy" that would guarantee the preservation of the
revolution until its final consolidation by the Constituent Assembly.

8^-Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 230.
S^Chernov, Rozhdenie, p. 252.
86lzvestiia, March 4, 1917, p. 1.
87stankevich, p. 70.

65
As a bridge between the Right and the Left, he might yet lure liberals
and socialists into political amalgamation or at least mitigate the
worst effects of friction between them.
While Kerensky derived satisfaction from solidifying his "above
party" role,®® he regarded his standing within the new government with
even more assurance.

He was confident of possessing a strong, perhaps

decisive, voice in the cabinet; N. V. Nekrasov and M. 1. Tereshchenko,
the ministers of Transportation and Finance, were reliable political
friends,®9 and both A. I. Konovalov, the Minister of Trade and
Industry, and Prince G. E. L'vov, the Minister-President and Minister
of the Interior, were non-partisan in orientation and pronouncedly
sympathetic to his views.90 Also, there was reason to believe that
his influence within the government would increase with the passage of
time.

As the emissary of the democracy, his authority extended far

beyond the limits of the Ministry of Justice, and he could anticipate
even greater prominence if future events demonstrated the correctness
of his nadpartiinost' line.
Unfortunately, the very strength of Kerensky's position blinded
him to its weaknesses and enticed him into ultimately fatal policies.
Ephemeral popularity was no substitute for a reliable political
apparatus, and he could not expect continuously to duplicate his

®®Chemov, Pered burei, p. 338.
®9p. N. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii. 1 vol in
3 parts (Sofia, 1921-23), part 1, p. 46.
90j(erensky, Crucifixion, p. 267; T. I. Polner, Prince L'vov's
biographer, recalled that on most issues the Minister-President was
"definitely disposed to Kerensky's point of view." See T. I. Polner,
Zhiznennyi put' Kniazia Georgia Evgenievicha L 'vova (Paris, 1932),
p. 251.
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victory of March 2.

But Kerensky was not fully aware of the limits of

a purely personal authority or the extent to which he was exposed to
adversity.

In retrospect, there is an ironic ring to his insistence

at a March 7 meeting of the Moscow Soviet that it should undertake
nothing without his advice.93While Kerensky overestimated his control over the soviets, he
also overestimated the degree to which his inclusion in the Provisional
Government increased its effectiveness.

The population, predominantly

agrarian and thoroughly war-weary, was unlikely to sympathize long with
the strident patriotism and privileged orientation of a cabinet drawn
mainly from the Progressive Bloc of the State Duma.

An indicated

compliance by the government with Kerensky’s will did not alter its
unrepresentative composition and corresponding debility or blur the
distinctions between liberalism and socialism.

Yet, in part because

he was included within it, Kerensky assumed that the government
possessed a plenitude of power and could cope simultaneously with
reform and the waging of war.92

xn fact, the Provisional Government

possessed only limited authority and would find even the restoration
of public order and preparations for the convocation of the Constituent
Assembly considerable strains upon its resources.93

The advantages

that the government did possess— a half-articulated desire for harmony
in time of crisis, the support of the army command and the middle

9lRusskoe Slovo, March 8, 1917, p. 3*
92shidlovskii, II, 65.
93p. N. Miliukov, "The Third Anniversary of Soviet Rule, " The
New Russia; a Weekly Review of Russian Politics. Ill (November 11,
1920), 328.
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classes, and a lingering toleration of rule by decree— could easily be
swept away by a general reaction to the overambitious exercise of
power. 94
Yet the precariousness of the new government's position was not
immediately apparent, and there were rational grounds for tempered
optimism.

The Soviet's intransigence was dampened by Kerensky's

presence within the cabinet, the negotiations between the Provisional
Committee of the Duma and the TsIK had indicated that some common aims
existed, and mob action in Petrograd appeared to be abating.

Further

more, it was expected that the irreconcilable differences that might
arrise could be postponed for action by the future Constituent
Assembly, which would theoretically be capable of combining forceful
action with democratic methods. These hopes eventually proved
illusory.

Nevertheless, the new cabinet looked forward to internal

stabilization and, with a truly blind belief that the revolution was
an act of nationalistic revulsion against tsarist military ineptitude,
to a continuance on an effective basis of Russia's participation in
the war.
Those assumptions were shaken by a crisis concerning the
liquidation of the monarchy.

Were the matter entirely in the hands of

the Duma and the Soviet, the tenuous unity which characterized their
relations would have been shattered and the government would have
fallen.

But the course of events was also influenced by the army

command, the British government, Kerensky, and the Imperial family.

9^. A. Maklakov, Iz vospominanii (New York, 1955), p. 377.
95shidlovskii, II, 65; A. Kerenskii, "Korotkaia pamiat,"
Izdaleka. p. 164.
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Under the impact of these various forces, a partial solution was found
which allowed a continuation of the newly formed order.
The problem of the monarchy was considerably eased by the fact
that the Tsar, after perfunctory resistance, decided against contesting
the revolution.

The attitude of the army leaders was decisive; deeply

disenchanted with the previous conduct of the war, they deserted
Nicholas II in the expectation that a new regime would revive the
faltering war effort.96

Even before the March 2 arrival at Pskov of

Alexander Guchkov and Vasilii Shul'gin, who had been sent by the Pro
visional Committee in order to obtain an abdication in favor of the
Tsarevich Alexis, Nicholas II had recognized his isolation and
capitulated.9?

But the two Duma deputies were startled by the form

which Nicholas' acquiescence assumed.

The Tsar, declaring that he

could not bear to be parted from his hemophilic son, brushed aside
Guchkov's proposals of a regency and abdicated in favor of his brother,
the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich.98 While Nicholas' decision was
an unexpected violation of the Imperial laws of succession, 99 it was
fully acceptable.

Guchkov's object was the preservation of the

monarchy, and as Michael was popular with the army command and the
middle classes, the question was opened in a favorable

w
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96For examples of the military pressure on the Tsar, see
"Dokumenty k 1vospominaniiam1 Gen. A. Lukomskago," ARR. Ill (1922),
251, 263.
97n. M. Tikhmenev, Iz vospominanii iposlednikh dniakh prelyvaniia
imperatora Nikolaia II v stavke (Nice, 1925)', p. 18.
98Evidence of A. I. Guchkov, Padenie, VI, 265.
99Evidence of Dubenskii, Padenie, VI, 407.
lOOEvidence Qf Guchkov, Padenie, VI, 267*
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Although he was a member of the Provisional Committee, Kerensky
had not been informed of the Guchkov-Shul'gin m i s s i o n . T h e pro
monarchist deputies® distrust of Kerensky did appear to be justified;
his republicanism was well known, and since February 2? he had
repeatedly warned the Duma that a reincarnated tsarism would never be
accepted, regardless of its guise.

But Nicholas® abdication under the

auspices of the Provisional Committee would necessarily increase the
prestige of liberal elements within the revolution, and for that reason
alone Kerensky would have supported Guchkov's effort.

Although it was

not generally known, he had opposed the Soviet's interference with a
similar attempt on March 1; when the TsIK had prevented Rodzianko from
reaching the Tsar by withholding transportation, Kerensky staked his
reputation upon his ability to block an accommodation with tsarism.
He strenuously insisted that he was sufficient guarantee against a pact
with Nicholas, that the Provisional Committee be allowed to act freely,
and that lack of confidence in his colleagues reflected adversely upon
his personal integrity.102

The TsIK grudgingly gave way.

While it was

fearful of granting so much authority to Kerensky, it was reluctant to
antagonize such a popular and tempestuous personage.103
The TsIK soon felt regret over the carte blanche it had been
browbeaten into granting.

After Miliukov's public advocacy of a

constitutional monarchy on the morning of March 3. Kerensky was
subjected to a hostile cross-examination by an aggrieved Petrograd

lOlShul'gin, p. 238.
102sukhanov, Revolution , I, 112.
103Chernov, Rozhdenie, p. 192.

Soviet.

Forced into a defensive position, Kerensky asserted his

innocence; he had not been consulted, the plan to establish a consti
tutional monarchy would fail regardless of Miliukov's efforts, and he
would resign from the government if that proved necessary. IQ** In fact,
the Soviet's suspicions regarding Kerensky were unwarranted, for he
had been aware of Miliukov and Guchkov!s intentions and had feverishly
countered them.

His tactics consisted of "pathos and t h r e a t s , a n d

Rodzianko later conceded their effectiveness; because of Kerensky1s
arguments, "it was quite obvious that the Grand Duke would have reigned
only a few hours and that terrible bloodshed, marking the beginning of
a general civil war, would have immediately started. . .

By the

morning of March 3 Kerensky had garnered enough support in the cabinet
and the Provisional Committee to request resolution of the issue
through a conference with the Grand Duke.^®?

Only Miliukov and Guchkov

remained in opposition, and a draft of Michael's abdication had even
been drawn up.-^0^
But none of these measures guaranteed the Grand Duke's
capitulation, and Kerensky entered the conference in an apparent state
of nervousness.

His behavior there left a painful impression.

Completely determined to force the Grand Duke's abdication, he was
frequently rude and threatening.

He warned Michael that an acceptance

lO^Kerensky, Russia, pp. 208-209.
105Sukhanov, Zapiski, II, 42.
lO^Rodzianko, "Gosudarstvennaia duma," p. 61.
10?Evidence of Guchkov, Padenie, VI, 273; Kerensky, Russia,
p. 215.
lOfyliliukov, Istoriia, part 1, p. 53*
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of the crown would be physically d a n g e r o u s , attempted to prevent
the full elaboration of Miliukov’s counter arguments that stability
required a visible head of s t a t e , a n d accused Guchkov, who arrived
late and tried to second Miliukov's efforts, of willful and malicious
disruption.m

In a final maneuver that offended his colleagues but

apparently amused the Grand Duke, Kerensky guarded the telephone after
the conclusion of formal discussions, hoping in that way to exclude
outside consultation on the q ue s ti on .Fortunately, Michael
succumbed to the campaign Kerensky had mounted and agreed to resign
his position.

The problem of the monarchy was resolved, the newly

formed Provisional Government began its legal existence, and Kerensky's
debt to the Soviet was discharged.

While ungraceful in execution, his

new victory was as significant as the one of the previous day.
The question of Romanov power was settled, but the problem of
the Romanov family remained.

Kerensky had not exaggerated greatly in

describing popular hostility to Nicholas, and the TsIK had responded
to it on March 3 by calling for the arrest of the Imperial family.-^3
But since the entire cabinet was opposed to such an action and the
TsIK, uncertain of success, had expressed itself with unusual

109n . A. Basily, Nicolas de Basily. Diplomat of Imperial Russia,
1903-1917. Memoirs (Stanford, 1973), p. 143.
llO^iiiukov, Vospoicdnaniia„ II, 316.
HlEvidence of Guchkov, Padenie, VI, 274. The exchange between
Guchkov and Kerensky was apparently very sharp. At any rate, when
Guchkov recalled the incident some months later, his resentment was
still very evident.
H2gasily, p. 144.
H3lzvestiia, March 4, 1917, p. 1.
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restraint, the issue was allowed to smolder for several days.H^
government moved toward a settlement on March 6.

The

After consultations

with General M. V. Alekseev, who represented Nicholas, and Sir George
Buchanan, the British ambassador, the cabinet agreed to send the
Romanov family abroad to England.H5

Correctly assuming that the

potentially controversial cabinet decision would meet with a better
reception outside of Petrograd, and probably hoping in that way to
muffle criticism, Kerensky unveiled the British offer of asylum in a
March 7 appearance before the Moscow Soviet.

His speech was well

received, and he drew almost uninterrupted applause when he declared
that he would "never be the Marat of the Russian revolution" and that
he would personally escort Nicholas to a suitable port.-^
But Moscow was not the center of the revolution, and Kerensky's
tactic failed.

Immediately after Kerensky's Moscow speech, the

Petrograd Soviet demanded that the Provisional Government

take prompt

and vigorous steps to gather all members of the Romanov family in one
place under dependable g u a r d , a n d reaffirmed its stand on March 9
with a decision to "carry out the arrest of Nicholas Romanov at all
costs, including the severance of relations with the Provisional
G o v e r n m e n t . T h e impending conflict was averted when the British
H^iliukov, Vospominaniia. II, 350.
115"Fevral'skaia revolutsiia 1917 goda," pp. 5^-55* Buchanan,
II, 10^.
U-^Russkoe Slovo. March 8, 1917, p. 3*
117"Trebovanie naroda o zakluchenii Nikolaia Romanova v
krepost," KA, LXXXI (1937), 123.
118izvestiia, March 10, 1917, p. 1.
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government, fearful of provoking labor unrest in its own country,
withdrew its initial offer.H9

Suddenly lacking suitable alternatives,

the Provisional Government imprisoned the Romanov family in the
Imperial Palace at Tsarskoe Selo.

The issue was not really settled;

extremists in the Petrograd Soviet advanced demands for a speedy trial
and execution of the former tsar, and the government was determined to
exile Nicholas as soon as possible.

As a provisional measure, and in

order to buy time, Nicholas remained confined and Kerensky instituted
a carefully circumscribed investigation into the prior activities of
the Imperial Court.1^0
With the problem of the monarchy at least tentatively disposed
of, Kerensky and his fellow ministers finally devoted their full
attention toward constructing the new order.
exceptionally fortunate.

They had been

The old regime’s belated sanction of the

revolution salved many violated consciences, and Britain’s withdrawal
of its offer of asylum for the Romanovs averted a dangerous break
with the Petrograd Soviet.

The Provisional Government, anxious to heal

its rupture with the socialists, emphasized non-controversial
legislation, and orders began to flow from governmental departments
that were at long last freed from inertia.

119a . Kerenskii, "Ot’ezd Nikolaia 11-go v Tobol'sk,11 Izdaleka,
p. 189; Meriel Buchanan, The Dissolution of an Empire (London, 1932),
p. 195*
120a . Kerensky, La verite sur le massacre des Romanov
(Paris, 1936), pp. 148-149; VVP, March 23, 1917, p. 2.

CHAPTER III

KERENSKY IN THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Because of his temperment and his training, Alexander Kerensky
could not have wished for a more suitable position than that of
Minister of Justice.

To many people in those intoxicated and decep

tively mild days, before ideological and class lines hardened on a
national scale, the Russian revolution symbolized the eradication of
evil and the inauguration of a superior way of life.

In that respect

Kerensky's office, more than any other, symbolized the renovative
power of the revolution.

It was the instrument that would destroy the

causes of old wrongs and create the conditions necessary for the
emergence of an egalitarian society.

In a very real sense, then, it

could be argued that the guiding hand of the Ministry of Justice also
held ultimate responsibility for the fulfillment of Russia's highest
aspirations. While some cautious men disputed these conclusions on
the grounds that the revolution was a wholesale violation of laws and
rights and provided an extremely

unfavorable environment for reform,

Kerensky had no doubt that a new era had arrived.

His enthusiastic

attitude was revealed in a March 2 message to the Councils of the Bar,
when he claimed to act "in the name of the salvation of our native
land" and called upon the legal apparatus to raise "true justice" to

lv. A. Maklakov, Iz vospominanii (New York, 195*0, p.
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the "heights that correspond to the greatness of the people and the
importance of the historical m o m e n t . B y placing Russian law on an
"unrivaled plane,"3 he hoped to surpass the English and French
juridical systems that he had so long admired^
While aware of the unique opportunities for legal reform,
Kerensky still recognized limitations upon his activities. These
boundaries, to which he had adhered from his first days in office, were
described in his April 13 speech before a special commission charged
with the revision of judicial charters. The primary task facing them,
he maintained, was the "cleansing . . . of all unethical layers that
the fallen regime had created." The Provisional Government, Kerensky
continued, was not empowered to pass new laws, for that would amount
to an illegal anticipation of powers belonging to the Constituent
Assembly.

Nevertheless, "the revolution should be borne in mind" and

statutes should be "adjusted to modem life. "5

That essentially

realistic and flexible policy, for which Kerensky had full cabinet
approval,^ called for a return to the legal purity of the 186*4- reforms
and at the same time allowed considerable room for discretion. 7

it

^Izvestiia. March 3» 1917, p. 1.
3Kerensky to Maklakov, cited in V. A. Maklakov, The First State
Duma; Contemporary Reminiscenses. trans. Mary Belkin (Bloomington,
1964), p. 240.
^Sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy; a Study of
the Evidence (London, 1939), p. 475*
5VVP, April 14, 1917, p. 2.
^Sbomik ukazov i postanovlenii Vremennogo Pravitel'stva,
2 vols. (Petrograd, 1917), I , 11.
7The 1864 acts, part of Alexander II's great reforms, abolished
the class courts and established an equitable system based on the
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appeared to be in keeping with the resources of the government, and in
view of the multitudinous abuses introduced since the 1880's promised
to satisfy the most stringent of critics.
Kerensky's measures involving amnesty and the recall of banished
political prisoners were certainly in accordance with the expectations
of revolutionary justice.

His first directives on March 2 required

the immediate release of all political prisoners currently held by
public prosecutors;® the conveyance to Petrograd, with honors, of the
aged populist heroine, Catherine Breshkovskaia;9 and the release of
the five Bolshevik Duma deputies who had been exiled for sedition,
against his strenuous protests and despite his legal defense of them,
in the first year of the war.-*-® Kerensky was allotted 500,000 rubles
for the benefit of those returning from exile, and he applied part of
those funds toward preparations for elaborate official welcomes.•*-■*- A
formal and comprehensive declaration of amnesty followed on March 6
for the purpose of realizing the "complete triumph of a new order
founded on law and freedom."

To achieve that end, law code articles

referring to religious crimes, sedition, subversive activities, and
laxity in official duties were voided.
specific needs of the revolution.

Further provisions met the

All politically motivated criminal

French model. Procedure was modernized and simplified, jury trial for
criminal offenses was introduced, and judges, except for misconduct in
office, were irremovable. Alexander III's counter reforms undermined
the integrity of those improvements.
®VVP, March 7, 1917, p. 1.
9lzvestiia, March 4, 1917, p. 4.
lOlzvestiia, March 3. 1917, p. 4.
llVVP, March 9, 1917, p. 3-
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acts except treason against the Provisional Government that took place
between February 23 and March 6 were nullified, and the rights of
“J p

petition and appeal were established to deal with ambiguous cases.
The governmental declaration on amnesty signalled a general
relaxation of legal penalties and an amelioration of the conditions of
imprisonment.

The most significant of these acts was the March 12

abolition of the death penalty.^3

The replacement of capital punish

ment by an unspecified term at hard labor was solidly within the
traditions of the Russian intelligentsia. As Vladimir Nabokov, the
noted liberal jurist, observed in the Cadet newspaper Rech1 (Speech),
"in no other country has opposition to this worst kind of murder been
so powerful as in ours." Most party newspapers subscribed to Nabokov's
conclusion that the new act was a "comforting phenomenon, a sign of
genuine magnanimity and wise f o r e s i g h t . T h e SR organ Delo Naroda
(The Cause of the People) expressed satisfaction that "the most
disgraceful blot . . . on our conscience and that of all mankind had
been removed,"^5 and the conservative Novoe Vremia (New Times) called
the voiding of the death penalty an "act of colossal majesty" and a
"lofty example of the ennobling of mores. . . .
Among non-socialists, editorial enthusiasm carried strong over
tones of relief.

The action was justified; the Provisional Government

12 WP, March 8 , 1917, p. 1.

13vvp, March 18, 1917, p. 1.
14Rech\ March 18, 1917, p. 31 5pelo Naroda. March 19, 1917, p. 1.

l^Novoe Vremia, March 18, 1917, p. 3*

78
had been involved in an unpublicized struggle with left elements in
the Soviet that had delayed passage of the law for four days and its
publication for another six.

If abolition of capital punishment had

been blocked, liberals and conservatives would have felt dangerously
exposed to Jacobin tendencies in the Soviet and an important check
against intensification of the radical revolution would have been
removed.
That conflict, the actual course of which is difficult to recon
struct, apparently stemmed from the controversy surrounding the dis
position of the Romanov family.

As with the dispute over Nicholas,

the catalyst was Kerensky’s March 7 visit to Moscow.

In a speech

before a liberal group, the Committee of Public Organizations, he
revealed that he had drawn up, and would sign on March 8 , an order
providing for the abolition of the death penalty.

Immediately upon

his return to Petrograd, Kerensky was approached by Iu. M. Steklov, a
pro-Bolshevik member of the TsIK and the new Editor-in-Chief of the
Soviet newspaper Izvestiia (News).

The Minister of Justice was

startled by the tenor of the interview: Steklov informed him that the
TsIK was extremely dissatisfied with his Moscow revelations and advised
him to reconsider the proposed abolition of the death p e n a l t y . S i n c e
the implication was that the Petrograd Soviet wished to retain capital
punishment for use against the deposed tsar, Kerensky took a serious
view of the matter.

He postponed signature of the act until March 12,

when an agreement reached with the Soviet concerning Nicholas1

17lzvestiia. March 9, 1917, pp. 6-7.
1%. Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point (New York,
1965), p. 240.

incarceration at Tsarskoe Selo made the issue less urgent,-*-9 and
allowed its promulgation in the official Vestnik Vremennogo
Pravitel'*stva (Provisional Government Herald) only on March 18.^0

it

is difficult to ascertain whether Steklov had been speaking for a
permanent minority or a transitory majority of the TsIK.

Preservation

of the death penalty was not advocated on the floor of the Soviet, but
such a line could have been considered by the TsIK in the general furor
surrounding Nicholas1 proposed exile.

Two non-socialist editors were

convinced that a vindictive minority campaign was being waged in the
Soviet.

On March 14 the liberal Den* (Day), charging that an attempt

was being made to "smear democracy and cast a shadow over it," demanded
that "outside pressure" be removed from the government with regard to
the bill,

and Rech* expressed similar sentiments in a March 15

editorial.22

Hostility from the extreme Left was expressed indirectly

after March 18, for both Steklov1s Izvestiia and the Bolshevik Pravda
(Truth) maintained a disapproving editorial silence when the law went
into effect.
Obviously, Kerensky's handling of the issue had been impeccable.
He had played patiently for time, simplified the problem, and relied
upon popular support to undermine or isolate opposition.

As a result,

a disturbing threat from the Left had been turned aside, revolutionary
idealism survived intact, and the political Right was assured some

^Izvestiia. March 10, 1917, 1.
20VVP. March 10, 1917, p. 1.
21r. Browder and A. Kerensky, eds., The Russian Provisional
Government. 1917; Documents. 3 vols. (Stanford, 1961), I, 202.
22Rech', March 15, 1917, p. 2.
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immunity from the worst consequences of past or future defeats.
Abolition of the death penalty had been the only really contro
versial reform advocated by Kerensky, and associated measures
encountered no difficulty.

On March 17 major reductions of penalties

for non-political crimes were carried out, and corporal punishment,
including the use of irons and strait jackets, were eliminated from
prison practices.23

Furthermore, on April 26 banishment to Siberia,

an especially hated practice of the old regime, was replaced by
imprisonment in a fortress or removal to a correctional workhouse.2^
Changes in prison administration and the parole system were
natural adjuncts to legal reform, and Kerensky insured that the Central
Prison Administration was responsive.

On March 17 disabled military

officers were encouraged to become wardens, courses in prison super
vision were drawn up, and procedures were instituted to guarantee the
rectification of abuses. ^

On the same day, plans were announced

regarding the expansion of Societies of Guardianship.

These organ

izations, created to facilitate the transition of released prisoners
to civilian life, were broadened to include representatives from all
social classes.26
Kerensky's legal and correctional reforms were in accordance
with Western progressive doctrines, but it would be erroneous to view
them primarily in those terms.

While he would have agreed with the

23pelo Naroda, March 19, 1917, p» 1*
24Browder, I, 20725VVP, March 18, 1917, p. 2.
26VVP, March 18, 1917, p. 2.
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argument that the strictness of the tsarist law code and the brutality
existing within the prison system had been necessary consequences of
the class character of the old regime and that a democratic order would
be able to sustain itself without resort to such draconian measures,
he based his actions on still other assumptions. As a Russian populist
he tempered Western socialist precepts with a religious faith in the
goodness and wisdom of the uncorrupted peasantry.

That set of beliefs

allowed him to equate the removal of repressive devices with an
immediate liberation of the potentialities of the people.

Rather than

acts of expediency undertaken to buttress a personal popularity, as
they later appeared to some observers, Kerensky's reforms were intended
to facilitate the moral and spiritual transformation of the nation. 27
Despite the adoption of foreign terminology, his measures were really
justified by an optimistic ideology that was almost exclusively Russian
in character.
On March 9 the ministerial council requested that Kerensky strike
down the legal inequities that had formerly existed throughout the
Russian Empire, and he responded on March 20 with the abolition of
pQ

restrictions based on religion and nationality.

Rights of residence

and travel were affirmed, bringing to an end tsarist restrictions such
as the Pale of Settlement, so that trades, professions, and
institutions of learning were thrown open to all on an equal basis.

27Alexander F. Kerensky, "Genesis of the October Revolution of
1917," unpublished manuscript, Hoover Institute, Stanford, California,
p. 31.
28lzvestiia, March 12, 1917, p. 4; Sboraik, I, *4-6-49.
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Rights of ownership and use of movable and immovable property,
including participation in joint-stock companies, were extended, civil
and military service was opened to all groups, and participation in
elections, the holding of elected offices, and registration as jurors
were guaranteed to all.

Finally, the use of non-Russian dialects and

languages was permitted in business proceedings and private schools.^9
None of these provisions jeopardized the traditional liberal conception
of an indivisible Russian state, and the various nationality groups
were certainly not satisfied, but the measure represented a clear
rejection of past efforts to promote Russification.30
newspapers applauded the act.

Non-socialist

Novoe Vremia observed that the triple

formula of "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality," which had disguised
a "divide and rule" policy, had come to an end,31 and Russkie
Vedomosti (Russian Gazette). the liberal Moscow daily, welcomed the
elimination of long-standing conditions of "oppression, violence, and
disfranchisement."32

Since the effects of that law were combined with

a prior affirmation of freedom of the press, assembly, and
association,33 most political requirements for an open society had
been met.

Voter qualifications remained to be worked out and the

government hesitated to dispense entirely with aristocratic titles and

29Sbomik, I, 46-^9.
3Ofhe term refers to a systematic governmental policy that
discouraged the expression of cultural pluralism within the Empire.
3lNovoe Vremia, March 23, 1917, p. 4.
32ftusskie Vedomosti, March 23, 1917, p. 3*
33Sbomik, I, 8.
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honorary ranks,34 but the short period of Kerensky's ministry was
notable for its progress toward a democratic, egalitarian society.
The Ministry of Justice was also responsible for determining
the culpability of members of the old regime and applying appropriate
punishment.

Kerensky found that a difficult part of his duties and

did his utmost to alleviate the burdens of those placed in his
charge.
tsar.

His solicitude was most apparent with respect to the former
Kerensky had expressed concern for the safety of the royal

family as early as March 1, when the fate of the revolution was still
in doubt,35 and Nicholas expressed surprise at the consideration and
courtesy extended to him at Tsarskoe Selo.36

Similar treatment was

accorded to such arrested functionaries of the former government as
Protopopov, Stunner, and Shcheglovitov, for their imprisonments were
really forms of protective custody.37
Kerensky's reluctance to take revenge on members of the old
regime was shown in a number of other ways.

Reactionary senators were

advised to resign their positions in order to spare themselves the
embarrassment of forced removal and to preserve the principle of
senatorial immunity.38

Also, with the notable exception of personnel

in the Ministry of the Interior, officials of tsarist departments were
3^lzvestiia, March 12, 1917, p. 4.
35Evidence of Dubenskii, Padenie tsarskogo rezhima; stenograficheskie otcheti. doprosov i pokazanii, dannikh v 1917 £* v
chrezvychainoi sledstvennoi komissii Vremennogo Pravitel1stva, ed.
P. E. Shchegoleva, 7 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1924-27), VI, 408.
36"Dnevnik Nikolaia Romanova," KA, XXI (1927), 94.
37Evidence of Protopopov, Padenie, IV, 55*
38Browder, I, 193•
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encouraged to remain at their posts. 39

But the most revealing example

of Kerensky's determination to limit retribution was his denial of
Kirghiz demands for an investigation of the Turkestan revolt of 1916.^®
As an oppositionist Duma deputy, he had investigated that outbreak,
which had been sparked by the illegal conscription into the army of
the draft-exempt natives and had claimed over 30,000 casulties.^ 3. jn
September of 1916 he had sharply condemned the conduct of Sturmer and
other involved officials, but he now evaded the issue on the entirely
unconvincing basis that the amnesty decree applied to everyone involved
in the disturbances.^
There was a particular blatancy about Kerensky's refusal to
reopen the Turkestan question, for he had just been appointed the
Prosecutor General of an Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry for the
investigation of "malfeasance in office of former ministers, chief
administrators, and other persons in high office of the civil and the
military and naval services."^

The intent of the commission was the

investigation of governmental illegalities, and its findings were to
be turned over to the Prosecutor General for appropriate action.^
Kerensky managed to shield former tsarist functionaries even in the
39yyp. March 8 , 1917, p. 340vvp, March 18, 1917, p. 1.
N. Pokrovskii, "Politicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune
Fevral'skoi revoliutsii v zhandarmskom osveshchenii," KA, XVII
(1926), 29.
^2yyp, March 18, 1917, p. 1.
^Introduction by P. E. Shchegolev, Padenie, I, v.
Wvvp, March 12, 1917, p. 1.
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face of such definite orders*

To be sure, his commission displayed

considerable investigative zeal, for when the October insurrection
interrupted its activities over eighty witnesses had been examined at
length and the accumulated testimony, published in 1924-27 in Moscow
and Leningrad under the title Padenie tsarskogo rezhima (The Fall of
the Tsarist Regime), comprised seven volumes.
intent of the law was evaded.

Nevertheless, the

Tightly controlled by the Minister of

Justice, who appointed its membership and exercised continued super
vision over its activities,^ the commission undertook to provide a
"complete picture of the old regime" in the light of revolutionary
principles.^

Much of the testimony focused upon quite legal

practices such as the use of undercover agents**? and the measures
taken by the tsarist authorities to contain revolutionary outbursts,**®
or the sensational, but frequently irrelevant, activities of Rasputin
and the tsarina's confidante, Anna Vyrubova.^9

The result was a

condemnation of the old order and the justification of revolution,
but in the process, questions of malfeasance in office were shunted
aside.

In this case, as in so many others, Kerensky tried to persuade

the political Right that it had nothing to fear.
Those who profited most from Kerensky's protection later

^5VVP, March 12, 1917, p. 1.
^VVP, March 9, 1917, p. 3*
^Evidence of V. L. Vurtseva, Padenie. I, 297.
^Evidence of Khabalov, Padenie, I, 197.
it-9Evidence of Prince N. B. Shchebatov, Padenie, VII, 219-222;
evidence of S. P. Beletskii, Padenie, IV, 416.
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condemned him, arguing that leniency fostered the spread of anarchy
and hindered the consolidation of power.

That interpretation,

eloquently expressed in Vasilii Shul'gin's accusation that Kerensky
"burned Russia on the altar of freedom,"50 was only partially
justified.
and example.

Admittedly, Kerensky overvalued the power of exhortation
He acted from the dubious premises that "all could be

obtained through good will" and that "a socialist could persuade his
people to do anything,"51 and his populist confidence in the
"inexhaustible storehouse of political wisdom and creative power of
the people"52 proved to be woefully unrealistic. Nonetheless, he was
undoubtedly correct in assuming that the bitterness of the past should
not be projected into the present, for such a development would
disrupt the existing fragile political balance and would threaten the
survival of the Provisional Government.

Kerensky's fervent belief in

voluntary obedience, the innate goodness of man, and the "inviolability
of the human personality"53 lent force to a necessary, if contro
versial, policy.

Later efforts to impose discipline were compromised

by Kerensky's characteristic blending of pragmatism and humanitarianism, but if he had not adopted that moderate course in February,
there might well have been no government to consolidate in August.
A swift and comprehensive re-establishment of order and authority
would have been impossible in any event, for the Ministry of Justice

50v. Shul'gin, Dni (Belgrade, 1925), p. 171.
51a. Choulguine, L'Ukraine contre Moscou, 1917 (Paris, 1935),
p. 116.
52izvestiia, April 14, 1917, p. 2.
53Kerensky, "Genesis," p. 16.
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was virtually bereft of enforcement mechanisms.

The Okhrana. the

Gendarme Corps, and the Police Department had been destroyed during
the February Days, and only months of careful administrative
reorganization could produce their revolutionary equivalents.54

In

the interim, law enforcement depended upon a hastily organized and
ineffectual police administration established by Prince L'vov on
March 10,55 and after its abolition on April 17 responsibility
devolved upon a municipal militia of notorious ineffeciency.56

The

system of courts had also collapsed, and Kerensky was forced to create
temporary ones (composed of a Justice of the Peace, a worker, and a
military representative) even before he formally eliminated their
tsarist counterparts.57

Although he was able on May 4 to institute

a network of local courts presided over by competent personnel,58
that was the only implemented measure that promised immediate results.
In the general administrative disintegration following the revolution,
Kerensky had few instruments at his disposal besides appeals to
conscience.
The limitations of that approach and the paucity of governmental
resources in the face of organized resistance were demonstrated in an
almost perpetual crisis at the Kronstadt naval base.

The Kronstadters

had welcomed the revolution with a massacre of many of their officers,

54v. Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," NZ, XXXV (1953), 218.
55VVP, March 14, 1917, p. 1.
56izyestiia, April 18, 1917, p. 1.
57yyp. March 29, 1917, p. 1.
58Russkie Vedomosti, May 13, 1917, p. 3»
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including the unpopular commander, Admiral Viren, and the imprisonment
in dungeons of the

s u r v i v o r s . 59

The sailors' hostility to authority

did not diminish after the February Days; a personal appearance by
Kerensky failed to alter their attitudes,60 and in late April a
judicial commission sent to the naval base to establish governmental
control narrowly escaped execution.61

A strongly disapproving stand

by the Petrograd Soviet temporarily softened the resistance of the
Kronstadt Soviet,^2 and the last of the imprisoned officers were
finally released after the suppression of the July disorders in Petro
grad,

but the island fortress preserved its independence.

The

Kronstadt imbroglio, an excellent illustration of the Provisional
Government's incapacity to master the forces of disruption, was a grim
augury of the future.
Regardless of its disquieting implications, the Kronstadt
situation was only one problem among many, and the ministry devoted
its major attention to greater needs.

As a caretaker regime, its

essential tasks were the maintenance of order and the preparation for
its replacement by an elected body.

But as challenging as they were,

those obligations were beset by complicating factors.

Clearly, the

war was a dangerously disruptive force; the pursuance of the struggle

59izyestiia, March 2, 1917, p- 1.
60izvestiia, March 17, 1917, p.
6lNorth Winship to Robert Lansing, April 30, 1917, Records of
the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Russia and
the Soviet Union, 1917, the National Archives, Washington D. C.
Record Group M 316, 861.00/386.
62Izvestiia, May 27, 1917, p.
63Kerensky, Russia, p. 230.
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against the Central Powers, which carried in its wake questions
regarding relations with allies and the military ambitions of the new
society, threatened to place enormous strains upon the government's
resources.

The issue of land reform, which could not escape factional

controversy, and the restiveness of national minorities posed similarly
obdurate challenges.

Also, party disputes, at times expressed within

the cabinet, then again in the Soviet's intervention in cabinet
affairs, complicated attempts at establishing effective rule.

Those

difficulties magnified Kerensky's influence within the government, for
his position as the "defender of the people's interests"^ provided
him with a mandate to act authoritatively in a steadily increasing
number of areas. Kerensky's efforts within the cabinet and on behalf
of it testified to his energy, his breadth of interests, and his
conviction that he had a right to supervise every aspect of the Pro
visional Government's activities.
Kerensky had an immediate impact upon governmental policy, for
from the outset he dominated the ministerial council.

His observation

that the new ministers "had unconsciously seen things in their true
proportions and realized what was necessary for the whole nation"^
was an indirect admission that their decisions had conformed to his
will.

Kerensky's control of the cabinet was not total, for on issues

such as Ukrainian self-government or foreign policy a minority composed
of Miliukov, Guchkov, A. A. Manuilov, and A. I. Shingarev held to
traditional liberal principles.

But Prince L'vov, N. V. Nekrasov,

^Izvestiia, March 4, 1917, p. 1.
65a. Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky's Own Story of the
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927), p. 6,
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M. I. Tereshchenko, V. L'vov, A. I. Konovalov, and I. V. Godnev
(the State Controller) consistently followed the lead of the Minister
of Justice. 66

Vladimir Nabokov, who served as Head of Chancellery to

the new cabinet and was present at all of its meetings, noted that the
"real power” was exercised by Kerensky and that most of the other
ministers deferred to his wishes.^

As that acquiescence was trans

lated into a seven-to-four majority on controversial topics, Miliukov
was justified in asserting that Kerensky possessed the "only voice of
authority. "68

The overall policy of the first Provisional Government

was that of its Minister of Justice, and his ascendancy within the
cabinet was probably more pronounced in March than it would ever be
again.
Kerensky did not limit himself to the control of general policy;
he also intervened in the affairs of specific ministries.

As befitted

a socialist, his first actions were directed toward a land settlement
in accordance with his populist desires.

Considering land reform to

be the "crucial problem of Russian life" and the only issue able to
"penetrate the heart of the country and pierce the mystery of the
popular soul,"69 he moved to convince the peasantry that their
interests would be protected.

In an abrupt and legally questionable

move on March 2, he abolished the Stolypin-established Land Surveying
66 p. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, 1859-1917. 2 vols. (New York, 1955).
II, 129-130.

67v. Nabokov, "Vremennoe Pravitel1stvo," ARR, I (1922), 40.
6 Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 333 .

69a . Kerensky, L 1Experience Kerenski (Paris, 1936), p. 55*

Department,

thus serving notice that he favored the traditional

communal system of land tenure.

He was also the first minister to

suggest impediments to the transfer of land, so that a land fund would
be readily available for distribution by the Constituent Assembly.71
Kerensky had the satisfaction of witnessing a prompt cabinet response
to the question.

On March 19 the government authorized the creation

of a land committee for the study of projected reforms,72 and by
April 23 the commission, under the chairmanship of A. S. Posnikov, had
made sufficient progress to attract the favorable notice of the SR
newspaper Delo Naroda.73

Liberals and moderates bitterly resisted

the restrictions on the transfer of titles necessary for the amassing
of a substantial land reservoir, but Kerensky's proposal would finally
pass into law on July 12.7^
Kerensky was more tentative in dealing with the aspirations of
national minorities than he had been
He

with regardto thelandquestion.

joined readily in the granting of Polish independence,for that act

not only reversed acknowledged injustices dating back to the Congress
of Vienna but caused problems for the occupying
showed sympathy for the Finns.

G e r m a n s . 75

He also

On March 5 he arranged for the

70lzvestiia, March 2, 1917, p. 1.
73-Rech1, May 10, 1917, P* 2.
72Russkie Vedomosti. March 22,

1917, p. 3-

73pelo Naroda. April 23, 1917,

p. 1.

7^For an example of such protests, see Russkie Vedomosti,
July 29, 1917, p. 1.
75p. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoroi Russkoi revoliutsii, 1 vol. in
3 parts (Sofia, 1921-23), part 1, p. 6k.
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conveyance from Siberia of P. E. Svenhufved, a former president of
the Sejm (the Finnish parliament), according him the honors due to a
returning revolutionary hero, 76 and supporting a cabinet decision to
restore the violated constitution of the Grand Duchy of Finland.
Finally, he extended to Finnish citizens the amnesty provisions
already implemented within Russia.77

But Kerensky realized that the

national minorities would press for greater gains than the unitary
state could tolerate (he privately told Sir Bernard Pares of his fears
that Russia might have to apply the principle of self-determination to
itself) , 7 8 and because of the danger inherent in separatism he was
reluctant to go beyond the redressing of obvious tsarist wrongs. For
example, he declined to answer a telegram from the Ukrainian Rada
reminding him of his Duma advocacy of an autonomous Ukraine,79
evidently hoping to discourage further discussion of the issue.

He

subsequently made it clear that only the Constituent Assembly could
determine the future relations between the peoples of the former
empire.^

while separatism did not become a serious issue while

he was at the head of the Ministry of Justice, from the first he was
concerned about its disruptive potential.
While Kerensky displayed caution concerning the future status of
the national minorities, he was forthright about prosecution of the

76izvestiia. March 7, 1917, p. 3*
77wP. March 8 , 1917, p. 1.
78sir Bernard Pares, My Russian Memoirs (London, 1931), p. ^33.
79Browder, I, 370.
80lzvestiia, May 30, 1917, p.
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war.

Since he believed that patriotic

outrage against tsarist

military ineptitude had been an important cause of the revolution, he
saw no major obstacles to a vigorous continuation of the allied
struggle against the Central Powers.

"The whole army," he claimed in

a Times interview, "from the commander down to the last soldier"
realized that anything less would "betray the r e v o l u t i o n . A l l i e d
representatives were quick to realize Kerensky's commitment to the war
effort.

On March 15 Maurice Paleologue, the French ambassador,

informed his government that Kerensky "alone was capable of making the
Soviet realize the necessity of continuing the war and maintaining the
a l l i a n c e , and on March 20 the United States consul at Petrograd,
North Winship, reported to his superiors that the entire cabinet,
including its socialist representative, was determined to mount a
vigorous military effort against the Central Powers.83
Kerensky's pro-war activities were not confined to the reassuring
of Allied missions.

On March 1 he had tried to obtain a retraction of

Order Number One, which had been issued by the Soviet without his
knowledge and which threatened to destroy the cohesion of the armed
forces, arguing that its contents were so offensive to non-socialists
that they would not participate in the Provisional Government.

When

8-^1he Times (London), March 23, 1917, p. 582Maurice Paleologue, La Russie des tsars pendant la grande
guerre, 3 vols. (Paris, 192277 III, 23^.
$3winship to Lansing, March 20, 1917, Russian Internal Affairs,

861.00/28^.
®^N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917; Eyewitness
Account, trans. and ed., Joel Carmichael, 2 volsT (New York, 19^2),
I, 130. Order Number One, passed on March 1 by the Soldier's section
of the Petrograd Soviet, undermined military discipline. Although

9^
that tactic failed, he ended his first formal speech as Minister of
Justice with an emotional appeal for military discipline.^5

Kerensky

continued to emphasize that theme throughout the term of the first
cabinet,

he returned constantly to the concepts of duty and obedience

to authority, arguing that without them the new Russia would become a
"State of rebellious slaves" and that the aspirations of the revolution
would be "drowned in b l o o d . H i s appointment to a newly-established
war cabinet created to control the Stavka (the army General Head
quarters) gave him a convenient platform for the furthering of these
views.

Kerensky*s new position also allowed him to participate

actively in the efforts of A. I. Guchkov, the Minister of War, to
increase the efficiency of the armed forces.8?

In public appearances

with Guchkov, he linked the success of the revolution with success in
war, claiming that the defense of the "hearth of democratic freedom"
would allow the "achievement of everything we d e s i r e . I t was his
tragedy, and that of his country, that Kerensky never altered that
stand.

He remained convinced that as a "free, self-liberated state"

Russia was honor bound to prove its worth on thefield ofbattle.^
applying officially only to the Petrograd garrison, theorder affected
all elements of the armed forces to some degree. Important articles
of that document called for the subordination of the military command
to the Soviet in all political actions, the formation of military
committees through election from the lower ranks, adherence to mili
tary discipline only in the performance of active duty, and the control
of weapons by the elected battalion committees.
85izvestiia, March 3. 1917, P- 1«
«6vvr, April 30, 1917, p.

2.

87VVP, March 11, 1917, p. 1.
B^Izvestiia, April 1R, 1917, p. 2.
89A. Kerenskii, Ob armii i voine (Petrograd, 1917), p. 6.

Kerensky's activities regarding land reform, national selfdetermination, and the position of the army in the revolutionary state
were partially acceptable to the ministers involved.

His intervention

in foreign policy was not, and that action shattered the cabinet,
clearly revealed the antagonisms and contradictions aroused by the
revolution, and contributed to the failure of succeeding governments
to meet the demands imposed on them.

There are strong ironic overtones

to the struggle between Kerensky and Miliukov, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, for they were in agreement regarding the objectives of
Russian foreign policy and differed only with respect to the tactics
that should be employed.

Both were partially justified in their

approaches; Kerensky possessed a sure instinct for domestic necessities
and Miliukov had a fine awareness of international complexities.

But

the results of their duel satisfied the requirements of neither and
promoted the destruction of the principles they were both trying to
preserve.
Russia's relations with its allies and the postwar settlement
lay at the heart of the controversy.

Miliukov shared the rightist

conviction that the revolution had resulted from dissatisfaction with
the tsarist conduct of the war, and he was firmly persuaded that the
success of a military offensive and the resulting revival of patriotism
within the country would sweep away the half-formed socialist formula
of peace without victory.90

Therefore, Miliukov was determined to

maintain the incentives for a continuance of the struggle.

The agree

ments with the Allies should be affirmed vigorously, and, in
9C>Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 337.

particular, Russia's acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits
should be defended.

The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, dignified

and cosmopolitan in manner, fit the traditional mold and would have
been at ease in the foreign offices of any of the major European
powers. He felt that national interests dictated an advantageous
material settlement, for altered boundaries and the corresponding
shift in material resources would represent the only significant change
in the postwar relations among states.

Miliukov also understood that

the Allies had agreed to Russian territorial expansion only out of
real or imagined necessity.

Accordingly, they would be delighted to

see a one-sided Russian repudiation of annexations so long as that
action did not jeopardize their own annexationist plans.91
Kerensky, who had never been abroad, lacked Miliukov's expertise
in foreign affairs and misunderstood the inflexibility and selfishness
of the Western Allies with regard to their war objectives. 92

Still,

he was as sensitive to Russian national interests as was Miliukov.
Victory had its own logic, and Kerensky was privately determined that
Russia would control European Turkey at the war's end.93
a sincere aversion to Miliukov's methods.

But he had

The revolution had to be

taken into consideration, and demands for war trophies had to be
replaced by an emphasis upon national defense.

Since the revolution

was expected to open a new era in the relations between peoples, it
was necessary to abandon the imperialistic vocabulary of the old

9lMiliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 337*
92a . Kerenskii, "Orientatsiia na Rossiiu," Izdaleka. sbornik
statei (Paris, 1922), p. 142.
93Kerensky, L'Experience, p. 112.
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regime.

A new language, one that appealed simultaneously to

revolutionary idealism and patriotism, had to be adopted before the
government could be assured of sufficient support for the resumption
of military operations.9^
The ultimate objective of Kerensky's intervention in foreign
policy was successful prosecution of the war with unreserved popular
backing, but his immediate aim was the avoidance of conflict with the
Petrograd Soviet.

Kerensky had not kept in close personal contact

with the TsIK, for he wished to "stay on the boundary between the
bourgeoisie and the Soviet democracy" in order to appear as the leading
"exponent of the all-national character of the revolution."95

Never

theless, he still realized that Miliukov's course of action would lead
to a serious clash with that body.

Hoping to forestall the Soviet's

intervention, he embraced the principles of revolutionary defensism
in order to settle the issue within the cabinet.
began on March

6 with

be internationalized.

Kerensky's campaign

a suggestion that Constantinople and the Straits
A few days later, probably on March 10, he

linked that proposal to a general revision of war aims.

He reproached

the Allies for cooperating with tsarism while pretending to wage a
war of liberation, argued that full support of free Russia and its
policies would redress that wrong, and claimed that the war could now
be transformed into a legitimate struggle between the forces of

9^A. Kerenskii, "Znachitel'nyiia stroki," Izdaleka,
pp. 2hh-2k5.
95l. 0. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia o Fevral'skoi revolirtsii.
2 vols. (Paris, 1963), I, 123-
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autocracy and those of
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Kerensky's timing was unfortunate.

On March 7 the Petrograd

Soviet, disturbed by his attitude concerning the Romanovs, created a
Liaison Commission to exert direct pressure upon the government.97
Plainly, the TsIK lacked full confidence in Kerensky and was prepared
to broaden its demands and increase its rate of intervention.

Proof

of Kerensky's diminished influence came on March 14, for in an "Appeal
to the PeoDles of the World," the Petrograd Soviet formulated its own
stand on foreign policy.

While the declaration was couched in

defensist language, it called for a "decisive struggle against the
acquisitive ambitions of the governments of all countries" and pro
claimed opposition by "every means" to the "policy of conquest of its
ruling classes. . . ." 9 8

once the revolutionary democracy entered

into the dispute over foreign policy, Kerensky's plans were ruined.
He had wished to attack Miliukov on his own grounds and for objectives
of his own choosing, and really desired no more than concessions in
terminology.

Instead, trapped in a net of his own weaving, he became

a reluctant accomplice in a drastic reorganization of the principles
affecting nations.
Miliukov, intimidated by neither Kerensky nor the Petrograd
Soviet, strenuously defended his conduct in a Rech* interview on
March 23.

Appealing to Wilsonian principles, the Foreign Minister

argued that alterations in the southern European map, especially with

96comments of Kerensky cited by J. Dillon, Great Britain,
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), XCII (1917), col. 301*
97Tsereteli, I, 122.
98lzvestiia, March 15, 1917, p. 1.
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regard to the reorganization of Austro-Hungary and the "liquidation
of European Turkey," would guarantee future peace and should not be
considered annexations.

"Peace without annexations," he continued

provocatively, was a German formula camouflaging itself as an inter
nationalist one.

Indulging in dubious self-righteousness, he further

maintained that the Turks, even after four and a half centuries, were
"strangers" in Constantinople and retained their hold there exclusively
through force.

Consequently, the transfer of the Straits to Russia

would not contradict the principle of self-determination of nations.
Miliukov concluded with a classic affirmation of Realpolitik: pos
session of the Straits, he said, was the possession of the "doors to
our home," and that protection "should belong to us."99
Miliukov's interview placed Kerensky in an intolerable position.
The March 23 evening session of the Petrograd Soviet revealed growing
suspicions that the Minister of Justice had defaulted on his socialist
obligations, and in the heat of debate he even appeared in some danger
of formal disavowment by his own party.

When a personal appearance

on the floor of the Soviet failed to dispel the gathering tension,
Kerensky decided upon vigorous measures.

On March 2k, he broke openly

with Miliukov by declaring publicly that the Foreign Minister had
expressed only his own personal views,101 and he pressed his attack in
a cabinet meeting of the same day.

Angrily waving the offending copy

of Rech1 before the assembled ministers, Kerensky insisted that

99Rech1, March 23, 1917, p. 2.
10°Russkie Vedomosti, March 28, 1917, p. 5*
IQlPelo Naroda. March 26, 1917, p. 3-
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Miliukov should not be allowed to "get away with" personal diplomacy,
that only a decision of the ministerial council could be advanced as
official policy, and that an immediate retraction of the Rech* inter
view was imperative.
impregnable.

For the moment, Miliukov's position was quite

The Foreign Minister correctly observed that he was only

countering similar tactics pursued by Kerensky and that, to the best
of his knowledge, his conduct of his ministry had the approval of the
majority of the cabinet.

In this case. Prince L'vov felt obliged to

reprove Kerensky; he noted the lack of prior ministerial criticism of
Miliukov's policies and formally endorsed his conduct
The Cadet leader's victory did not last.

While Kerensky was

forced into temporary silence, other socialists intensified their
demands for a governmental repudiation of annexations and indemnities.
The sharpest of the public responses to Miliukov's cabinet vindication
was a March 25 editorial by Vladimir Zenzinov in Delo Naroda.

In a

signed article entitled "The War Aims of the Provisional Government,"
the rotund, energetic SR issued a direct challenge to Prince L'vov.
The cabinet, Zenzinov stated bluntly, had to decide between Miliukov's
imperialism and revolutionary defensism.

If it chose territorial

expansion, the Soviet democracy could only reply with civil war.1^3
The timing and content of the Delo Naroda editorial indicate collusion
between the author and the Minister of Justice.

An old friend of

Kerensky's, Zenzinov had been moved to tears by his eloquence during

102Nabokov, p. 58*
103Pelo Naroda, March 25, 191?. P* 1*

the February Days and was firmly under his influence.104

Also, he was

currently acting as an informal liaison between the socialist minister
and the Petrograd Soviet ;1°5 in that consultative role, he was surely
aware of Kerensky’s needs and desires.

While direct evidence is

lacking, it. appears unlikely that Zenzinov would have launched such a
strong attack upon the government without the approval of his mentor.
But regardless of its source of inspiration, the March 25 editorial
was effective in restoring Kerensky's position among his colleagues.
On March 2k, Prince L'vov had resisted demands by the Liaison Com
mission for an official clarification of Miliukov's views, but by
March 26 he was willing to expose the issue to a cabinet vote.

On that

day, by a seven-to-four margin, Miliukov was ordered to draft a compro106
mise document on war arms.

The tenacious Minister of Foreign Affairs managed to preserve a
considerable part of his program.

His March 27 statement, which was

approved by the cabinet and the Liaison Commission, rejected "dominion
over other nations, deprivation of their national possessions, or
forcible occupation of foreign territories."

But it avoided the slogan

"without annexations or indemnities" and maintained that the "Russian
people would not allow its Motherland to emerge from this struggle
humiliated and undermined in its vital forces."

Furthermore, the

declaration upheld all obligations assumed toward Russia's allies.10?

IC&Zenzinov, "Fevral'skoe dni," p. 231.
105N. Sukhanov, Zapiski o revoliutsii, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1922-23),
I, 307106Nabokov, p. 59; Sukhanov, Zapiski, II, 353107Rech1, March 28, 1917, p. 2.
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It was apparent that the document could be viewed in a number of ways;
Miliukov certainly reserved the right to interpret it to his own
satisfaction, and the Liaison Commission was willing to allow him to
do so if that fact could be hidden from the rank and file delegates of
the Petrograd S o v i e t . A s a compromise solution, the March 27
declaration had only one serious defect.

Since it was directed solely

to the citizens of Russia and was not a diplomatic note, it had no
direct bearing upon official relations with Russia's allies.
Had viliukov conducted himself with circumspection after
March 27, that deficiency would probably have been overlooked.

The

Petrograd Soviet expressed satisfaction with the compromise,

and

Kerensky's objections concerning terminology had been met.

But the

Foreign Minister continued to behave in a provocative manner.

On

April 1 he notified the Allies that Russian abandonment of the Straits
would be an abandonment of previous agreements and mutual obligations,
and attributed contrary assertions to "weakened and undermined" groups
on the extreme Left.m

He also pressed for an immediate assault on

Constantinople, hoping in that way to present his political opponents
with a fait accompli.

But Miliukov's maneuver failed, for the

Stavka refused to cooperate.

The officers consulted argued that the

10%abokov, p. 59.
109Novoe Vremia, March 28, 1917, p. 5*
H Olzvestiia, March 31, 1917, p. 3*
lllBrowder, II, 1058.
112m . N. Pokrovskii, "Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del,"
KA, XXX(1928), 26.
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assault would be politically ill-timed, that the major military threat
lay on the German front, and that the army lacked the discipline and
organization required for such a difficult operation.-*--^

Kerensky was

convinced that Miliukov's actions would be taken as evidence of bad
faith on the part of the cabinet,

and he responded by adopting an

uncompromisingly internationalist posture.

The Justice Minister

unveiled his new line at a reception for British and French socialists
at the Marinskii Palace on April 6, when he took sharp issue with the
surprised Foreign Minister.

While Miliukov spoke of increasing Russian

military pressure upon the Central Powers, Kerensky attacked Allied war
aims, repudiated annexations, and urged the embarrassed foreign envoys
to emulate the example of Russian socialists.^-5

Thus, in a typically

dramatic fashion, he publicly re-opened the cabinet split that
ostensibly had been healed on March 27.
The 1etrograd Soviet moved into the widening breach.

Its inter

vention carried new dangers, for on April 8 Victor Chernov, the veteran
SR leader, had arrived from exile in Great Britain.

A dedicated inter

nationalist, Chernov immediately attacked the tenor of Miliukov's
foreirn communiques^^ and mobilized support for a diplomatic note
based on the March 27 declaration.^?

Kerensky was alarmed by his

113A. D£nikine, La decomposition de l'armee et de pouvoir:
Fevrier-Septembre, 1917 (Paris, 1921), p. 141.
H4Kerensk.y, Russia, p. 245.
H5Nabokov, p.

60,

H6v. Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii (Paris, 1934),
p. 360.
H 7 a . Chugaev, et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenii v Rossii
v Aprele 1917 g.; April'skii krizis (Moscow, 1958), p. 313*
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declining influence and decided to force the issue in the cabinet,
thereby eliminating the need for outside intervention.

The Justice

Minister began his campaign on April 13; in violation of a ban imposed
by Prince L'vov against individual revelations regarding cabinet
activities,

he announced the preparation of a note to the Allies

affirming the socialist position.

His plans backfired when Miliukov,

who was not. even considering such a project,^ 9 indignantly demanded
an official governmental denial.

Kerensky tried to defend himself;

he claimed that he had been misquoted, that he had really meant that
a revision of war aims was being discussed, and that some concessions
were necessary in any event.-^0

But the rights of the Foreign Minister

had been clearly infringed upon, and a majority of the cabinet agreed
that he was justified in his demand.

On April 14 the Provisional

Government, fully aware of the danger it was courting, officially
announced that Kerensky's statement was inaccurate.-*-21
The governmental retraction provoked a violent response in the
Petrograd Soviet, and its new spokesman, the Georgian Menshevik leader
I. G. Tsereteli, made continued socialist support of the government
dependent upon the direct transformation of the March 27 declaration
into a diplomatic document.122

Kerensky's policy lay in shambles.

attempt to ward off Soviet intervention had produced the opposite
H^Nabokov, p. 58.
H9Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 352.
120Kerensky, Russia, p. 246.
121VVP, April 14, 1917, p. 1.
122xsereteli, I, 85-
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effect, and in the approaching conflict he had to stand with Miliukov
to preserve some flexibility in the conduct of international affairs.
The embattled cabinet adopted a bold line; it agreed to
Tsereteli's demands but attached a covering statement that contradicted
large parts of the declaration.

While Kerensky was uneasy regarding

the tenor of some of the passages,-*-23 he endorsed the final draft,
claiming that it "should have satisfied the most extreme critics of
Miliukov's

imperialism."-*-2^

That assertion was insupportable.

The

covering statement made it apparent that the cabinet had no thought of
peace short of total victory, that war aims would be revised only
within the bounds "established by previous agreements," and that
"guarantees and sanctions" meant ounitive measures against the Central
Powers, with the accompanying territorial gains that these measures
i m p l i e d . r' The cabinet's challenge to the Soviet was emphasized by
the peremptory fashion in which the matter was handled.

The Soviet

had not been informed that an explanation would accompany the diplo
matic statement ,126 ancj

was no^ notified of the contents of the

covering note until that document had been dispatched.-*-2^7 The cabinet
also aroused the Soviet's resentment by issuing the note on April 18,
which coincided with the Russian observance of May Day, the inter
national socialist holiday.128

123Nabokov, p.

The matter had come to a head in the

63.

12%erensky, Catastrophe, p. 135•
125Chugaev, p. 725126Tsereteli, I, 86.
127chugaev, p. 727.
12-8j2vestiia, April 21, 1917, p. 1.
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worst way possible: as open defiance of the Petrograd Soviet by the
government.
If the now unified cabinet had had to contend solely with the
Soviet leadership (which had been remarkably sympathetic in the past),
it probably would have prevailed.

But the TsIK was not the Soviet

democracy, and the immediate result was a serious outbreak of violence.
The streets of Petrograd filled with protesting soldiers and workers,
and some military units even considered direct assaults against the
government.129

a

conciliatory stance by the TsIK and the cabinet eased

the situation.

Both leadership centers appealed for sufficient time

to work out further compromises,130 and Kerensky persuaded the
commander of the Petrograd garrison, General Lavr Kornilov, to refrain
from forcibly dispersing the crowds.131

On April 20 and April 21, in

a series of extended meetings, the ministerial council, the TsIK, and
the Temporary Committee of the State Duma (resurrected to buttress the
position of the government) discussed ways to appease the unruly
population.132

a

really workable solution to the dispute over foreign

policy could wait.

Of greater importance was the diminution of popular

passions and a restoration of confidence in the present leadership.133

129v. Rakhmetov, ed., "Aprel'skie dni 1917 goda v Petrograde,"
KA, XXXIII (1929), 78-80.
130Chernov, p.

368.

13lE. Varneck and H. Fisher, The Testimony of Admiral Kolchak
and Other Siberian Materials (Stanford, 1935), p.~S5»
132Nabokov, p. 62.
133Tsereteli, I, 87 •
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Kerensky took little part in the proceedings and was absent much of
the time. ^ 4

Since his ventures into foreign affairs had proved

uniformly disastrous, the government position was defended mainly by
Prince L'vov and N. V. Nekrasov.135
While the resulting compromise ended the "April Days," it was a
clearly inadequate solution.

The government agreed, over Miliukov's

strenuous protests, to release a suitable interpretation of the
April 18 note to the internal press and to forward it as a non-diplomatic item to the Allies.-*-36 The explanation, published on April 22,
represented a Soviet victory.

"Guarantees and sanctions," the

sensitive passage of the April 18 statement, was interpreted as arms
limitations and the formation of international tribunals, and "decisive
victory" as the creation of a stable international order based on
national self-determination.137

Miliukov immediately claimed, with

technical accuracy, that nothing had been officially conceded.^38

But

it was obvious that the April 21 agreement had been an interim measure
passed to pacify the masses, that Miliukov, defeated in his own
ministry, was in an untenable position, and that the issue could be
resolved safely only when a more flexible and less controversial person
assumed direction of foreign affairs.
!3**v. Stankevich, Vospominaniia, 1914-1919 (Berlin, 1920), p. 115*
135'1'sereteli, I, 105.
136Nabokov, p. 64.
137lzvestiia. April 22, 1917, p. 3*
138Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic
Memories, 2 vols. (New York, 1923), II, 124.
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On April 26, Kerensky publicly opened the question of govern
mental reconstruction and linked political stabilization to the
inclusion within the cabinet of representatives from the TsIK.

In an

open letter to Delo Naroda. he declared that the situation had changed
drastically since he had first entered the government.

The "toiling

democracy," initially disorganized, was now so strong that it was
obliged to participate actively in the life of the state.

A coalition

including the leaders of the principal liberal and socialist parties,
he continued, was imperative.

The Provisional Government lacked the

authority to govern, and while he was willing to remain at his post "to
the end," his position was "perhaps too difficult to bear alone."139
Suspicions that Kerensky was again playing a lone hand were soon
dispelled; on April 27 Prince L'vov, in the name of the ministerial
council, formally requested that the TsIK consider the question of
c o a l i t i o n . W h i l e the Soviet debated the issue, Kerensky continued
his campaign within the cabinet.

Since concessions would have to be

made before the Soviet would agree to participation in the government,
he suggested that foreign policy be conducted by a ministerial com
mission and demanded, on the threat of resignation, that Miliukov be
transferred to the Ministry of Education.1^1
The TsIK split sharply over the question of coalition.

The

populist parties, less bound than the Social Democrats to a Marxist
interpretation of political development, supported the proposal to

139pelo Naroda. April 26, 1917, p* 3*
l^Olzvestiia, April 28, 1917, p. 2.
l^lKerensky, Catastrophe, p. 137*
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allow their representatives into the cabinet, but the Mensheviks and
Bolsheviks opposed it,1^2 and enforced their will on April 29 by a
close twenty-three to twenty-two vote.1^3
reconsider its position.

Events forced the TsIK to

In the first place, the Soviet's opposition

was eroded by continued popular pressure for coalition;!^ by April 30,
those sentiments reached such a pitch that they were "very difficult
to resist."1^5

But the decisive point occurred on May 1, when

Alexander Guchkov resigned on the grounds that he was unable to fulfill
his obligations as Minister of War.1^6

A renewed request for

coalition by Prince L'vov^? followed by a personal appearance by
Kerensky on the floor of the Soviet^S provided the opportunity for a
socialistic volte face. On May 2, by a decisive forty-four to nine
margin, the TsIK agreed to allow socialistic participation in the
government.1^9
The Soviet's reversal appeared to be a vindication of Kerensky's
long-held policies.

He had finally realized the "unionand cooperation

of all living, creative forces of the country," and believed that
coalition ended the destructive Soviet formula of conditional support
-^ D e l o Naroda, April 26, 1917, p. 1.
1^3Russkie Vedomosti. April 30, 1917, p- 5*
l^Izvestiia, April 29, 19"17, p. 3*
1^5Tsereteli, I, 135l^Russkie Vedomosti, May 2, 1917, p. 5»
147VVP, May 2, 1917, p. 1.
148Kerensky, Russia, p. 248.
1^9rsereteli, I, 136.
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of the Provisional Government.150

The TsIK seemed to agree.

While

it took the precaution of binding prospective socialist ministers to
their parties' will,151 its newspaper, Izvestiia, proclaimed that "so
long as our comrades are in the government, it is our government."152
The resulting cabinet possessed greater authority than its
predecessor, but it was compromised by the problems that had called it
forth.

The Allies had interpreted Miliukov's forced resignation on

May 2 as a renunciation of Constantinople and the Straits;153 the new
cabinet could not contradict that view publicly, but most of its
members were firmly committed to preserving Russia's anticipated war
prizes.15^

That determination lured the government into a major

military offensive in its efforts to regain the respect and consider
ation necessary for diplomatic

c o n c e s s i o n s , 155

and the results were

shattering military defeat, the July uprising, and the disintegration
of the cabinet.

Of course, no cabinet could have circumvented the war

and its related problems.

But the First Coalition's difficulties were

vastly increased by the legacy of Miliukov's doctrinaire inflexibility
and Kerensky's badly-handled intervention in foreign affairs.

150Rerensky Catastrophe, p. 141.
151lzvestiia, May 6, 1917, p. 4.
152Izvestiia, May 6, 1917, p. 3153a . Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, trans. G. Kerensky
(London, 1934), p. 304.
l54Kerensky, Catastrophe. p. 130.
155Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 378.

CHAPTER IV

THE COALITION EXPERIMENT

The First Coalition, formed on May 5. ended the governmental
instability that had lasted since mid-April and opened a new phase of
the revolution.

Kerensky had often insisted that effective rule was

impossible without the participation of those who previously had been
"objects rather than subjects" of power,! and his prediction had been
fulfilled.

As the embattled cabinet admitted on April 26, the absence

of direct socialistic representation had so fostered internal disinte
gration that the country was on the verge of civil war.^

The April

disorders had been almost as disturbing to the members of the TsIK as
to the liberals, for they had not previously realized the full extent
of their strength.

They had wished only to bend the government to

their will, and had had no desire actually to destroy it.

But that

was no consolation, for the Soviet's opposition to Miliukov's foreign
policy had shattered the authority of the cabinet and had fostered the
spread of anarchy.

Since the moderate socialists in the Soviet were

unwilling to adopt the Leninist position of uncompromising hostility

!a . F. Kerenskii, "Politika Vremennogo Pravitel'stva," SZ, L
(1932), 419.
2vvp, April 26, 1917, p. 1.
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to the middle classes,3 they felt compelled to retrieve the situation
through a broadening of the governmental base.**
While a cabinet able to provide vigorous national leadership
required a fusion of liberals and socialists,5 both groups undertook
serious risks in adopting that approach.

Under the previous regime,

th” Soviet leaders had enjoyed the easy popularity stemming from an
adversary position.

In sharing formal responsibility for state

actions, they were exposed to the same kinds of criticism that they
previously had engaged in.

The moderate majority of the TsIK agreed

to coalition in the dubious expectation that they could successfully
resist pressure from the extreme Left and exercise a continuing control
over the masses. ^

Were they to fail, as Kerensky had during the April

crisis, the resources of moderation would be exhausted.

The Cadets,

who represented the viable political Right, were also placed in a
difficult position.

They freely acknowledged their current helpless

ness in the face of popular disenchantment and recognized that the
political situation could only be alleviated through socialistic repre
sentation in the cabinet.7

But they resented the ouster of their party

leader, Miliukov,3 and were concerned that the socialist ministers,

3Pravda, April 7, 1917, p. 1^Izvestiia, May 6, 1917, p. 4.
5a . F. Kerenskii, "Korotkaia pamiat', " Izdaleka. sbomik statei
(Paris, 1922), p. 166.
^Izvestiia, May 6, 1917, p- 3*
?Russkie Vedomosti, May 6, 1917, p* 3*
% . Nabokov, "Vremennoe Pravitel1stvo," ARR, I, (1922), 6k.
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answerable to their party organizations, would not possess sufficient
independence to deal effectively with controversial issues on a cabinet
level.9 They also feared that the socialists would use their liberal
associates as a front behind which to pursue purely partisan
policies.
Demonstrating his usual impatience with party concerns, Kerensky
recalled that negotiations were complicated by a formidable array of
"theoretical formulae and dead political blueprints" advanced by both
the Right and the Left.H

He should have expected that response.

Liberals were thrown on the defensive and afraid that defeat would be
transformed into an ideological rout, and socialists were exposed to
possible attacks from their own volatile supporters.

Under those

conditions, it was only to be expected that difficult and protracted
debates would ensue.

As the editors of Russkie Vedomosti observed, an

experiment was being introduced that "could be attempted effectively
only once."12
The Minister of Justice succeeded in reducing the impact of those
"deadly class antagonisms."13

His open letter in Delo Naroda had been

9p. Miliukov, Vospominaniia. 1859-1917, 2 vols. (New York, 1955),
II, 374.
lOSee the report of the April 27 meeting of the Fourth State
Duma cited in Izvestiia, April 29, 1917, p. 3*
llA. Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky8s Own Story of the
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927), p. 141.
12Russkie Vedomosti, May 6, 1917, p. 3*
l3Kerenskii, "Politika," p. 419.
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a cogent and timely appeal for coalition,!^ and his successful
authoring of a council resolution to transfer Miliukov to the Ministry
of Education, which provoked the Foreign Minister’s May 2 resignation,
had been an indispensable preliminary to socialist cooperation.15
Kerensky's conciliatory efforts continued throughout the period of the
governmental crisis.

From May 2 to May 5, he acted as a vital link

between the cabinet, the TsIK, a special delegation of the TsIK created
to negotiate with the cabinet,16 the Stavka, and the Cadet Central
Committee, all of whom participated in various stages of the coalition
discussions.
While the negotiations were acrimonious and extended, they took
an unexpected turn that greatly strengthened Kerensky’s position.
Ironically, that situation arose from a tactical decision on the part
of the Cadets, the very group that had come to view Kerensky with grave
s u s p i c i o n . U n d e r adversity, the Cadet Central Committee abandoned
its February position of social reconciliation and reverted to the
tested parliamentary tactics of a minority party.

In a partial

softening of Miliukov’s original program, they decided to insist on
only two matters of principle: a vigorous prosecution of the war and a

l^Delo Naroda. April 26, 1917, p. 3«
15Miliukov, Vospominaniia. II, 3^9 •
l6The special delegation of the TsIK consisted of Chkheidze,
Tsereteli, B. 0. Bogdanov, F. I. Dan, V. Stankevich, I. M. Bramson,
Chernov, L. B. Kamenev, Iu. Iurenev, Sukhanov, Sokolovskii, A. V.
Peshekhovov, and N. D. Avksent'ev. See Izvestiia. May 3. 1917*
p. 3.
17v. Stankevich, Vospominaniia. 1914-1919 (Berlin, 1920), p. 129.

lBMiliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 371*
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firm stand against internal disorganization.19

The rest of the

governmental platform was considered temporarily expendable, counters
to be bartered for a majority of non-socialist posts within the
cabinet.20

Thus, they adopted the ancient device of reculer pour

mieux sauter, for they relied upon future cabinet maneuvers to regain
the ground lost by unavoidable verbal concessions to socialist
sentiments.
While the new Cadet policy was certainly venturesome, it rested
upon several dubious assumptions: that domestic stabilization would
proceed to the point that orthodox parliamentary manipulations could
succeed; that the period of non-party politics was over, so that
ministerial votes would consistently split along ideological lines;
and that an active resumption of the war would result in a popular
shift to the Right, with a subsequent relaxation of socialist pressure
upon the government.2-'- In short, the Cadets took a calculated risk.
They assumed that socialist participation in the new ministry would
allow a normalization of the political process and that their greater
parliamentary skills would assure the protection of their essential

19Russkie Vedomosti. May 6, 1917, p» 3*
20i. g . Tsereteli, Vospominaniia o Fevralfskoi revoliutsii.
2 vols. (Paris, 1963), I, 15^• The Cadets gained both points. The new
platform rejected annexations and called for a revision of war aims but
pledged to continue the war and to provide strong rule. Military power
was to be increased while the army was democratized, and the intro
duction of self-government into the provinces would be speeded up.
Also, vital industries would be nationalized, preparations for land
reform would begin, and income would be redistributed. Finally, the
government pledged to convoke the Constituent Assembly as quickly as
possible. The full text is cited in VVP, May 6, 1917, p. 1.
2lExamples of those sentiments can be found in Rech*, May 5,
1917, p. 3; Russkie Vedomosti, May 6, 1917, p. 3; and Izvestiia.
May 11, 1917, p. 2.
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interests.
In retrospect, of course, it is obvious that Miliukov's followers
erred on almost every point.

But their pivotal mistake, the one that

determined the complexion of the new government and nullified their
strategy from the outset, was the belief that non-partisan politics
were in fact a thing of the past.

They had. assumed that a serious con

test for cabinet supremacy would take place, and to counter that
imagined danger they had insisted that the Cadets occupy at least as
many ministerial positions as the socialists.22

That safeguard,

designed to produce a liberal majority within the cabinet, became a
snare.

The TsIK, concerned primarily with pacifying its followers,

stressed the importance of the projected platform but was markedly
reluctant to invest its members with governmental portfolios.23

The

surfeit of positions that suddenly appeared gave Kerensky unexpected
room for anti-party manipulations and allowed a limited revival of his
nadpartiinost' line.
As a result, the First Coalition was practically tailored to
Kerensky's desires and was a testament to his skill in exploiting
opportunities.

He had insisted upon an impressive socialist presence

and Victor Chernov, I. G. Tsereteli, and M. I. Skobelev, all
influential members of the TsIK, agreed to enter.

Admittedly, his new

colleagues showed little enthusiasm for their posts.

Tsereteli had

resisted Kerensky's first approaches and became Minister of Post and

22stankevich, p.

131.

23W. S. Woytinsky, Stormy Passage; a Personal History Through
Two Russian Revolutions to Democracy and Freedom, 1905-19&Q (New York,
1961), p.
Voitinskii was a Left member of the TsIK.
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Telegraph only after receiving assurances that he would be exempted
from administrative duties.24

Chernov bitterly protested his transfer

from the Soviet, made his entrance into the cabinet dependent upon
Tsereteli's,25 and finally accepted the sensitive office of Minister
of Agriculture with the understanding that Kerensky's support would
assure the success of a land policy based on SR principles.^
Skobelev also raised difficulties; he made a strong attempt to acquire
control over naval affairs27 and was persuaded to enter the ministry
of labor only after the intervention of the Stavka and the cabinet.^8
But those dissatisfactions could be ignored, for the new ministers had
been opposed to the general principle of coalition and they would
naturally resent the specific conditions of their participation.

The

important point was that they assured a government of popular
confidence.29
Once that was accomplished the portfolio Kerensky particularly
desired, that of War and Navy,30 acquired great importance.

The

government was totally committed to an offensive, for it felt that
24see Tsereteli's explanations before a plenary session of the
Petrograd Soviet, cited in Izvestiia, May 9 , 1917, p. 5«
25v. Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii (Paris, 193*0♦

p. 373.
26s. 1. Shidlovskii, Vospominaniia. 2 vols (Berlin, 1923), II,

121.
27Tsereteli, I, 161.

28stankevich, p. 131.
29a. Kerenskii, "Natsional'nymi kylisami," Izdaleka. p. 96 .
30chemov, Rozhdenie, p. 373*
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success in the field would protect the revolution from German inter
ference and so restore domestic confidence that violent political
oscillation would be eliminated.31

As the coalition was predicated

upon a vigorous military effort, much would have to be subordinated
to the needs of the army and the wishes of the Minister of War.

Since

Alexander Guchkov resigned on May 1 under unusual conditions, with the
proper approach the ministry of war was virtually in Kerensky's hands.
Guchkov's letter of resignation, which had been given wide
currency in the press, made it clear that a conservative minister
could not hope to reverse the debilitating effects of Order Number
One.32

As the Cadets were excluded on that basis, and as the Stavka

was completely opposed to an unabashedly leftist candidate,33 Kerensky
came under active consideration.

The military leadership did advance

an alternative name: that of P. I. Pal'chinskii, an efficient
administrator and a former member of the M;ilitary Commission of the
State Duma.

But Kerensky countered Pal'chinskii's candidacy by

seeking the approval of the cabinet and the TsIK for himself, and the
two groups responded so vigorously that his appointment was virtually
a "directed governmental decision."34

A brief conversation between

Prince L'vov and General M. V. Alekseev, the Supreme Commander and the
acknowledged spokesman of the Stavka, settled the issue.

Prince L'vov

31see Kerensky's comments cited in Izvestiia, April 14, 1917,
p. 2.
32Russkie Vedomosti. May 2, 1917, p. 5*
33Stankevich, p. 131.
34see the excellent analysis in Birzhevye Vedomosti, May 3 ,
1917, p. 4.
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reminded the aged general of Kerensky's prior support of the army and
the war, his still considerable influence with the populace and the
Soviet, and his potential to moderate the disruptive effects of
military democratization.

When the Stavka yielded to the Minister-

President's arguments, Kerensky's appointment was formalized.35
Kerensky's acquisition of the ministry of war allowed continuity,
on an efficient basis, with Guchkov's policies, and was thus an
indirect assault on the verdict of the April Days.

His success in

placing M. I. Tereshchenko, the urbane former finance minister, into
the ministry of foreign affairs strengthened that attack by permitting
a sophisticated continuation of Miliukov's policies.

Even more than

in Kerensky's case, Tereshchenko's nomination involved a timely recog
nition of opportunity.

Prior to the May 2 negotiations, Victor Chernov

had been considered Miliukov's most likely successor.

He had led the

Soviet's resistance to governmental foreign policy, and most socialists
thought that as foreign minister he could best protect their
interests.36

But the Cadets opposed his candidacy for that very

reason, and Kerensky suggested that Tereshchenko fill the disputed
position37 when they threatened to boycott the cabinet unless Chernov
occupied another post.38

While the Ukrainian sugar producer's entry

was due more to general exhaustion by the various disputants than to
35a. Kerenskii, "Iz vospominanii," SZ, XXXVII (1928), 296 .
36stankevich, p. 131.
37Tsereteli, I, 159*
38d . Francis, Russia from the American Embassy: April 1916.
November 1918 (New York, 1921)’, p. 119.
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his actual qualifications,39 he completely satisfied Kerensky's
requirements.

Tereshchenko's imperialist leanings were disguised by

an idealistic p o s t u r e h e was fluent in French and familiar with
international a f f a i r s a n d he had, as of yet, acquired no dangerous
political enemies.*4-2

Furthermore, the new Foreign Minister was a firm

advocate of interclass cooperation and had already demonstrated his
affinity with Kerensky in a series of clashes with Miliukov.^3

His

presence in the cabinet significantly increased Kerensky's ability to
influence governmental policy.*4^
The TsIK's reluctance to become entangled in governmental admin
istration provided Kerensky with further opportunities to determine
the political complexion of the First Coalition.

A dearth of prominent

candidates for socialist-orientated posts allowed him to sponsor
successfully the appointments of two personal supporters: A. V.
Peshekhonov, a Popular Socialist, as Minister of Food,^5 and a former
deputy, P. N. Pereverzev, a Right SR, as Minister of Justice.^

As

these men were only minor political figures, their contributions to

39stankevich, p.

132.

*<-0p. Milioukov, Ch. Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, Histoire de
Russie: reforms, reaction, revolutions. 3 vols. (Paris, 1933). III»

1272.
^Tsereteli, I, 159*
^Nabokov, p. k6,
*4'3Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 329; Shidlovskii, II, 133*
^Kerenskii, "Iz vospominanii," p. 305*
*>-5Stankevich, p. 130.
^6a . Dem'ianov, "Moia sluzhba pri Vremennom Pravitel'stve,"
ARR, IV (1922), 78.
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the popularity of the new regime were marginal.

Their real signifi

cance lay in the resultant expansion of Kerensky's influence in the
ministerial Left.
Kerensky also established a solid foothold on the Right.

Of the

five Cadets in the ministerial council, only three, A. A. Manuilov, the
Minister of Education, A. I. Shingarev, the Minister of Finance, and
D. I. Shakhovskii, the Minister of Welfare, were reliable party
agents.^?

A. I. Konovalov, the Minister of Trade and Industry, and

N. V. Nekrasov, the Minister of Transport, had broken with Miliukov and
defended Kerensky in the first government.^8

The Minister of War also

retained the core of his support from the previous regime.

As V. N.

L'vov, I. V. Godnev, and Prince G. E. L'vov were in possession of their
former seats,^9 Kerensky was in a position to do considerably more than
determine the direction of foreign policy and the conduct of the war.
He controlled a powerful voting bloc theoretically able to dominate
the cabinet.50
While Kerensky held tangible advantages— concrete popular backing
in the form of socialist ministers, an institutionally powerful post,
a picked successor to his major rival, and imposing support within the
cabinet— his nadpartiinost' program faced new obstacles.

The Cadet

return to political orthodoxy presented the primary difficulty.

It

^?Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 380.
48yospominaniia, II, 329-330.
49VVP, May 6, 1917, p. 1.
50Kerensky had the potential virtually to engulf the ministerial
Left, for Tsereteli and Skobelev sided with him with great consistency.
See Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 374; P. Sorokin, Leaves from a Russian
Diary (New York, 1924), p. 89.
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had been the cause of Kerensky's opportunities from May 2 to May 5,
but it revived a situation with which he had never had success.

His

political ascendency began only after the revolution weakened the
strength of traditional party precepts, and their full resurrection
threatened him with a reversion to his Duma ineffectiveness.
Kerensky's creation of an intermediate bloc within the cabinet
accelerated that dangerous development, for it increased the intensity
of the Cadet response and jeopardized the support of Nekrasov and
Konovalov.

The Left Cadets' previous differences with Miliukov had

been more over methods than aims; findingtheir party in an unfavorable
position, they were increasingly drawn to the minority devices of
obstructionism, protest, and resignation.51

Since Kerensky's approach

to provisional rule was based upon the softening of class antagonisms,
his effectiveness diminished as class and party lines hardened.
Finally, the presence of Tsereteli and Chernov in the cabinet
significantly reduced Kerensky's tactical elasticity.

At a stroke,

the War Minister was deprived of his most dramatic argument: the claim
that he alone in the cabinet represented the democratic masses, that
defiance of his will was denial of the

r e v o l u t i o n . 52

While Kerensky

could still advance a modified version of that claim, it did not carry
the same force and he could not use itwith the imaginative freedom
that he had in the past.

5lAfter initial vacillation, Nekrasov decided to remain with
Kerensky. Konovalov chose a different course; on May 20, he resigned
from the government in protest of a cabinet decision to permit worker
control over factory policy. He was replaced by V. A. Stepanov, a
fellow Cadet. See VVP, May 21, 1917, p. 2.
52Nabokov, p. 40.
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Thus, the state of the cabinet and of Kerensky's position within
it were altered.

The First Coalition was more representative than its

predecessor, and was therefore more powerful and better able to command
the obedience of the population.

At the same time, it lacked its

previous homogeneity and was exposed to grave internal conflict.

Dual

power had not been abolished; it had been transferred from public view
to the cabinet, where it assumed more subtle, but sharper, forms.

The

Cadet denial of the spirit of coalition and the influx of new socialist
ministers also caused a serious erosion of Kerensky's moral authority.
While he did not fully understand the implications of those two related
e v e n t s , 53

Kerensky still surrendered unique assets in his quest for

enhanced power.

His institutional advantages were impressive, but they

could endure only as long as the coalition itself.
Because of its increased obligations, the longevity of the new
government was problematical.

Its ability to act decisively in natters

of war, foreign policy, and internal reconstruction were hampered by
the disastrous legacy of the April Days, and the magnitude of its tasks
promised to introduce stresses that could easily shatter it from
within. Had the cabinet been able to choose a policy of guarded re
trenchment and compromise rather than one of headlong retrieval, its
history would perhaps have been different.

In that special sense, and

in a way that he did not intend, Chernov was correct in observing that
the new regime was "trying to remedy a mistake of the past rather than
solving the problems of the present and the future."5^

In pursuit of

53Tsereteli, I, 121.
5^Chernov claimed that the time for class harmony had vanished
and the period of class struggle was at hand. Chernov, Rozhdenie, p.

37^.
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that goal, especially with regard to the war, the government expended
its strength in defiance of the increased risks of failure.
Kerensky had sought command of the war ministry because the war
was the major problem facing the country, but he was aware of his own
shortcomings and of the difficulties that lay ahead.

He was a lawyer,

not an expert in military affairs, and he felt the lack of a formal
military training.55

But his tours with Guchkov had revealed the

serious extent to which demoralization within the army had progressed,
and that destructive process had to be

r e v e r s e d . 56

Furthermore, only

a figure of revolutionary statue could attempt the military recon
struction necessary to an

o f f e n s i v e . 57

While the new War Minister

confronted a host of specific problems, most of them resolved them
selves into one central difficulty: how best to re-establish discipline
within the revolutionary climate fostered by Order Number One.
That declaration, issued unilaterally by the Petrograd Soviet on
March 1,58 threw the relationships between upper and lower ranks into
a state of great confusion.

Each of its major articles (subordination

of the military command to the Soviet in political matters, the
formation of military committees through election from the lower ranks,
the relaxation of off-duty discipline, and control of weapons by the
elected battalion committees)59 contributed severely to military

55VVP, May 11, 1917, p. 356see Kerensky's speech in VVP, April 30, 1917, p. 2.
57izvestiia, May 5, 1917, p. 2.
58m. V. Rodzianko, "Gosudarstvennaia Duma i Fevral'skaia 1917
goda revoliutsiia," ARR, VI (1922), ?k.
59izvestiia, March 2, 1917, p. 1.
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disorganization throughout the armed forces.60 Alexander Guchkov,
Kerensky's predecessor in the war ministry, had made a sincere effort
to strike an effective balance between the rival needs of discipline
and democratization.

On March 5, he abolished the use by enlisted men

of honorifics in military address and accepted the existence of
soldier's committees as a fait accompli.61

On the following day, he

announced the creation of a special commission, headed by General A. A.
Polivanov but composed equally of military personnel and Soviet dele
gates, charged with defining the mutual relations of officers and
men.

62

Until the latter part of April, Guchkov believed that a satis

factory compromise was possible.

Just prior to his resignation, in a

proclamation approving the principle of elected military courts, he
maintained that respect of authority could coexist with individual
freedom.63
Guchkov's inability to moderate the Soviet-backed proposals
of the Polivanov Commission finally caused him to re-evaluate his
position.

Unable to accept the abolition of saluting, corporal punish

ment, and the powers of commanders to appoint and dismiss
he resigned in protest.

o f f i c e r s , 64

While the War Minister's May 1 resignation

was symptomatic of the malaise affecting the entire government, he
still managed to transform it into an asset for his successor.
60y. 1. Nevskii, "Verkhovnoe komandovanie v pervye dni
revoliutsii," KA, V (1924), 228.
olvVP, March 7, 1917, p. 1.
62yyp, March 8, 1917, p. 1.
63VVP, April 20, 1917, p. 2.
64WP, May 3 , 1917, p. 1.

Guchkov

126
achieved that result by refusing to coordinate his retirement with
Miliukov's and by insisting that his action was provoked by conditions
which he, personally, had been unable to alter.65

He thus separated

military issues from the current crisis over foreign policy, dramatized
the difficult plight of the armed forces, and implied that a more
popular minister could prevail where he had been defeated.
Kerensky effectively exploited Guchkov1s resignation.

When its

impact was added to his still considerable status as a guardian of the
revolution and the government's renewed dedication to a strong military
effort, he had little difficulty in revising the Polivanov recom
mendations . As a result the new act, Order Number Eight (also known
as the Declaration of Soldiers' Rights), contained two vital clauses
that Guchkov had fought vainly to obtain.

It now provided for the use

of force to inspire obedience under combat conditions, and it allowed
commanders exclusive power in the appointment and temporary suspension
of

o f f i c e r s . 66

Kerensky's modifications were not entirelyunopposed;

Pravda launched a blistering attack upon them,67 and the All-Russian
Congress of Soviets expressed concern over the powers invested in the
Officer

Corps.

68

But the dominant socialist institution, the TsIK,

offered adequate support for Kerensky's actions and the reforms went

65VVP, May 2, 1917, p. 1. Miliukov considered Guchkov's act to
be a betrayal of liberal and nationalistic interests. See Miliukov,
Vospominaniia, II, 369.
66yypt May 14, 1917, p. 1. Order Number Eight effectively ended
the work of the Polivanov Commission, but Kerensky did not feel free to
disband it until July 14. See VVP, July 28, 1917, p. 2.
67izvestiia, May 26, 1917, P» 2.
68izvestiia, June 29, 1917, p. 5-
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into effect without serious difficulty.69
Order Number Eight strengthened discipline among the lower
military grades, but it did not provide adequate control over the army
command.
manner.

Kerensky approached that problem in a direct and brusque
Prior to his May 11 publication of Order Number Eight,

Kerensky announced that he required aid in "carrying the burden of the
Fatherland."

Accordingly, no resignations would be accepted from the

high command if such actions were designed to avoid responsibility or
to protest against democratic reform in the army.70

Evidently, he

anticipated a rash of resignations in response to Guchkov's, and he
was determined to prevent depletion of the Officer Corps.
The Minister of War was quickly provided with the opportunity to
demonstrate his sincerity.

On May 15 General V. I. Romeiko-Gurko, the

Commander-in-Chief of the Western front, declared that he could not
tolerate the contents of Order Number Eight, denied all moral respon
sibility for the satisfactory performance of his duties, and indicated
an intention to return to private life.

Kerensky refused to accept

his resignation, demoted him to the rank of divisional commander, and
made it clear that only Gurko's previous record prevented his being
reduced to the lowest ranks.71
citrant general had been harsh.

Kerensky's treatment of the recal
But at the same time, it had been an

indication to the Officer Corps that the major upheavals of the
Guchkov ministry (during which over a hundred generals had been

69lzvestiia, May 14, 1917, p. 2.
70VVP, May 6, 1917, p. 2.
71VVP, May 27, 1917, p. 1.
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retired) were ended.72
intensity.

Kerensky emphasized that point with great

Officers, he maintained, could look forward to a period

of personal security and military stabilization.

The "process of

revolutionizing the country and the army" had been completed, and
"creative work" could begin.73
As much as Kerensky wished to retain the confidence of the army
leadership, he was forced to accept some changes in command.

General

L. G. Kornilov, the Commander of the Petrograd Military District, had
resigned immediately before Guchkov7^ and was immune from Kerensky1s
injunction.

Since Kornilov's relations with the Petrograd garrison

were strained in any case, Kerensky felt it best to transfer him to
the front75 and to tolerate his replacement by General P. A. Polovtsev,
a former member of the Duma Military

C o m m i s s i o n . 76

The War Minister

also decided to replace General M. V. Alekseev, the Supreme Commander,
with General A. A. Brusilov, the former Commander of the Southwestern
(Galician) front.

While widely respected by the Officer Corps, 77

72yyp. April 5, 1917, p. 2; Chernov, Rozhdenie. pp. 392-393*
73A. I. Denikine, La decomposition de l'armee et du pouvoir,
Fevrier-Septembre, 1917 (Paris, 1921), p. 287. Kerensky's attitude
regarding promotions from the ranks is a good illustration of his
desire to placate the Officer Corps. Apparently, the only step he
took in that direction was an order on May 6 that authorized the
elevation of non-commissioned officers who lacked scholastic quali
fications to the rank of sub-lieutenant upon the recommendation of
their commanding officer. VVP, May 7, 1917, p. 2.
7^-Birzhevye Vedomosti, April 30, 1917, p. 5*
75VVP, May 9, 1917, p. 3*
76Birzhevye Vedomosti, April 30, 1917, p. 5*
77VVP, May 24, 1917, p. 5*

Alekseev had been a continual trial to

G u c h k o v , 78

sought every oppor

tunity to decry the democratic reforms that had taken place,79 and
continually advocated the postponement of offensive activities.80
Dismissal of the conservative general had not been completely within
Kerensky's power, for it required cabinet approval.

That was provided

on May 7, however, after Alekseev's public declaration that a peace
0*1

without annexations or indemnities was impossible.OJ- In many respects,
Brusilov was an excellent choice.

Since he had a deserved reputation

as a fighting general, his appointment was expected to have a catalytic
effect upon army morale.82 Also, he had often opposed the ideological
rigidity of the traditional army leadership, understood the necessity
of democratic reforms, and expresses a willingness to second Kerensky's
e f f o r t s . T h e War Minister recognized the mark of personal ambition
in Brusilov's political resiliency but still felt that he would be a
reliable associate.

The new Supreme Commander, he claimed, was a

"strong man" able to "create, to act, and to take risks."8^
While Kerensky had been at pains to strike a good working
relationship with the traditional military leadership, he chose to rely
primarily upon officers of a liberal cast.

Accordingly, he surrounded

78Nevskii, p. 238.
79"Fevral'skie revoliutsii 1917 goda," KA, XXL (1927),

69.

80m . Pokrovskii, "Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del," KA,

XXX (1928), 29.
81WP, May 11, 1917, p. k.
82Rech«, May 2k, 1917, p. 2.
83Denikine, p. 256.
8^Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 198.
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himself with persons of his own political persuasion.85

General

B. S. Romanovskii, one of the youngest generals in the army and a
partisan of Kerensky, was appointed Chief of Staff within the Stavka,
where he exercised considerable control over appointments.®® Lieu
tenant General A. A. Manikovskii, Colonel P. Iakubovich, and Prince
Tumanov were withdrawn from the Stavka and assigned positions as
Deputy Ministers of War.®?
judgement.

Those choices demonstrated impeccable

Manikovskii had been one of the few general officers to

advocate compromise with socialist demands,®® and both Iakubovich and
Tumanov had aligned themselves with the revolution from its outbreak,
had served in the Duma Military Commission,®9 and continued on good
terms with the Petrograd Soviet.90

The Minister of War also asked

Colonel V. L. Baranovskii, his brother-in-law, to head a military
cabinet designed to oversee political matters concerning the armed
forces.91

The army had proven itself the arbiter of the revolution,

and Kerensky intended to control it through the appointment of
®5Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 379*
86vvP, May 26, 1917, p. 1. General B. S. Romanovskii should not
be confused with General P. I.Romanovskii, who was involved deeply in
the Kornilov revolt.

®7Manikovskii's appointment is noted in Sjt^nkevich, p. 143;
Tumanov's can be found in VVP, May 26, 1917, p. 1; and Iakubovich's
is cited in VVP, May 11, 1917, p. 1.
88e. Varneck and H. Fisher, eds., The Testimony of Kolchak and
Other Siberian Materials (Stanford, 1935), p* 67.
89A. Kerensky, The Prelude to Bolshevism; the Kornilov Rising
(New York, 1919), pp. 286, 310.
9°Tsereteli, I, 13^-13591stankevich, p. 143.
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reliable subordinates.
Within a short period, Kerensky managed to retard the erosion
of authority affecting the lower ranks, to stabilize the Officer Corps,
and to submit the military to a supervisory organization of his own
creation.

But he could gain real freedom of action only be securing

command of the Soviet-appointed commissars attached to the various area
headquarters and by obtaining the respect of the army committees that
determined, to a great extent, the attitudes of the rank and file.
The War Minister easily accomplished both of these objectives.

The

practice of sending commissars to military commands had begun under
the first government, when the Soviet still feared counterrevolution;
at that time, socialist control over the political activities and
internal affairs of the army had been justified.92

Under a coalition

government and a socialist Minister of War, though, that no longer
seemed the case.

On May 6, after consultations with Skobelev and

Tsereteli, Kerensky was given complete jurisdiction over all military
commissars.93

Technically, the Petrograd Soviet retained some

influence, for Kerensky was obliged to notify it of specific actions
that he had taken.

But since the Soviet was dependent upon the

Ministry of War for any information that it might receive, it lost
practical control over the armed forces.9^

The army committees, for

similar reasons, yielded as completely as had the Soviet.

Headed in

92stankevich, p. 169.
93Tsereteli, II,

36.

S&While in effect from May 6 as an informal agreement, an
official proclamation transferring the commissars to Kerensky's control
was composed only on July; 14-. VVP, July 28, 1917, p. 2.
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large part by moderate SR's and Mensheviks, they gave Kerensky their
full support and contributed heavily to his popularity among the masses
of the soldiery.95
Demonstrating his usual political sensitivity, Kerensky had
balanced the needs of the Left and the Right without seriously compro
mising essentials in the revitalization of the military leadership.

He

adopted the same approach with the disciplinary mechanisms of the armed
forces.

In a characteristic appeasement of socialist sentiments, he

began with a judicial reform of the military courts.

Provisions were

made for the election of regimental court judges, and the resulting
boards had to be comprised of an equal number of officers and soldiers.
Juries, also comprising an equal number of officers and men, were
introduced into military circuit courts and army corps military courts,
to which crimes of a really serious nature were referred.

Jury

decisions were determined by majority vote; in case of a tie, the view
most favorable to the defendent was adopted.96
Kerensky also invested military committees with considerable
powers.

They were granted the right to share communication facilities

(except under urgent wartime conditions), they were given authority to
enforce discipline under normal circumstances, and they had an un
restrained right to conduct political education sessions among the
soldiers.

Furthermore, the committees were placed in possession of

broad powers in the examination of complaints and the conducting of

95lu. Danilov, La Russie dans la guerre mondiale. 1914-1917.
trans. A. Kaznakov (Paris, 1927), p. 542; Miliukov, Vospominaniia.

II, 379.
96Russkie Vedomosti, June 17, 1917, p. 2.
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appropriate investigations.

They were also allowed a significant

share in the determination of work loads and schedules.97
Those concessions allowed Kerensky to move into a quite different
area.

On May

30,

he imposed severe penalties upon persons convicted of

evasion of orders, open revolt, voluntary abandonment of assigned
positions, refusal to carry out orders, or incitement to those crimes.
Punishments included penal servitude and the loss of all civil rights.
The latter penalty was a particularly harsh one, for it included the
inability to serve in any public capacity, to take part in elections,
or to own property.

In the case of mass evasions of duty, when it

proved impossible to evaluate individual guilt, the recalcitrant
military units were subjected to disbandment.98
The passage of these disciplinary regulations completed
Kerensky's administrative reorganizations.

In order to assure the

"combat prepardness of the army," which he defined as his particular
mission,99 he had one other major duty: the generation of sufficient

enthusiasm for an offensive by a "free army of citizen soldiers."100
He began that task on May 12 with a whirlwind tour of the front.
Adopting an emotional approach, in which he argued that the army would
be "accursed" if it failed to defend the "honor and dignity" of free
R u s s i a , h e kindled patriotic demonstrations at almost every place

97izvestiia, May 25, 1917, p. 1.
98yyp, June 1, 1917, p. 1.
99a . Kerenskii, Ob armii i voine (Petrograd, 1917), p. 9«
lOOlzvestiia, May 14, 1917, p. 2.
IQlVVP, May 14, 1917, p. 1.
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that he appeared.I®2

By the end of May, reports flowing into the

Stavka from various army headquarters testified to Kerensky's effect
iveness and revealed heightened confidence in the probable success of
the offensive.1°3

Except for occasional moments of self-doubt, 1 ^ the

War Minister shared in the general optimism that was infecting govern
mental circles and widening portions of the army leadership.1^5

It

would have been difficult to react otherwise: his appearances before
the troops produced such excitement that his right arm was disabled
by the handshakes of fervent admirers.106
Active military operations were again feasible by the middle of
June.

At the same time, internal political developments dictated that

such attempts should be pressed forward without delay.

The general

euphoria over coalition had faded, and there were disturbing
intimations that the Left was reviewing its commitment to an aggressive
war policy.

Kerensky received his first indications of impending

difficulties shortly after June 6, when the TsIK secretly informed him
that he should obtain the support of the All-Russian Congress of
Soviets before launching an offensive.107

The Congress1 response,

102^. Pokrovskii and la. A. Iakovlev, eds., Razlozhenie armii
v 1917 goda; 1917 goda v dokumentakh i materialskh (Moscow, 1925),
p. 91.
!Q3fLazlozhenie. p.

89.

lO^Denikine, p. 266.
105stankevich, p. 160.
lO^Russell Diary, June 15, 1917, Charles Edward Russell Papers,
Box 3, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washington,
D. C.
107Tsereteli, II, 212.
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that the army should remain in a condition to "take either the
offensive or the defensive" and that a "purely military and strategic
point of view" should dictate the choice,108 indicated a return to
strict revolutionary defensism.
displayed the same tendency.

Other revolutionary institutions

The Third All-Russian Conference of the

SR Party refused to offer Kerensky membership in its Central Committee
because of his zealous militarism,109 and a sizable minority of the
Petrograd Soviet declined to send fraternal greetings to the army for
the same reason.HO

The final, and perhaps most ominous, sign of

gathering discontent was increasing restiveness in the Petrograd
garrison.

Kerensky's efforts to move its personnel and weaponry to the

front had been bitterly resented,m and some units had flatly refused
to cooperate.H2

Direct intervention by the TsIK moderated the

garrison's attitude, but that was accomplished only by equating
defiance of Kerensky with a "stab in the back" of comrades at the
front.113

Those warning signs could not be ignored; the offensive had

to begin before disenchantment in the rear affected the newly estab
lished situation on the front lines.
The Minister of War responded quickly to the altered political

IQBRech', June 13, 1917, p. 1.
109Pelo Naroda, June 9, 1917, p- !•
llORech1, June 13, 1917, p. 1.
llllzvestiia, June 23, 1917, p. 2.
112l. Toblin, "Iiul'skie dni v Petrograde," KA, XXIII (1927),

H 3lzyestiia, June 25, 1917, P» 7»
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circumstances.

His orders were dispatched on June 1 6 , and fighting

broke out on June 18 on the Galician front, July 7 on the Western,
July 8 on the Northern, and July 9 on the Rumanian front.H5

Initial

successes in Galicia, due chiefly to elaborate artillary preparation,
superior manpower, and the low morale of the opposing Austrian
troops,H6 supported the liberal thesis that victory would promote
internal stabilization.

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets reversed

its previous stand and expressed complete approval of the offensive,H ?
restlessness within the Petrograd garrison diminished,H 8 and the
capital was swept by patriotic outbursts unknown since the first year
of the war.119
Unfortunately, the celebrations were premature.

On July 6 a

German counter-blow shattered the Russian drive in Galicia,120 trans
formed the Russian divisions there into disorderly and panic-stricken
mobs, 121 and reduced the Russian assaults on other fronts into

localized holding actions.122

On July 13 Kerensky acknowledged defeat

n^VVP, June 20, 1917, p. 1.
115Pcnikine, pp. 266-267.

U6Nilioukov, Histoire, III, 1236-1237.
H 7lzyestiia, June 20, 1917, pH SRusskie Vedomosti. June 21, 1917, p. 1.
119Pelo Naroda, June 20, 1917, p. 1; Novoe Vremia, June 20, 1917,
p. 3; Birzhevye Vedomosti, June 22, 1917, p. 1.
120WP, July 11, 1917, p. 2.
121y. Vladimirova, "Bol'shevizatsiia fronta v prediiul1skie
dni 1917 g.," KA, LVIII (1933), 98.
122izvestiia, July 11, 1917, p. 1.
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by ordering: the armies on all fronts to stand on the defensive.
Galicia was lost, over 40,000 casulties had been sustained,123 and
irreparable damage had been inflicted upon the cohesion of the revo
lutionary armies.

The First Coalition's military gamble had failed,

and its bargaining power with the Allies, as well as its ability to
keen political extremism in check, dissolved along with its armies in
the field.
Kerensky was forced to endure heavy criticism for the failure of
the summer offensive.

Derisively called a Persuader-in-Chief by many

conservative officers, he was condemned for relying too much upon
moral exhortation and too little upon traditional methods of military
discipline.

That argument was perhaps best expressed by General

A. I. Denikin, then the commander of the Western front:
Kerensky called on the army to do its duty. He spoke of honor,
of discipline, of obedience to commanders. Vain WordsJ When
Russia was consumed in flames, he cried out to the fire:
Extinguish yourselfJ124
While accurate in part, that interpretation ignored both the narrow
framework in which the Minister of War was forced to operate and the
real administrative accomplishments that were due to his efforts.
Furthermore, the inevitability of military failure was clear only in
retrospect.

The short-lived enthusiasm of the troops was easily taken

for patriotic dedication,125 and not even the most skeptical officers

123N. N. Golovine, The Russian Army in the World War, ed.
Sir Paul Vinogradoff (New Haven, 1931). P* 275*
124oenikine, p. 253*
125Danilov, p. 542.
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anticipated the extent and rapidity of the Russian

c o l l a p s e . 126

Given

the political strictures that he was forced to tolerate and the state
of the army since February, Kerensky achieved as much as was possible.
His failure, and that of the coalition as a whole, lay in the erroneous
assumption that a strong: war posture could coexist with fundamental
domestic experimentation.
The resounding military catastrophe that destroyed the Russian
army as an effective instrument of state power was accompanied by the
disintegration of the government.

That event had been likely from the

beginning, when the Cadets renounced the conception of a Union Sacree
and considered their alliance with socialism as a temporary stage in an
ongoing political struggle.

But exposed though the cabinet was to

serious strains, a remarkable number of problems were required to
disrupt it.

Disputes over agrarian policy, a major crisis over the

status of the Ukraine, renewed disorders in Petrograd, and the
political repercussions of military defeat finally combined to

dis

credit the notion of coalition and to destroy the fragile balance that
had retarded the deepening of the revolution.

By the first week of

July, Kerensky's policy of class mediation had become obsolete.
Although he would elaborate brilliant stratagems to revitalize that
concept, his efforts would be frustrated by a diminishing base of
popular support.
An important element in the failure of the coalition experiment
was the inability of the government to formulate an effective agrarian
policy.

While the peasantry remained passive during the first weeks

126p. Browder and A. Kerensky, eds., The Russian Provisional
Government, 1917; Documents, 3 vols. (Stanford, 1961), II, 998-1010.
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of the revolution, incidents of agrarian disorders rose dramatically
in April and May.127

Governmental ineffectiveness apparently

reinforced that trend, 128 for j_n june the number of land seizures and
rural disturbances doubled over the preceding month.129

Chernov

admitted that irreversible action relating to land ownership would
compromise the work of the Constituent Assembly, but he was convinced
that interim measures were necessary to pacify the rural population.
As a result, he moved to halt the conversion of communal holdings into
private property and proposed a ban on land transactions to preserve
a land fund upon which the Constituent Assembly could act.

In order

to facilitate those two measures, the Minister of Agriculture further
proposed to establish land committees that would specify the conditions
of land use until a permanent solution could be

achieved.

^-30 These

proposals were familiar, for Kerensky had advanced them in the first
cabinet.

But there was a substantial difference between a statement

of principle and the direct threat of implementation.

Prince L'vov,

charging that such actions would "undermine the people's respect for
the law" and "confront the Constituent Assembly with an accomplished
fact," led the liberal opposition that blocked Chernov's program.^31
As the embattled Agriculture Minister refused either to modify or to
shelve his proposals, the issue remained in public view.

Socialist

127VVP, July 14, 1917, p. 1.
128}*. p., "Bor'ba za zemliu v 1917 g.," KA* LKXVII (1936), 90.
129m. Marminov, "Agramoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu po dokumentam
glavnogo zemel'nogo komiteta," KA, XIV (1926), 215.
130Pelo Naroda, July 9, 1917, p. 1.
13lRusskie Vedomosti, July 4, 1917, p. 4.
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demands for land reform intensified, 132 and the publicity generated
by the cabinet's internal conflict increased the serious unrest already
afflicting the countryside.133
The nationality problem posed an even more severe challenge to
the cabinet than the agrarian issue.

Fundamental land reform assured

a gradual redistribution of wealth and a realignment of classes, but
the status of the Russian borderlands immediately affected the power,
resources, and international standing of the nation.

Furthermore, the

integrity of the centralized state was definitely threatened.

The

breakdown of imperial order throughout the country allowed the
outlying nationalities to gather local authority into their own hands,
and the feeble machinery of the Provisional Government was insufficient
to reverse that process.

Because of the ingrained resentment of the

national minorities against the Russification policies of the old
regime, de facto autonomy automatically revived separatist tendencies
in the border regions.3-3^
Influenced by its nationalistic liberal majority, the cabinet
vigorously defended the principle of national unity.

Kerensky, as

committed as any liberal to the doctrine of an indivisible Russia,
upheld that position in a June 11 speech, when he asked the democrats
of the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Finland to maintain their ties with
Russia.

The Constituent Assembly, he declared, was the only organ

3-32izvestiia, June 27, 1917, p. 9*
133VVP, July 14, 1917, p. 1.
13%he V. A. Maklakov Archive of the Russian Embassy in Paris,

1917-1924, 4 boxes, Collection of the Hoover Institute at Stanford
University, box 1, accession no. 26003-937-
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empowered to fix the relations between the Russian people and its
outlying nationalities.

Any premature attempt at dismemberment, he

continued, would result in the collective ruin of all concerned
parties.^85

The nationalistic Minister of War had already indicated

a readiness to supplement persuasion with force.

At a speech in

Helsingfors on May 10, he warned Finnish separatists that the govern
ment would not move beyond the restoration of the Finnish constitution.
Extremists, Kerensky added, should be especially careful not to
"confuse love with weakness."

Revolutionary Russia, the source of

"creative strength," could mobilize power superior to that of tsarism
and had to be "taken into account."136
That threatening stance helped to keep most of the centrifugal
forces in check.

The intimidated Finnish Sejm resisted considerable

popular pressure for a formal declaration of independence,^? pleading
that the moment was not propitious.138

Estonia, Latvia, and Livonia

followed Finland's general lead, but showed a greater tolerance for
the concept of autonomy within a loosely federated republican
system.-*-39 A similar pattern of temporary restraint appeared in most
other outlying regions of the former empire.

In the Caucasus, the

various national committees kept full control over local affairs.

But

for the sake of military defense against Turkey, they were careful to

135Russell Diary, July 8, 1917.
136izvestiia, May 30, 1917, p. 4.
137lzvestiia, June 23, 1917, p. 6.
3-38yiiiiukov, Vospominaniia, II, 391.
139s. M. Dimanshtein, ed., Revoliutsiia i natsional1nyi vopros
(Moscow, 1930), pp. 226 ff.
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recognize the principle of national unity.1^0

Turkestan also main

tained the tenuous balance between submission to the central government
and de facto independence.

The government-appointed Turkestan

Committee, which supposedly administered the province, exercised little
meaningful influence.

Yet serious political differences between

traditionalists and westemizers divided the Moslem ranks, and mutual
suspicion between Russian settlers and the indigenous population
checked an immediate drive for full autonomy.
The Ukraine did not feel a comparable need for prudent measures.
The most important and populous of Russia's border regions, possessed
of a proud cultural tradition and led by fervent nationalists, it
moved steadily toward collision with the Provisional Government.

The

March 20 governmental declaration removing restrictions on national
minorities had only a palliative effect,1^3 and throughout April and
May Ukrainian demands for effective self-government multiplied.
Michael Hrushevskii, a lifelong proponent of Ukrainian independence
and the President of the Central Rada (the dominant organ of regional
goverranent) brought the issue into the open on May JO.

In a note

addressed jointly to the Provisional Government and to the TsIK,
Hrushevskii issued a clear challenge to established minority policy.
He called for the recognition of the Ukrainian right to autonomy; the
lAODimanshtein, pp. 392-402.
141«iz istorii natsional'noi politiki Vremennago Pravitel1stva,"
KA, XXX (1928), 79.

142"Xz dnevnika A. h. Kuropatkina,11 KA, XX (1927), 65*
l43Sbornik ukazov i postanovlenii Vremennago Pravitel'stva.
2 vols. (Petrograd, 19177, I, 46-49-
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admission of Ukrainian delegates to international conferences dealing
with the rectification of national borders; the formation of Ukrainian
military units in the rear and, where possible, at the front; the
immediate consolidation of the Southwestern provinces into a discrete
Ukrainian political unit; and the transfer of state funds to the
R a d a .

344

There is no doubt that Hrushevskii's demands reflected

popular sentiments.

April congresses of the Ukrainian Socialist Revo

lutionary and Socialist Democratic parties, the Ukrainian National
Congress (convoked by the Rada to broaden its popular base), the AllUkrainian Peasant Congress, and the First Ukrainian Military Congress
oassed similar resolutions.345
The cabinet rejected the Ukrainian demands on the tested grounds
that the self-appointed Rada had not been elected democratically and
that the will of the Constituent Assembly could not be compromised.346
But it soon became apparent that a mutual accommodation was necessary.
The political freedom that existed within the armed forces promoted
contact between Ukrainian nationals, and after the convocation on
May 6 of the First Ukrainian Military Congress the formation of ethnic
units advanced at an alarming rate.

While Kerensky was completely

opposed to the fragmentation of the army, which jeopardized the pending
offensive,347 he was unable to halt the process.348

His helplessness

344a . Choulguine, L ’Ukraine contre Moscou, 191? (Paris, 1935),
p. 117.
l45Choulguine, p. 97146VVP, July 2, 1917, p. 2.
1471. V. Demkin, ed., Velikaja Oktiabr1skaia sotsialisticheskaja
revoliutsiia na Ukraine, 3 vols. (Kiev, 1957), I, 304-305.
148izvestiia, June 2, 1917, p. 2.
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was demonstrated on June 5 by the convocation, against his orders,^49
of a Second Ukrainian Military Congress*

Meeting under the protection

of the Central Rada, the congress declared its intent to create a
separate national army despite the wishes of the government or the war
ministry.150
position.

That action placed Kerensky in an extremely difficult

He could remain true to his Great Russian proclivities,

refuse to treat with the Rada, and accept the continued disintegration
of the army; or he could seek an agreement that would at least protect
the integrity of the armed forces.

In a typical display of tactical

elasticity and faith in the future, he chose the latter course.
The opportunity for a settlement arose after the June 10
proclamation of the First Universal by the Ukrainian Central Rada.
That declaration, virtually one of independence, announced the complete
re,lection of the Provisional Government's authority within the
boundaries of the Ukraine.

It also established the Rada as the tempo

rary ruling body of that area, promised the swift convocation of a
national assembly to establish a permanent government, and called for
the creation of a national army.151

Neither a direct appeal by the

Provisional Government to the Ukrainian population!52 nor the open
airing of the possibility of civil war by the Russian liberal press!53

I49pravda, June 2, 1917, p- 2.
150stankevich, p. 148.

151p. N. Sobolev, ed., Velikaia Oktiabr1skaja sotsialisticheskaia
revoliutsiia, khronika sobytii, 4 vols~ (Moscow, 1957-196l), II, 417.
152VVP, June 17, 1917, p. 1.
153For example, see Russkie Vedomosti, June 18, 1917, p. 3*

14$
proved to be deterrents.

The broadening crisis, exacerbated by the

appearance of a Ukrainian General Secretariat that gave immediate form
to the threat of self-rule, was met by a proposal from Tsereteli,
Chernov, and Skobelev for direct negotiations.

On June 26, despite

strong Cadet misgivings that Russian national interests would be
sacrificed by such a precipitous move, the cabinet resolved to dispatch
Kerensky, Tsereteli, and Tereshchenko to Kiev.15^
In all probability, Cadet fears were aroused by Tsereteli’s
inclusion in the cabinet delegation.

Socialistic distrust of the

unitary nation-state was well known, and recent debates on the
Ukrainian question in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets had revealed
considerable sympathy for the principle of regional autonomy.^55

But

if the Cadets depended upon Kerensky to defend the inviolability of the
centralized state at that particular time, they were to be seriously
disappointed.

The Minister of War realized that the cohesion of the

army depended upon the results of the Rada negotiations.

Since further

decomposition endangered the offensive and, through it, the very
existence of revolutionary Russia, he was willing to subordinate all
other considerations to military
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At the Kiev Conference, which lasted from June 28 to June 30, he
achieved that end at the exclusion of almost everything else.
essential Ukrainian demands were accepted.

The

The General Secretariat

was acknowledged to be the central administrative institution, the

15M'sereteli, II, 133*
155lzvestiia, June 16, 1917, p«
156choulguine, p.

123.
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Southwestern provinces were merged into a single area under the
authority of the Rada, and the legislative acts of the Rada were
accepted as complete and binding upon the cabinet.

A final concession,

one that further alienated the Cadets, specified that the Constituent
Assembly would determine the transfer of land within the Ukraine
according to Socialist Revolutionary principles.
Rada agreed to moderate its military demands.

In exchange, the

Ukrainian national

units were to be formed only where the combat effectiveness of the
army would not be imperilled, governmental recruitment within the
Ukraine was allowed to continue, and the Russian military command in
Kiev was freed from interference by local authorities.157
The Ukrainian agreement was presented on a non-negotiable basis
to the ministerial council on July 2, despite Cadet objections that
such a course was "judicially incompetent" and a "betrayal of Russian
interests."158

Kerensky's passionate insistence that the document

immediately be approved won the requisite cabinet support, but the
Cadets responded with wholesale resignations.159
was both vitriolic and theatrical.

Kerensky's reaction

He condemned the Cadet ministers

for needlessly complicating the government's position during a time of
crisis,150 urged the rump cabinet to retain power with its present
membership until a convenient time could be found for its expansion,

157d . A. Chugaev, et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v
Rossii v Iiule 1917 g.; Iiul'skii krizis (Moscow, 1959). P» 506.
158Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 391.
159lzvestiia, July 4, 1917, p. 3*
160Kerensky, "Iz vospominaniia," p. 301.
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and made a dramatic departure from Petrograd to prepare for the
impending offensive on the Western front.161
The cabinet's disruption was particularly untimely, for it
coincided with a serious increase of tension within the capital.
Chronic unrest within the Petrograd garrison!62 was supplemented by
a general disenchantment with the failure of Chernov’s agrarian
proposalsl63 and recent governmental refusals to expedite worker
control over the factories.164

But perhaps the most important cause

of popular disaffection was the steadily growing influence of the
Bolshevik Party among the revolutionary workers and soldiers of Petrograd.

Under the vigorous leadership of V. I. Lenin, the Bolsheviks had

been hammering incessantly at the government.

Their objections to the

launching of an offensive prior to a suitable revision of war aimsl65
were especially effective; that approach inflamed a garrison manifestly
opposed to fighting and an urban population increasingly resentful of
the sacrifices demanded by the war.

The abrupt Cadet resignations

touched off the gathering violence.166

From July 3 to July 5, Petro-

grad was exposed to mass disorders of a magnitude unknown since the
fall of the monarchy.16?

161a . Ker-enskii, "Arest1 bol1shevikov,11 Izdaleka. p. 170.
l62Tobolin, p. 58.
I63lzvestiia, July 6, 1917, P- 2.
l64yyp t june 28, 1917, p. 3*
l65Pravda, May 11, 1917, p. 1.
l66Kerenskii, "Iz vospominanii," p. 301.
l67solobev, II, 458.
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The predominant characteristic of the radical uprising during
the July Days, and one that detracted seriously from its effectiveness,
was its unplanned and uncoordinated nature.

As B. 0. Bogdanov, a

member of the TsIK, observed, confusion was so widespread that he
could not determine whether the movement was an armed uprising or an
armed demonstration.168

The disturbances possessed a Leninist com

plexion from the outset, for they were conducted under the slogans
"Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers" and "All Power to the
Soviets. "169

But so long as they retained their spontaneous nature,

neither the truncated cabinet nor the Petrograd Soviet dared to attempt
forcible suppression.

That situation changed on July 4 when the

Bolsheviks assumed responsibility for the m o v e m e n t . W i t h the July
Days clearly identified with a radical leftist party, revolutionary
spontaneity was transformed into conspiracy and Kerensky was able to
intervene.

The War Minister was delighted at the opportunity to strike

at the major anti-war
of the cabinet,^ 1

party in thecountry.

he directed

Acting with theconsent

loyaltroops towardthecapital and

allowed the release of information linking Lenin with the flow into
Russia of German funds.^ 2

The arrival in Petrograd of government

troops, together with charges of treason against the Bolshevik leader
ship, produced a rapid restoration of order.173

l68Tobolin, XIV (1927), 6 9 .
169Nabokov, p. 77•
170Delo Naroda, July 5, 1917, p. 1.
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Provisional Government was again in full command of the situation.174
The leaders of the moderate Left greeted the quelling of the
July disorders with open relief,175 for the socialist party organ
izations, far more than the Provisional Government, had been the
targets of mass hostility.176

But their sentiments turned into con

sternation on July 5* after Kerensky declared a vendetta against the
entire radical Left.

The public accusations of treason against Lenin

served a valuable purpose in pacifying the garrison, but they were not
sufficiently substantiated to warrant the widespread arrests of
Bolshevik leadersl77 and the governmental seizure of the Bolshevik
headquarters at the Kshesinskaia Palace.178
Kerensky's arbitrary manner.

The TsIK also resented

His decision to dismiss Pereverzevl79

and General Polovtsov on grounds of incompetence,180 his summary
disbandment of garrison units,1®1 and his countenance of excessive
force in the confiscation of weapons and the dispelling of street
gatherings!82 seemed unnecessary.

The TsIK still retained confidence

174yyp, July 9, 1917, p. 1.
175lzvestiia, July 5, 1917, p. 1.
176izyestiia, July 4, 1917, p. 2.
177Dem'ianov, pp. 93-94.
178Kerenskii, "Iz vospominanii," p. 305*
179VVP, July 9, 1917, p. 3* Pereverzev was replaced in the
Justice Ministry by I. N. Efremov. VVP, July 11, 1917, p. 3.
180p. a . Polovtsov, Dni zatmeniia (Paris, 1927), p. 140.

181WP, July 8, 1917, p. 1.
182yypt July 8, 1917, p. 1. For additional information, see
Kerenskii, "Arest1 Bol1shevikov," p. 169*
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in the parity of Kerensky's motives, but they agreed to approve his
methods only after he coupled revelations about the extent of the
Galician defeat with a threat of resignation.183
Although the TsIK accepted the necessity of an anti-Bolshevik
crusade, they began maneuvers designed to limit the scope of reaction.
The outlines of that prudent campaign appeared on the evening of
July 5* when the SR and Menshevik Central Committees demanded that for
the time being the rump cabinet act in accordance with the wishes of
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.184

Their demand, born of an

awareness of vulnerability and a fear of counterrevolution, created a
very dangerous situation.

By unilaterally reducing the independence

of the cabinet and reintroducing dual power in the midst of a serious
political crisis, it cleared the way for open class warfare.
Kerensky, determined to retain the initiative, immediately sought
an understanding with the moderate Left.

On the night of July 6, in

an informal meeting with the leading figures of the Soviet democracy,
he advanced concrete proposals for future political tactics.185

His

preferred solutions were characteristic, and included opportunism and
the balancing of class interests.

The July Days and the current

difficulties at the front, he maintained, had served to discredit Left
extremism.

In an excited manner, which Tsereteli later described as

".joyful and stimulated," the War Minister claimed that a "blessed
turning point in the mood of the country" had been reached and that
l83Kerensky, Catastrophe, pp. 243-244.
184Russkie Vedomosti, July 9, 1917, p. 4.
185The participants were Tsereteli, Chernov, Skobelev, Chkheidze,
F. I. Dan, and A. R. Gots. See Tsereteli, II, 3^8.
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the opportunity was finally present for the exercise of "solid power."
While the imposition of strong rule was both desirable and inevitable,
Kerensky continued, it should be prefaced by a demonstration of
socialist strength and proceed with socialist participation.

In that

way, counterrevolution would be checked and the restoration of the
government could be accompanied by tangible concessions to popular
demands.186

Despite some spirited opposition, especially from the

Menshevik F. I. Dan, Kerensky's arguments prevailed.187
That demonstration of socialist strength, designed in large part
to place Kerensky at the head of a cabinet of his own choice, assumed
a dramatic form.

On July 7, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets

confronted the government with a list of controversial demands: the
dissolution of the State Duma; proclamation of a republic; immediate
passage of Chernov's agrarian legislation; and adoption of an active
peace policy.188

Prince L'vov, justifiably angered by their peremptory

tone, attacked them as a "deviation from non-party principles" in favor
of "purely socialistic aims" and withdrew from the cabinet.189

Upon

his resignation, he suggested that Kerensky occupy his vacated
position.190
Kerensky has sturdily defended his analysis of July 6, main
taining that Prince L'vov's resignation opened the way to genuine

186rSereteli, II, 348.
187Sukhanov, Revolution. II, 473*
188pelo Naroda, July 8, 1917, P* 2.
189Russkie Vedomosti, July 9, 1917, p. 4.

190t . I. Polner, Zhiznennyi put Kniazia Georgiia Evgenievicha
L'vova (Paris, 1932), p. 255«
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political stabilization.

In the first weeks following the collapse

of the July rising, he claimed, unrest subsided in the countryside,
the factories, and the front.191

That constructive process, which

protected and extended the gains of the revolution, was reversed only
by the intervention of "reckless generals" who had an inferior under
standing of state
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Even before the formation of the ill-fated

Second Coalition, however, there were indications that the lull would
prove temporary, that the July Days and the military reverses had
produced a sharpening of class antagonisms, and that further revo
lutionary spasms lay ahead. Kerensky’s conviction that Bolshevism was
a political aberrationl93 blinded him to the real meaning of July 3*
He joined liberals and moderate socialists in attributing the disorders
to conspiracy,194 but the tardy Bolshevik response to the July Days
indicated that the Petrograd masses were more radicalized than even
they had suspected.

If such substantial and continuing popular

dissatisfactions could build up while the government leaned on the
Petrograd Soviet, it was unlikely that a Right resurgence would dispel
them.
At the same time that mass support for the Provisional Govern
ment was eroding, Kerensky chose to court the political Right.

Since

in many respects he was more nearly a liberal than a socialist, he was
drawn naturally to that course of action.

Yet the past months had

191A. Kerenskii, "Fevral' i Oktiabr'," SZ, IX (1922), 287.
192Kerenskii, "Politika," p. 421.
l93Kerenskii, "Arest1 bol'shevikov," p. 170.
194VVP, July 9, 1917, p. 1.
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demonstrated the popularity of radical socialist ideals, and the
non-socialist parties could no longer look forward to ideological
vindication in the Constituent Assembly.

Under those circumstances,

adherence to strict non-partisan policies and democratic principles
was a form of political suicide.

Kerensky hoped to exploit the July

Days in order to establish a poxverful, independent government that
could protect state interests and exercise control over disruptive
forces at each end of the political spectrum.

In fact, he placed

himself and his moderate allies between a weakened but resentful Left
and a frightened, belligerent Right.

That course of action led

directly to the political convulsions of August and September.

CHAPTER V

THE FINAL BID FOR POLITICAL STABILIZATION

Prince L'vov resigned on July 7 because of a conviction that the
rupture between liberals and socialists could not be healed and that
the country was on an unavoidable course toward civil war.

His

participation in the Provisional Government had been based on the
premise that moderate policies would preserve the best of the old
order and provide a painless transition to the new one.l

The July

Days and the attendant polarization of politics shattered that belief.
Although the former Finister-President assumed a public position of
confidence in the possibilities for compromise,2 he revealed his acute
discouragement to T. I. Polner, a close friend and future biographer.
He made way for Kerensky, Prince L'vov told Polner on July 9, because
it was time for a strong leader to assume control of the state.

The

salvation of Russia required the forcible dispersion of the soviets
and the firing upon of the populace, and while he could not issue such
orders, Kerensky could.3

lv. Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii; Fevral1skaia
revoliutsiia (New York, 193*0. P» 33***
2Russkoe Slovo, July 12, 1917, p. 3*
3T. I. Polner, Zhiznennyi put' Kniazia Georgiia Evgenievicha
L 1vova (Paris, 1932), p. 258.
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Kerensky certainly had not manipulated Prince L'vov's
resignation in order to wage war indiscriminately upon the socialist
forces, but he did agree that the former Minister-President1s useful
ness had come to an end.

It was necessary, Kerensky recalled later,

to complete the rout of the extreme Left and to curb anarchy.
Unfortunately, Prince L'vov's nature was too gentle to permit the
external compulsion that was now required.2* Kerensky's decision to
assume formal leadership did seem to be a sound one.

The collapse

of the Galician front, the July uprising, and the Cadet resignations
had created a dangerous situation, and it was evident that the nation
was gravely imperilled.

Kerensky's personal standing among the

masses was still unrivaled,5 he had demonstrated a capacity for de
cisive action in the suppression of the Bolshevik disorders,6 and he
was guaranteed support from the socialist leadership in the intro
duction of disciplinary measures.7

In that crucial time, replete with

danger and with opportunity, it seemed imperative that he be in a
Q

position to implement fully his nadpartiinost' program.
Kerensky was equally confident that the political Right would
accept his leadership and, in particular, that the Cadet Party would
extend full cooperation.

Since his attempt to strengthen the

**A. Kerenskii, "Iz vospominaniia," SZ, XXXVIII (1929), 251.
5p. Milioukov, Ch. Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, Histoire de
Russie; reforms, reaction, revolutions, 3 vols. (Paris, 1933), HI,
1280.
6p. A. Polovtsov, Dni zatmeniia (Paris, 1927), p. 1^0.
7l. G. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia o Fevral'skoi revoliutsii.
2 vols. (Paris, 1963), II, 3^8.
BKerenskii, "Iz vospominaniia," p. 251.

156

non-socialist forces and still exert control over them came to such a
dismal end, it is useful to examine his evaluation of the current
political situation.

Kerensky's key assumption, and in retrospect hie

most surprising one, was that liberal disenchantment with coalition
politics could be totally discounted.

In referring to the July 2

resignations of the Cadet ministers, he argued that their "unfounded
dissatisfaction" was of "no particular significance." The Cadets,
Kerensky continued, had simply panicked under stress; in less difficult
circumstances, the crisis would have dissolved "quickly and without
trouble."9 An important factor in his calculations was a conviction
that neither agrarian reform nor the Ukrainian problem were at the
root of Cadet discontents.

The real issue that had provoked the

ministerial withdrawals was the disproportionate influence of the
Petrograd Soviet in the conduct of governmental affairs.16 Since the
previous imbalance had been corrected by the defeat of Left extremism,
liberals could re-enter the cabinet with clear consciences.H
Kerensky's optimism stemmed from confidence in the beneficent
effects of the Bolshevik rising and from faith in his ability to
establish an effective regime under those new conditions.

Yet, he did

have specific cause to believe that the Cadets would prove tractable.
N. V. Nekrasov, who acted as Kerensky's link to the Cadet Central
Committee in much the same fashion as Vladimir Zenzinov did with
%. Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky's Own Story of the
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927), p. 236.
lOKerenskii, "Iz vospominaniia," XXXVII (1928), 301.
UTsereteli, II, 3^8*
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regard to the TsIK,12 informed him that serious stresses existed
within the Petrograd party leadership.13 Miliukov had encountered
grave difficulties in a crucial meeting on July 1, and he had barely
been able to win approval for the ministerial resignations of the
following day.

The obvious connection between the Cadet withdrawals

and the beginning of the holshevik uprising served further to under
mine Miliukov's authority, and important segments of the liberal press
were sharply critical of his ideological inflexibility.^ Nekrasov's
public airing of the supposedly confidential Central Committee pro
ceedings, 15 which Kerensky had probably encouraged, generated lively
polemics among liberals throughout the country,16 and it appeared
entirely possible that Miliukov's hard-line policies would be
repudiated.17
Kerensky was to be disappointed, for the Cadet Party was not at
all ready to topple into his hands.

Liberal dissatisfaction with

the coalition experiment ran too deep to be easily expurged, and
Miliukov kept control over his forces.

Furthermore, he came to his

own conclusions about the meaning of the July Days, and they
were wholly incompatible with Kerensky's.

The acting Minister-

12p. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, 185^-1917, 2 vols. (New York,
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President saw in the disorders a discrediting of irresponsible
extremism and a growing socialist commitment to political restraint.
The Cadet statesman discerned in them a welcome division in the
previously united socialist ranks and an ebbing of socialist power.18
The satisfaction with which he noted the appearance of that rift
indicated that he saw an opportunity to consolidate the state on his
own terms.

Most liberals, significant elements of the army command,

and virtually the whole of privileged Russia would arrive at a similar
interpretation.

The results would be the political isolation of the

Provisional Government, attempted counterrevolution, and the
intensification of the radical revolution.

Since the February Days,

Kerensky’s political instincts had been remarkably trustworthy.

But

on this occasion his self-confidence, his natural optimism, and his
persistent underestimation of the power of class interests blinded him
to the evident discontents of the Right and the real danger inherent
in its revitalization.
But at first events occurred much as Kerensky anticipated.

He

assumed control over the cabinet immediately upon Prince L'vov's
withdrawal,19 and the Soviet leadership responded with an abandonment
of its demands for the dissolution of the Duma, the proclamation of a
republic, and the deference of the cabinet to the will of the AllRussian Congress of Soviets.

In fact, the July 8 declaration of the

truncated government conceded very little to the socialist pressures
that had been applied in the recent past.

Prior demands for an active

l%!iliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 39^-•

19v. Nabokov, "Vremennoe Pravitel’stvo," ARR, I (1922), 79.
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peace policy found reflection in a renewed dedication to revolutionary
defensism, and the cabinet merely promised to "propose" an Allied
conference for the revision of war aims.

The intense agitation of

Petrograd workers for an eight-hour day and control of factory adminis
tration was met by an agreement to draft bills "concerning" those
issues.

The only firm commitments that Kerensky and his surviving

colleagues accepted were the holding of elections to the Constituent
Assembly on September 1?, the abolition of civil ranks and orders, and
an agreement that the land should be transferred to the toilers.20
The cabinet's ambiguous stand on these vital issues won the complete
acceptance of the VTsIK (the All-Russian Central Executive Committee)
and the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasants Deputies, and
on July 9 they named the Provisional Government the "Government to
Save the Revolution."21 The title was meaningful.

Kerensky's rump

cabinet was invested with "unlimited power" to restore military
discipline and combat extremism,22 and an Izvestiia editorial urged
the population to "give it all your strength and all your resources."23
The July 9 Soviet debates had revealed the precarious state of
the army and the pressing need for forceful measures against military
dissolution,2^ and the government responded on July 12 with a limited
reintroduction of the death penalty for servicemen.

While the

20yyp. July 8, 1917, p. 1.
21lzvestiia, July 11, 1917, p. 6.
22Bjrzhevye Vedomosti, July 11, 1917, P- 123Izvestiia, July 11, 1917, p. 1.
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cabinet agreed unanimously that the act was necessary,25 Kerensky
signed it reluctantly and only after erecting numerous safeguards for
the benefit of the accused.

The measure applied only in the zones of

active military operations, the special courts which conducted the
proceedings were composed equally of officers and men, and initiative
for a trial had to come from at least the level of divisional
commander.

Also, simplified procedures were established for the miti

gation of sentences.

As he explained in the promulgation of the

decree, its passage had been a "painful decision" taken to correct a
"tragic" situation.26

Kerensky’s entire approach to government in the

post-July period was foreshadowed in the way he handled the restor
ation of the death penalty.

The turn to the Right was to be both

gradual and qualified, revolutionary idealism was to be preserved as
much as possible, and only after threats failed was actual punishment
to be carried out.

As much as any other factor, it was Kerensky's

continued dedication to moderation and restraint in times of crisis
that led to the profound liberal and conservative disenchantment with
his leadership.
Non-socialists were also disgruntled with Kerensky's abrupt
July 12 ban on land transactions.

But in his view, that act resulted

from a happy coincidence of necessity and principle.

He had long

advocated the preservation of a land reservoir that the Constituent
Assembly could draw upon on short notice, and the new law would
certainly accomplish that aim.

Land speculation, fictitious sales,

25Pelo Naroda, September 15, 1917, p. 2.
26v v p , July 13, 1917, p. 3-
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and the encumbering of property with mortgages were hindered by a
requirement that all deeds passed since March 1, 1917, be approved by
both the ministry of agriculture and local guberniia land committees.
Furthermore, any property put up for public auction could be taken
under state management at the discretion of those two agencies.27

The

act satisfied Kerensky's populist sentiments, he was convinced that it
marked an important step in pacifying the restive peasantry, and it
discharged a personal promise that he had made to the socialist Star
Chamber on July 6.28

The new ban, which Russkie Vedomosti promptly

termed "monstrous,"29 also served to remind liberals that they had
only harmed themselves by boycotting the cabinet.
After the passage of the agrarian legislation on July 12,
Kerensky was prepared to negotiate with the Right for the recon
struction of the ministry.

But while he was convinced that the "quick

rehabilitation of the nation" required the presence within the cabinet
of liberal ministers,30 he was determined that the new ones would
prove more adaptable than their predecessors.

Accordingly, he tried

to circumvent Miliukov's militant Petrograd organization, which had
expressed strenuous opposition to the July 8 declaration.

On July 12,

in a transparent effort to exploit the recent dissension in liberal
ranks, he offered portfolios to the Moscow Cadets N. I. Astrov and

27VVP, July 14, 1917, p. 1.
28rsereteli, II, 348. The term refers to those prominent
socialists, including Chernov, Tsereteli, Dan, Chkheidze, Gots, and
Skobelev, who dominated the TsIK and the VTsIK.
29Russkie Vedomosti, July 29, 1917, p. 1.
30Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 250.
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N. M. Kishkin and the Moscow Trade-Industrialist S. N. Tret'iakov.31While Kerensky had chosen candidates who were strongly attracted to
the principle of coalition,32 his attempt to dispense with the Petromrad Cadets failed.

When they arrived in the capital from Moscow

on July 14, the three prospective ministers were immediately closeted
with the Temporary Committee of the State Duma and the Cadet Central
Committee, where they were given an intensive course in power politics.
As a result, they placed stringent conditions upon their entry into
the

c a b i n e t . 33

in

those uncertain times, the pressures to present a

common liberal front were too great to resist; in the last analysis,
that meant Kerensky would have to contend with Miliukov after all.
A July 15 letter to Kerensky from Astrov, Kishkin, and V. D.
Nabokov, in which Miliukov's influence was clearly visible, set forth
the Cadet requirements for coalition.
demands were impossible to fulfill.

At the moment, the liberal
The new government was to pledge

itself solely to the "preservation of the revolution" and was to avoid
any measures that would cause "civil strife" or hinder the powers of
the Constituent Assembly.

Thus, interim social reforms such as the

restrictions on land transactions or constitutional experimentation
such as the Ukrainian agreement were to be renounced.

The Cadets

further required "total union" with the Allies in matters of war and
peace, the creation of a strong, disciplined army, and the abridgement
of the rights of soldiers' committees.

They also demanded an end to

3lRusskie Vedomosti, July 18, 1917, p. 4.

32Birzhevye Vedomosti, July 16, 1917, p. 4.
33See the detailed interview with Astrov in Russkie Vedomosti,

July 18, 1917, p. 4.
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the "many authorities" participating in the administration of the
state and insisted that cabinet members be freed from responsibility
to outside organizations.

Finally, since their influence in the

country had suffered a recent decline, the Cadets implied that
elections to the Constituent Assembly should be postponed so that the
"true national will" could be expressed. 3^

It was evident that the

Cadets were interested in far more than a repudiation of the July 8
declaration.

They sought no less than a reversal of all the political

setbacks sustained since the outbreak of the February revolution, and
they were willing to accept coalition only if their socialist
colleagues acted as liberals.
While Kerensky rejected the Cadet demands, he attempted to prove
that the practical differences separating them were relatively minor.
In moves obviously aimed at mollifying liberal opinion, the MinisterPresident began investigations aimed at further discrediting political
extremists,35 ordered the closing of the Bolshevik newspapers Pravda
and Okopnaia Pravda (The Trench Truth),36 and appointed a known
disciplinarian, General Lavr G. Kornilov, Supreme Commander of the
armed forces.37

Furthermore, in a short written reply to the July 15

Cadet letter, he argued that the present national emergency erased the
distinction between the July 8 declaration and previous cabinet
platforms.

In light of the present necessities, Kerensky informed the

3^The text is cited in Russkie Vedomosti, July 18, 1917, p* b.
35Rech1, July 22, 1917, p. 5»
36Birzhevye Vedomosti, July 16, 1917, p« 5*
37Russkie Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, p* !•
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Cadets, "the statement contained in your letter does not ..prevent your
entry into the government."38

Kerensky had been very explicit, and

Miliukov's party could hardly have misunderstood him.

He had indicated

that the necessary adjustments to the revolution had been made, and
they had to be accented.

But no further concessions were required, and

the way was finally clear to the curbing of excesses and the
strengthening of state authority.
The Cadets would have accepted Kerensky's offer at any previous
time, for it represented a definite commitment to governmental con
solidation and stabilization.

But they now thought they could afford

to wait; the July Days and the military crisis had weakened the entire
Left, not just the Bolsheviks, and they were confident that Kerensky
would recognize his isolation and meet their specific terms.

The

formal Cadet answer, which was both stilted and unnecessarily rude,
came on July 20.

In a deliberate misrepresentation of Kerensky's

position, the Cadets accused him of attempting to alter the program
and purpose of the Provisional Government for partisan ends.

They

further charged that he had remained inflexible in the face of signi
ficant concessions (a reference to their decision not to demand
Chernov's resignation from the cabinet), and they concluded with an
assertion that Kerensky's attitude amounted to an "abandonment of any
attempts to come to an agreement with us on a really national
program. "39
The sharp Cadet rejection of Kerensky's offer was preceded by

38Russkie Vedomosti. July 22, 1917, p« 2.
39Rech', July 21, 1917, p. 2.
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other reverses.

A meeting of the State Duma on July 18 had revealed

severe dissatisfaction with Kerensky, and there had been several
instances when he had been personally vilified.

More importantly,

Miliukov had delivered two very disturbing speeches to the Duma
members.

While he admitted that Kerensky's leadership was still

required, he claimed that the present situation "would not last."

It

would soon become essential, the Cadet statesman continued, for the
Minister-President either to "yield his post or to take as his
assistants military leaders" who would exercise the real authority.
Shortly after Miliukov predicted either Kerensky's dismissal or
his effacement before a thinly-disguised military dictatorship, the
Minister-President was given a foretaste of the treatment he could
expect.

Victor Chernov had been the object of defamatory attacks

since the July 12 passage of the agrarian reforms, and on July 20 he
resigned in order to prosecute his libelers in the courts.^

Under

other conditions, Kerensky would have welcomed Chernov's departure.
The relationship between the former Trudovik and the SR veteran (who
considered his younger rival an upstart and an interloper) had often
been strained, and Kerensky was already considering excluding Chernov
from the projected cabinet.^2

But it was one thing for Kerensky to

use liberal discontent to ease Chernov from power, and quite another
to see the Agriculture Minister virtually driven from office while he
himself was similarly threatened.

If the Right could force such a

^QIzvestiia, July 21, 1917, p. 3*
^llzvestiia, July 21, 1917, p« 5*
^2Boris Savinkov, K Delu Kornilova (Paris, 1919), p» 9»
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noted socialist from the ministry, Kerensky could well be the next
victim.
The final blow came from the Left.

Antagonized by the liberal

demands, the socialist leaders forbade any alteration of the July 8
declaration^ and proposed that the cabinet be reconstructed without
recourse to the Cadets.^

Kerensky was now placed in a completely

untenable position, for he was charged with the creation of a new
government yet prevented from reaching any accommodation with the
necessary participants.

He broke the impasse on July 21 in a defiant

and theatrical fashion.

In a dramatic re-creation of Ivan Groznyi's

flight from Moscow in 1564, he resigned his office, declared Nekrasov
acting head of state, and left Petrograd.

His letter of resignation,

which was promptly released to the press, was brief and direct.

In it,

Kerensky stressed the impossibility of expanding the government
sufficiently to meet the present requirements.

As a result, he could

no longer retain power and still remain true either to his conscience
or to his understanding of current political needs.
Kerensky's angry gesture spread consternation among almost the
entire political leadership of Petrograd.

As the cabinet itself was

caught by surprise, the first impulse of most ministers was to place
their resignations alongside that of the Minister-President's.

But

after a confused interval, Nekrasov observed that some governing body

Tsereteli, II, 382.
44Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 251.
45Russkie Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, p. 2.
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ought

to exist in the event that Kerensky chose to return.^"6

Accordingly, the ministers agreed temporarily to remain in office,
decided to reject Kerensky's resignation, and called for an extra
ordinary conference of the major political parties and organizations
in P e t r o g r a d . T h e response was immediate.

On the evening of

July 21, the representatives of the principle socialist and liberal
grouos assembled in the Malachite Hall of the Winter Palace in order
to resolve the acute governmental crisis.^
The long and difficult session, which lasted from 10:30 p.m. to
6:00 a.m., resulted in a grudging and embittered admission that the
class truce should, after all, be extepded.

A number of speakers

succeeded each other, and some of them, notably the Right Socialist
Revolutionary N

D. Avksent’ev, the Trudovik A. V. Peshekhonov, and

the Cadet-echappe Nekrasov, delivered stirring appeals for genuine
cooperation and non-partisan

compromise.^

But the conference

proceedings were dominated by Miliukov and Tsereteli, the protagonists
of the Right and the Left, and they probed mercilessly into the wounds
of the past months.

Neither accepted responsibility for the current

governmental paralysis, each accused, the other of a systematic
subversion of state authority, and they both refused to yield on the
main points of controversy.

Miliukov again rejected the July 8

declaration and reiterated his disapproval of the recent agrarian

46Rech», July 22, 1917, p. 2.
^Russkie Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, p. 2.
Tsereteli, II, 382.
^^Russkie Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, pp. 3-^*
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reforms, and conceded only that a resolution of those issues should
await the reconstitution of the cabinet and the recovery of state
power.50

Tsereteli proved equally obdurate.

He refused to abandon

demands for a revision of war aims and maintained that socialist
ministers would continue to report to their party organizations,
arguing that such actions represented an exchange of information
rather than actual supervision.51

Both agreed, however, that neither

the socialists nor the liberals were prepared to assume sole respon
sibility for the state and that recourse to coalition was again
necessary.

They also admitted that only Kerensky possessed sufficient

popularity to form such a government.52
The various party resolutions marking the end of the conference
followed the outlines of the debates.

The Menshevik and SR statements,

delivered by Dan and Gots respectively, gave Kerensky the right to
choose ministers who would support the July 8 declaration.

The Cadet

resolution, presented by M. V. Vinaver, permitted Kerensky to select
ministers on an "all national basis" and stressed that they had to be
exempt from party control.

The small Trudovik and Radical Democratic

parties, which occupied the interstices between the Cadets and the
SR-Menshevik nexus, expressed complete confidence in Kerensky and
refused to set any conditions on the formation of the ministry.53
After being informed of the results of the extraordinary conference,
5^Birzhevye Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, P»
53-Pelo Naroda, July 22, 1917, P* 3*

52RUsskie Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, p. 3*
53Pelo Naroda, July 22, 1917, p* 3*
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Kerensky returned to the capital, withdrew his resignation, and opened
negotiations for the rebuilding of the government.

The Minister-

President indicated immediately that the new cabinet would be free of
partisan restrictions.

In a July 22 announcement to the press, he

condemned "oarty controversies," warned that he would not tolerate
interference with necessary changes in the "order and distribution" of
governmental work, and hinted that he might assume extraordinary
governing powers.5^
The membership of the Second Coalition reflected Kerensky's
unique position and testified to his victory of July 21.

While party

disputes flared as soon as he began to distribute portfolios,55 he
came very close to the cherished goal of a non-partisan cabinet.

The

diminution of the Petrograd Soviet was particularly evident; Tsereteli
had retired from the government, and just two ministers, Chernov and
Skobelev, held posts in the TsIK.5^

Furthermore, Chernov's presence

was the only real imposition on the Minister-President. Kerensky
attributed his recent exclusion from the Central Committee of the SR
Party directly to Chernov, actively disliked him as a result, and
would have preferred to see the ministry of agriculture in other
hands.57

But in this case, Kerensky had to yield to the will of his

nominal party.

The intensive Right campaign against the SR leader had

5^VVP, July 23, 1917, p. 1.
55Pelo Naroda, July 26, 1917, p. 1.
56Tsereteli, II, 386.

57v. B.
p. 225*

Stankevich, Vospominaniia, 191V1919 (Berlin, 1920),
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inflamed socialists at all political levels,58 and the Soviet demanded
that he retain his previous position.59

The Minister-President was

almost as successful in restricting the ministerial influence of the
Right as he had been with the Left.

While four Cadets joined the new

government, only F. F. Kokoshkin and P. P. Iurenev were closely
identified with M i l i u k o v . T h e rest of the cabinet consisted either
of personal friends such as I. N. Efremov, A. V. Peshekhonov, and
Nekrasov, or relatively uninfluential but compromise-orientated figures
such as S. N. Protopovich and N. D. Avksent'ev.*^
Kerensky's initial pronouncements demonstrated his freedom from
direct party control.

To the discomfiture of Miliukov and Chernov,^2

the Minister-President signaled his disdain for the recent doctrinal
disputes by refusing to release a governmental platform.*^3

Instead,

he issued a "Declaration to the Citizens of Russia" which promised an

58For example, see Delo Naroda, July 25, 1917, p* 1; Izvestiia.
July 23, 1917, p. 759Russkie Vedomosti, July 27, 1917, p. 2.
60Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 256.
8It he cabinet membership was as follows: Kerensky, MinisterPresident and Minister of War and Navy; Nekrasov, Deputy MinisterPresident and Minister of Finance; Tereshchenko, Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Skobelev, Minister of Labor; Peshekhonov, Minister of Food;
Chernov, Minister of Agriculture; S. F. Ol'senburg, Minister of
Welfare; Iurenev, Minister of Transport; Prokopovich, Minister of
Trade and Industry; A. M. Nikitin, Minister of Posts and Telegraph;
Kokoshkin, State Controller; A. V. Kartashev, Ober-Procurator of the
Holy Synod; Avksent'ev, Minister of the Interior. See Izvestiia.
July 25, 1917, p. 3»
^^Milioukov, Histoire. Ill, 1280; V. ’Chernov, Pered burei.
vospominaniia (New York, 1953), P* 339*
63Kerensky, "Iz vospominaniia," XVIII (1929), p. 256.
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"iron government" that would weld national unity and restore the
country's honor.^

Both the Right and the Left viewed Kerensky's

independent stand with deep misgivings: Russkie Vedomosti criticized
the peremptory tone of the declaration, which seemed to exclude any
consultation with liberal organizations,65 and Izvestiia warned that
further social reforms were imperative.66

Nevertheless, the Minister-

President 's first actions passed without serious challenge.

Kerensky

had apparently attained the position that he had envisioned on July 6.
While he
them, and

hadnot silenced his critics, he had certainly intimidated
hewas confident that his advantage could be maintained into

the foreseeable future.
Kerensky had badly miscalculated.

He had attributed his success

on July 22 to the belated recognition that only a true union of social
forces could extricate the country from its difficult position.^?
fact, theSecond
weakening
strength.

In

Coalition had been made possible only by the sudden

ofthe Soviet and a concurrent dispersion of liberal
As the enforced solidarity of the Left and the Right was

based on little more than a present lack of suitable alternatives, it
could not be expected to endure.

Kerensky had temporarily bridged a

widening gap between two antagonistic blocs in his victory at the
Malachite Hall, but he had not forged a new Union Sacree. As soon as
liberals or socialists found a new point of leverage, his regime would

64izvestiia, July 26, 1917, p. 6.
65Russkie Vedomosti, July 27, 1917, p. 2.
^izvestiia, July 25, 1917, p. 2.
67izyestiia, July 23, 1917, p« 5*
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come under severe pressure.

Also, the above-party configuration of

the Second Coalition prevented an effective response to the revival of
social or political tensions.

Largely sundered from supportive party

institutions, the new cabinet lacked the capacity to moderate conflict
and was exposed to outside assault.
It was Kerensky's ill fortune that he provided the instrument
through which that precarious political balance was disrupted.

That

occurred when he appointed General Lavr Kornilov to the post of Supreme
Commander on July 18 ° and reaffirmed his original decision, after
some hesitation, on July 22.^9

Kornilov’s promotion appeared to be a

logical step in the recovery of state power.

The new army leader was

highly respected in military circles,70 and as he had been invaluable
in containing the German advance in Galicia,71 he seemed an excellent
choice to replace the demoralized

B r u s i l o v . 72

But Kornilov immediately indicated that he would not be a pliant
tool in Kerensky's hands.

As conditions to his acceptance of the post,

the Supreme Commander insisted that he be held responsible only to his
conscience and the will of the nation, that he be freed from inter
ference in the conduct of military affairs, and that the death penalty
be extended to all areas where military reserves were stationed.

^Birzhevye Vedomosti, July 20, 1917, p. 3*
69Savinkov, p. 20.
70A . I. Denikin, Ocherki Russkoi smuty, 5 vols. (Paris, 1921-25),
II, 157lRusskie Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, p. 2.
72penikin, Smuty, II, 15.
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Kornilov also demanded that his recommendations at the July 16 Stavka
conference, which included a purging of the Officer Corps, the '
prohibition of soldiers' meetings, and restrictions on the activities
of military committees, be implemented without delay.73

Kornilov's

strong stand attracted national attention, and non-socialists saw him
as the awaited "general on a white horse" who would lead Russia away
from the abyss.7^

The discontents of the Right, previously so

diffused, had found an object about which to coalesce.

From the moment

of the Supreme Commander's appointment, liberal toleration of Kerensky
depended upon the degree to which he aligned himself with his unruly
subordinate.
After the Kornilov putsch, that unfortunate general was cast in
a distorted mold which left serious traces in historical works on the
period.75

The major contributors to that view were Kerensky, who

wished to salvage the reputations of the Officer Corps and the Cadets,
and Boris Savinkov, the famed terrorist, who was interested in
enhancing his own reputation.

According to Kerensky, the Supreme

Commander was a true "man of the people," a straightforward patriot
unfamiliar with political subtlety.76

Kornilov's faults stemmed from

his virtues; outrage at the excesses of the Left and the decomposition

73Russkie Vedomosti. July 28, 1917, p« 3*
7^A. Denikine, La decomposition de l'armee et du pouvoir;
Fevrier-Septembre, 1917 (Paris, 1921), p. 300*
7$For examples, see W. H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution.
2 vols. (New York, 1965), II, 19^; A. Moorehead, The Russian
Revolution (New York, 1958), P> 217.
76Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 298.
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of the army permitted his exploitation by unscrupulous advisors like
N. N. Filonenko and Savinkov, and his fighting qualities led to
impetuous, ill-considered acts.’'7''7 The Minister-President further
maintained that Kornilov was slowly guided into treasonous activities
and that his final decision to establish a dictatorship was due to an
erroneous conviction that the government harbored German agents.''7®
Kerensky's assertions, which really amounted to a partial
exoneration of the Supreme Commander, were indirectly supported by
Savinkov, the Assistant Minister of War during the Second Coalition.
From almost the beginning of the revolution, Savinkov claimed, he had
used the general to advance his own ambitions.

In need of a deus ex

machina to help him replace Kerensky, Savinkov had assured Kornilov's
promotion to Corps Commander and then Supreme Commander;79 in fact, he
had even shown contempt for the general's intelligence by indicating
his fraudulent i n t e n t i o n s . T h e conclusions, at least by inference,
were that Kornilov was first misled and then victimized by a small
clique of adventurers and that his revolt was an aberration in an
otherwise constructive political process.
That interpretation was oversimplified.

An impatience with the

nuances of coalition politics was not the same thing as political
naivete, and there is ample evidence that the slight, Asiatic appearing

77a . Kerensky, The Prelude to Bolshevism; the Kornilov Rising
(New York, 1919), xiii.

78prelude, p. 51*
79Savinkov, p. 9*

SOSavinkov, pp. 21-22.
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general was neither obtuse nor credulous.

His natural talents were

beyond dispute; born a commoner, he rose to the level of general
officer at a time when family status was still an important factor in
promotions.83- Furthermore, Kornilov’s disenchantment with governmental
policy was the result of personal experience, first as the commandant
of the demoralized Petrograd garrison®^ and then as a corps commander
on the Galician front, and was thus based on practical rather than
ideological considerations.

Because his alienation from the revolution

had developed gradually, it was actually less complete than that of
many officers.

For example, even after the military debacle at

'Iarnopol, at which he had been present, he was less vehement than his
colleagues in urging corrective measures; under questioning by a
commission of inquiry, Kerensky later admitted that the restrained tone
of Kornilov's proposals at the July 16 Stavka conference had been an
important consideration in his promotion two days l a t e r . T h e editors
of Izvestiia were also appreciative of Kornilov1s past services and
previously conciliatory attitude and applauded his appointment in the
belief that it preserved the safety of the revolution.Kerensky and
the moderate socialists had misjudged Kornilov’s reliability, but they
did so only because they failed to take the times into account.

While

the Supreme Commander was less disillusioned with compromise than the
majority of the Right, the difference in degree was of little

8^-Birzhevye Vedomosti, July 20, 1917, p. 3*
82por an example of Kornilov’s efforts, see VVP, March 7, 1917,
p. 1 .
83Kerensky, Prelude, p. 19*
8^-Izvestiia, July 20, 1917, p* 5-
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significance.

In common with the great majority of non-socialists, he

was now firmly convinced that the state was in mortal danger and that
extraordinary measures were necessary.

After July 18 he was in a

position to act upon those convictions.
But at first Kornilov was inclined toward cooperation with the
government.

His startling declaration of responsibility only to his

conscience and the will of the nation on July 19 had not been the claim
to dictatorial power that Kerensky had suspected.®5

instead, it had

been a variation of the same rather self-righteous argument that the
Minister-President had often applied against both the Left and the
Right.®®

Events quickly changed the Supreme Commander’s attitude.

Kerensky sympathized with the Kornilov program, but he delayed imple
mentation because he wished to introduce it gradually and in less
abrasive forms.®?

Kornilov, on the other hand, had been assured by

Savinkov that his demands would be accepted,®® and he became increas
ingly resentful of the Minister-President's imagined breach of
promise.®9
The developing conflict became public knowledge and its
progression was well documented in the press.

A strong editorial

urging the immediate adoption of Kornilov's proposals appeared in

85stankevich, p. 221.

®6chemov, Pered burei, p. 339.
87yyp, August 15, 1917, p. 3.
88savinkov, p. 20.
89Denikin, Smuty, II, 17.

Russkie Vedomosti on July 28,90 and the barren results of a meeting
between the Supreme Commander and the cabinet on August 3 produced
increased liberal criticism of Kerensky's "obstructionist" tactics.91
A second conference between Kornilov and Kerensky, held at the
general's request on August 10, served only to underline their dif
ferences.

The meeting was preceded by rumors of the Supreme

Commander's impending

d i s m i s s a l , 92

which gained credence when he

arrived in Petrograd with bodyguards carrying machine guns.93

The con

ference was conducted in a strained atmosphere and had an inconclusive
result.

Kerensky again refused to implement Kornilov'soriginal

program, turned aside a request to militarize

thewarindustry

and the

rail system, and agreed only to "consider" the extension of the death
penalty to the rear.94

In the opinion of non-socialists, the unsatis

factory meeting of August 10 defined the issues.

Their sentiments were

perhaps best expressed by an incorrigible monarchist, the English-bom
Grand Duchess Marie, whose preferences allowed the drawing of sharp
distinctions.

The choice, she maintained, was now between the "great

Russian patriot General Kornilov" and the "Kerensky faction with its
wordy vacillation."95

9QRusskie Vedomosti, July 28, 191?, P- 3*
9lRech1, August 4, 1917, p. 392izyestiia, August 6, 1917, P- 3*
93lzvestiia, August 11, 1917* p. 4.
94izVestiia, August 11, 1917, P- 3»
95Grand Duchess Marie, Education of a Princess: a Memoir
(New York, 1930), P. 330.
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Ironically, the furor surrounding the Kornilov program obscured
serious efforts by Kerensky to consolidate state authority.

From the

latter part of July to the middle of August, the harried MinisterPresident enacted measures that had been far beyond the capacity of the
First Coalition and that, in less critical times, would have been
warmly welcomed by the liberal forces.

On July 15, he imposed strict

penalties upon the violation of censorship regulations,^ thus
converting an ineffectual voluntary policy into one that had real force.
A week later, he assumed the right to close any meetings or disperse
any assemblies that threatened thesuccess of the wareffort

or

imperilled the security of the state.97 OnJuly 30. heextended the
death penalty to the navy on the same terms as the army.98

On August 3.

Kerensky created a special political administration, directly
responsible to the war ministry, that subordinated soldiers' committees
to the will of military commissars.99

Also, on August 5 he provided

severe penalties, including banishment to Siberia,100 for those guilty
of insulting Allied countries or their agents by "word, deed, or in
publications."101
Those vigorous measures were accompanied by others specifically
designed to placate liberal sensibilities.

96VVP, July 15, 1917, p. 1.
97VVP, July 29, 1917, p.

1.

98lzvestiia, August 18, 1917, P*

99yyp, August 10, 1917, p. 2.
looyyp, August 23,
loiyyp,

1917, p. 3*

August 6, 1917, p. 2 .

On August 5, he ordered
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the transfer of the Romanov family from Tsarskoe Selo to Tobol'sk,^®^
where they would be secure from interference by the Petrograd Soviet.
On August 9, Kerensky postponed elections to the Constituent Assembly
from September 17 to November

12,103

providing the Cadets with

additional time to develop their political campaigns throughout the
country.

The Minister-President also hardened the tone of his speeches

and proclamations.

For example, he applied the term "counter

revolution" to Left protests against state centralization,10** and he
substituted "Directives to the Population of the State" for "Appeals
to the People" in official pronouncements.105

A new firmness was also

evident in his approach to nationality problems.

Kerensky sharply

turned aside a Finnish bid for full independence and insured that
their inevitable protests would remain uncoordinated by dissolving the
Finnish Sejm.106

Furthermore, he issued to the Ukrainian Rada a set

of unexpectedly restrictive instructions that partially negated the
concessions of July 2.

While Ukrainian nationalists objected to the

content of the new directive, whichnullified theRada’s

right to

ratify laws passed by the ProvisionalGovernment andseriously

reduced

its authority over minority groups in Ukrainian territory,107 they

1°2VVP, August 6, 1917, p. 1.
103d . A. Chugaev, et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v
Rossii v Avgust 1917; Razgrom Kornilovskogo miatezha (Moscow, 1959).
p. 177.
lO^Rech1, August 5. 1917, p.
105vvp, July 20, 1917, p. 1.
106yyp, July 21, 1917, p. 1.
107VVP, August 5, 1917, p. 3-
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avoided an open clash with Kerensky and agreed to continued nego
tiations.

The Minister-President also assumed a firm stance in the

conduct of foreign policy.

Official declarations to the Allies

reflected a determination to restore the fighting capacity of the armed
forces and to wage further military campaigns, and the issue of revised
war aims was carefully avoided.^^9

Kerensky had completely fulfilled

the Cadet demands of July 1j, and except for an immediate imple
mentation of Kornilov's program, there was little more that he could
have done to pacify the Right.
His efforts were wasted, for the Kornilov program had become an
inflexible standard by which all else was measured.

While the Left

viewed Kerensky's actions with growing alarm,HO the Right impatiently
aligned itself on the side of the Supreme Commander.
unable to halt that attrition in popularity.

Kerensky was

His differences with

Kornilov concerned only questions of emphasis and timing, and an out
right repudiation of the general would have had severe repercussions
on his own policy.

Under those conditions, the sole alternative was

a form of passive resistance; he was forced to endure a progressive
loss of influence in both political camps in hopes that the passage of
time would reduce the clamor form the Right and still allow a
continuation of his own platform.m

1°^A. Choulguine, L 'Ukraine contre Koscou, 1917 (Paris, 1935).
p. 133109Kor example, see VVP, July 19, 1917, P* 1ll^Delo Naroda, August 22, 1917, P« 1*
llldee Kerensky's speech before the Democratic Conference, cited
in Izvestiia, September 15, 1917, p.
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That enforced passivity was very hard to bear.

Kerensky had

always reacted to opposition in an aggressive fashion, and the present
lack of resources left him increasingly despondent.

After a

particularly disturbing interview with Kokoshkin on August 11, when
mass Cadet resignations were threatened unless the Kornilov program
was instituted,112 Kerensky revealed his discouragement.

"They accuse

me of inefficiency," he complained to Pitirim Sorokin, his private
secretary.

"They think a dictatorship is necessary.

with all this hopeless striving. . . ." H 3

How tired I am

The beleaguered Minister-

President had ample cause to be disheartened.

He had almost lost

control of the cabinet, and he faced the certainty of renewed criticism
at the approaching Moscow State Conference.
The Moscow State Conference, scheduled to meet at the Bolshoi
Theatre from August 12 to August 15, had been originally conceived as
a means to bolster the government's influence in the country and to
gamer support for its aggressive p o l i c i e s . T h e optimistic days of
the Government to Save the Revolution were past, however, and the
controlled turn to the Right had become a desperate holding action
against political extremism.

Kerensky had seriously considered

cancellation, for he recognized the dangers of allowing a rallying
point for Kornilov's supporters.H 5

But liberal pressure for a public

H2Kerensky, Prelude, p. 38.
113P. Sorokin, Leaves from a Russian Diary (New York, 1924),
pp. 79-80.

114VVP, July 13, 1917, p. 3115Kerensky, Prelude, p. 33-

182
appearance by the Supreme Commander had been unremitting,-*--*^ and the
Minister-President finally agreed to let "everything be openly
expressed."H7

Kerensky did take some precautions; he ordered Kornilov

to speak only of the current situation at the front,H8 an<} he urged
Petrograd socialists to send impressive delegations to Moscow.^ 9

But

those measures were clearly inadequate, and he dreaded the coming test
of strength with the Right.-*-20
As Kerensky had feared, the Moscow conference turned into a
prolonged demonstration of liberal solidarity with the Supreme
Commander.

The 2,414 delegates were drawn equally from socialist and

non-socialist ranks, but "frock coats and starched shirts overshadowed
blouses" in the enormous crowds surrounding the Kremlin.121

Further

more, the propertied elements obviously had come to support Kornilov.
Although the Minister-President arrived with an impressive retinue, he
was unable to distract attention from his rival.

He later recalled,

with considerable bitterness, that he had been virtually ignored while
the "popular hero," Kornilov, was treated as the titular head of state
by some and as a savior by others.^ 2

H ^Izvestiia. August 11, 1917. P* 4.
H7s. P. Mel'gunov, Vospominaniia i drevniki, 3 vols.
(Paris, 196-14-), II, 224.
H^Kerensky, Prelude, p. 82.
H 9lzvestiia, August 11, 1917, p. 4.
120sorokin, p.

89.

121lzvestiia, August 13, 1917, p. 2.
122Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 315.
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That disparity in treatment continued into the conference
proceedings.

Kerensky's opening address, a lengthy defense of

coalition interspersed with warnings against counterrevolution,123 was
listened to with visible impatience by the audience.12^

But Kornilov's

speech, which consisted of little else than repeated demands for the
immediate adoption of his program, was often interrupted by tumultuous
ovations from the Right.1^5

The Supreme Commander's appearance marked

the beginning of a general liberal attack upon Kerensky.

Vasilii

Maklakov, a Right Cadet, charged that Russia had reached the crucial
point where "salvation, not revolution," was required,126 and Miliukov,
continuing in the same vein, asserted that Kerensky had failed
completely to take effective measures for the "restoration of order or
the protection of lives and property."12?

But the sharpest assault at

the conference was delivered by the newly-elected Cossack Ataman,
General A. M. Kaledin, who expressed disdain for the Minister-President
and urged the creation of a "really strong government resting in
capable hands."128 Kerensky was badly shaken by the criticism directed
against his leadership, and his closing speech, which Rech' accurately
characterized as a reaction of "nervous sensitivity to the new

123VVP, August 15, 1917, PP* 2-3.

12^S. I. Shidlovskii, Vospominaniia. 2 vols. (Berlin, 1923),
II, 138.
125lzvestiia, August 15, 1917, p. 3*
126ia. A. Iakovlev, ed., Gcsudarstvennoe Soveshchanie; 1917 god

v dokumentakh i materialakh (Moscow, 1930), p. 117*
127izvestiia, August 16, 1917, p. 2.
128iakovlev, p. 76.
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wave,"129 was an open admission of personal defeat.

He agreed to

abandon the "middle course," to suppress revolutionary idealism, and
to think "solely of the state."

Finally, in an emotional peroration

that startled the delegates, he promised to satisfy their "yearning
for autocracy, for a power that applies pressure from above."130

The

Minister-President's agitated performance only underlined his desperate
position.

It was apparent that he had lost control of the conference,

that his leadership had been rejected, and that his political isolation
was almost total.

Kerensky's repudiation by the Right had been so

complete that, in looking back at the Moscow events, he took solace in
the fact that he had not been ousted by Kornilov through the simple
device of acclamation.^31
The Moscow State Conference was followed by the Kornilov revolt.
The Supreme Commander, increasingly irritated by governmental
hesitations that "bordered on the criminal,"^32 had considered the
possibility of a military coup for some time, and his adulatory
reception in Moscow reinforced his opinion that the moment for direct
action had arrived.

The political signs were certainly favorable.

The Left had been in steady decline since the July Days, Kerensky's
authority had been seriously undermined, and the entire Right awaited
the establishment of a stronger form of rule.

"Unwilling to miss such

129Rech\ August 17, 1917, p. 1.
130lzvestiia, August 16, 1917, p. 2.
13lKerensky, Catastrophe, p. 316.
132see the interview with Boris Savinkov, cited in Birzhevye
Vedomosti, September 12, 1917, p. 1.
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an opportunity,"133 Kornilov set several cavalry divisions in motion
against Petrograd on August 20.134

He acted in the belief that

resistance would be minimal and that unreserved liberal support would
assure a rapid re-establishment of the state apparatus.135
It was a measure of Kerensky's isolation that he was unaware of
Kornilov's intentions. While Petrograd liberals were not informed of
the details,136 they knew that a major assault against the government
was in preparation.

On August 13 Kornilov had warned Miliukov that an

"open conflict" with Kerensky was imminent,137 and he had apparently
even sent subordinates to the State Duma to investigate the deputies5
attitudes toward a military coup.138

But the Minister-President1s

control over the Stavka had completely broken down, and he received
only faint indications of approaching difficulties. While he placed
the Grand Duke Nicholas under house arrest in response to tenuous
reports of counterrevolutionary plots, 139 he failed to extend his
suspicions to the Supreme Commander.

In fact, he unintentionally

facilitated Kornilov1s plans. Riga had fallen to the Germans on the
night of August 20, and the way was suddenly open for a rapid enemy
advance toward Petrograd.

The unexpectedly poor showing of the

133p. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoriia Russkoi revoliutsii, 1 vol. in
3 parts (Sofia, 1921-23), part 2, p. 173*
13^-Denikin, Smuty. II, 22.
13^1iliukov, Istoriia, part 2, p. 174.
136Nabokov, p. 44.
137Miliukov, Istoriia, part 2, p. 173*
138shidlovskii, II, 14-1.
139Russkie Vedomosti, August 24, 1917, P- 2.
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defending troops, who had allowed the crossing of the Dvina by
numerically inferior forces,

persuaded Kerensky that the Kornilov

program had to be adopted after all.

Accordingly, he dispatched

Savinkov to the Stavka with a proposal for the extension of the death
penalty to the rear,^- he further reduced the influence of soldiers'
committees in military affairs,
the government to Moscow. -^3

and he announced plans to transfer

Anticipating that those actions would

provoke disorders, the Minister-President also directed the Third
Cavalry Corps to Petrograd for the enforcement of martial law.l^
Kerensky's concessions completely misled the Supreme Commander.
Since they involved a drastic break with the Left which carried the
threat of civil war, and since the Third Cavalry Corps was already
advancing against the capital, Kornilov evidently assumed that his
superior had uncovered the plot and had chosen compliance rather than
resistance.

Coordinated action with the government suddenly appeared

possible, and N. V. L'vov was dispatched to Kerensky with the Supreme
Commander's terms.

The conditions were practically identical to

Miliukov's proposals at the State Duma meeting of July 18; a military
dictatorship was to be established, and Kerensky was offered a minor
post, the portfolio of justice, in the projected

regime.

l^ONovoe Vremia, August 22, 1917, p. 3*
l^lSavinkov, p. 19142vvp, August 26, 1917, p. 3*
l^Russkie Vedomosti. August 27, 1917, p* 3*
l^See Kerensky's speech in Izvestiia, September 15, 1917, p.
1^5stankevich, p. 229; A. Kerenskii, "0 vozstanii Gen.
Kornilova," Izdaleka, sboroik statei (Paris, 1922), p. 178.
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That illusory period of unanimity, during which both Kerensky
and Kornilov thought they were in control of the situation, was
shattered on August 26 when N. V. L'vov arrived at the Winter Palace.
After confirming the accuracy of the former Ober-Procurator’s message
in a cautious telegraphic conversation with the Supreme Commander,
Kerensky assembled the cabinet and demanded absolute authority to
suppress the rebellion.

The ministers reacted to Kerensky's charges

with a mixture of skepticism and alarm.

Kokoshkin, speaking for the

Cadets, protested against the Minister-President's "dictatorial
character," argued that a misunderstanding had occurred, and threatened
to resign unless a suitable accommodation was reached with Kornilov.
But when Kornilov refused a direct order to yield his position to
General V. N. Klembovskii^? and raised the standard of civil war,-^8
the cabinet submitted to Kerensky's will.

While Chernov left the

government, judging accurately that he would be needed in the Soviet,
the rest of the ministers stayed at Kerensky1s disposal in hopes that
they could exert a moderating influence upon events.-^9
To the frustration of the Petrograd Cadets, who tried to strike
an understanding with the Supreme Commander,-*-50 Kerensky adamently
resisted negotiations.

His response was characteristic, for an

association with overt counterrevolution was a serious violation of

l^°Russkie Vedomosti. September 1, 1917, p. 5147vyp, August 29, 1917, p. 1.
l^Bpusskie Vedomosti, September 1, 1917, p. 2.
1^9Russkie Vedomosti, August 30, 1917, p. 3*
150chugaev, p. 452.
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his fundamental beliefs.

In that respect, the Minister-President was

as ideologically inflexible as the party leaders that he had so often
castigated.

Despite his unquestioned sympathy with liberalism,

Kerensky's commitment to the revolution was unqualified.

He could

agree to harness it, or even temporarily to compromise its integrity
if national goals were at stake, but he was unable to participate in
its destruction.

He later indicated that if the choice had been

between extremism of the Right and the Left, he would have supported
the former on the grounds that the chances for democratic evolution
were greater where liberal values existed.-1-51 But Kerensky considered
the Kornilov revolt to be a reactionary challenge to moderation, and
for that reason he was compelled to oppose it with all the resources
at his command.
Accordingly, the Minister-President sought the immediate
liquidation of the revolt.

On August 27, he forestalled further

liberal attempts at a rapproachement with Kornilov by publicly
declaring the general a traitor "consciously provoking a fratricidal
war. "-1-52 He then appealed to the Soviet for aid-1-53 and appointed
Savinkov Governor-General of the Petrograd Military District, investing
him with authority to conduct the defense of the capital.154

As

General Klembovskii refused to replace Kornilov and declared solidarity

151a . Kerenskii, La Russie des Soviets d'apres les Bolcheviks
eux-memes (Paris, 1920), p. 7152yyp. August 28, 1917, p. 1.
153lzvestiia, August 29, 1917, p. 4.
154yyp, August 29, 1917, p. 2.

189
with the revolt,155 Kerensky assumed the office of Supreme Commander
and appointed the manifestly unwilling Alekseev as his Chief of Staff.
In his new role as dictator, he pointedly ignored the majority of the
cabinet by selecting Nekrasov and Tereshchenko as his assistants,156
commanded a halt to all troop movements toward Petrograd, and declared
a rail strike to assure the execution of that order.157
Kerensky raised the alarm before Kornilov's forces were within
striking distance of the capital, and to that extent he took part in
the effective defense of the revolution.

But after that act, events

passed completely out of his hands.158 while liberals stood aside,
the reinvigorated Soviet transformed Petrograd into an armed camp where
hastily organized workers' detachments mingled freely with garrison
troops.159

Governmental orders were ignored, and the dispersion of

Kornilov's forces along the m i l system, their breach of communications
with the Stavka, and their demoralization in the face of intensive
propaganda were conducted under the auspices of the Petrograd
Soviet.160
The result was an accelerated re-enactment of the last days of
the tsarist regime.

Kornilov's troops lost cohesion as they neared

155RUsskie Vedomosti, August 29, 1917, P» 3*
156Russkie Vedomosti, September 1, 1917, p.
157vvp, August 29, 1917, p. 3>
158V. Zenzinov, Iz zhizni revoliutsionera (Paris, 1919), p» 90.
159lzvestiia, August 29, 1917, p« 6.
I60por a vivid portrait of the ineffectiveness of the Provisional
Government during the Kornilov revolt, see Sorokin, p. 89*
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the capital, and at the first clear opportunity they joined the ranks
of the revolutionary forces.161

Even the formal conclusion of the

revolt was reminiscent of the February Days.

On September 1, against

Kerensky's advice, General Alekseev journeyed to Mogilev and obtained
the peaceful surrenders of Kornilov, General A. S. Lukomskii, and
other participants in the

uprising.
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The revolution had inscribed

a full circle and was again at the fluid point that had been reached
in February.1^3
But this time the restraints of February had been swept aside.
In the space of two months, the failures of the First Coalition had
produced their fatal consequences.

The social equilibrium was

completely disrupted, the advocates of coalition were discredited, and
compromise, as understood in the February settlement, had become
impossible.

If Kornilov's defeat had embraced only the Cadets and the

army command, the government, with the aid of the traditional socialist
leadership, might well have preserved sufficient authority to bring
the country to the Constituent Assembly and an eventual reconstruction
of the sta+e apparatus.

But a series of governmental blunders,

prompted by Kerensky's unrealistic desire to recreate a strong cabinet
in the immediate wake of the Kornilov revolt, led to his political
disgrace and the enfeeblement of the moderate leadership that had

l6llzvestiia, September 2, 1917, p« 3«
l62por discussions of that event, see Novoe Vremia, October b,
1917, p. 3; W P , September 2, 1917, p. 2.
1^3See A. Kerenskii, "Genesis of the October Revolution of 1917,"
MMS, The Hoover Institute, Stanford University, p s 25.

supported him in the past.164

While the major forces of the Right

withdrew from active politics in sullen anticipation of civil war,1^5
important soviets, including those in Petrograd and Moscow, fell under
the sway of Bolshevik majorities hostile to the Provisional Govern
ment .166

By early September, Russia was split into irreconciliable

factions, with their most extreme elements prepared for a forcible
settlement of their differences.

In the interim, Kerensky's regime,

divorced from real support by either the Right or the Left, was
tolerated as an inconvenient relic of an unsuccessful and embarrassing
political experiment.

l64see the discussion on the fate of political moderation in
Delo Naroda. October 15* 1917, P» 1«
l65shidlovskii, II, 145.
I66izvestiia. September 22, 1917, P* 4.

CHAPTER VI

THE COLLAPSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT

In 1920, Kerensky expressed regret over his participation in the
Second Coalition.

Its failure had been foreshadowed in the debates at

the Malachite Hall, and if he had stood by his resignation of July 21,
events might well have taken a different course.

The gathering

reaction, unable to proceed in the guise of stabilization, would not
have gained the same momentum, and its impact would have been less
destructive.^

Furthermore, if he had escaped involvement with Kornilov

he would have preserved his standing among the populace, and in the
"darkest days that lay ahead" perhaps could have been of additional
use to his country.^
That was a significant evaluation, as important for its omissions
as for its affirmations.

Without abandoning the charge of Komilovist

treachery, Kerensky tacitly acknowledged the workings of a deeper
force— the dissolution of the class truce in the wake of the Galician
defeats and the Ukrainian crisis.

Yet his populist belief in the

renovative power of the revolution forbade the conclusion that the

lA. Kerenskii, "Gatchina," Izdaleka, sbomik statei (Paris, 1922),
p. 213.
2a . Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky’s Own Story of the
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927), p. 254.
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class rupture was permanent,3 and his nationalistic bias led him to
deny a necessary connection between the exorbitant demands of the First
Coalition and the Kornilovshchina.4
had simply been one of faulty timing.

In Kerensky's opinion, his error
His return to power on July 22

had bean a precipitate act undertaken when the energies of the Russian
people had been temporarily depleted, so his subsequent inability to
control events did not reflect adversely on either the validity of
coalition or the feasibility of state consolidation.5 The former
Minister-President was particularly insistent on those two vital
points. The Second Coalition succumbed to conspiracy, not to a funda
mental alteration in the dynamics of the revolution.

Since it

"accurately expressed resolutions freely adopted by all parties (except
the Bolsheviks) that had any weight in the nation,"6 its aims and
methods conformed to the true will of the population.
Historians of the period have tended either to ignore Kerensky's
assertions or to note them with visible impatience.7 Their negative
reactions are understandable, for his argument contained the typical
distortions of the experienced political lawyer, and the consensus to
which he referred existed largely in his imagination.

Yet it would be

3a . Kerenskii, Ob armii i voine (Petrograd, 1917), p. 6.
4a . Kerenskii, "0 vozstanii Gen. Kornilova," Izdaleka. p. 186.
5A. Kerenskii, "Politika Vremennogo Pravitel'stva," SZ,
L (1932), 422.
6Kerenskii, "Politika," p. 423.
7See W. G. Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution
(Princeton, 1974), p. 472; 0. H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of
Bolshevism (New York, 1958), p. 462; R. V. Daniels, Red October;
the Russian Revolution of 1917 (New York, 1967), p. 88.

19^
a serious error to dismiss Kerensky's statements as still another
round in the seemingly endless recriminations of the emigration, for
they provide valuable insights into the otherwise perplexing denouement
of the Kornilov revolt.

Even before the formation of the Second

Coalition, Kerensky believed that popular support for coalition could
only be temporarily dampened.

As he was convinced that it could never

be eradicated, he was forced to accept the corollary that extremism was
merely a surface phenomenon that would fail to strike enduring roots in
the national consciousness.

Those assumptions were erroneous, but

once it is realized that the Minister-President accepted them as valid
political principles, his initial reaction to Kornilov's challenge
becomes understandable. It is then possible to describe the way in
which Kornilovism discredited Kerensky and, through him, the last
bastion of governmental stability— the moderate bloc in the Petrograd
Soviet.
Of course, the Stavka uprising promised severe repercussions in
any event.

Upon its outbreak P. P. Iurenev, the Cadet Minister of

Transport, predicted that it would deliver a "terrible blow to the
reconstruction of the country's forces,"8 and while he spoke, a new
wave of anarchy was erasing the disciplinary gains of the previous
weeks.9 An intensification of the radical revolution was clearly
unavoidable; the established revolutionary leaders had initiated the
swing to the Right that had so quickly surged out of control, and their
disgruntled followers were unlikely to be easily appeased.

^Russkie Vedomosti. September 1, 1917, p. 5.
9lzvestiia, September 2, 1917, p. 5-
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Kerensky's staunchest supporters in the TsJK accepted the necessity
of drastic concessions.

At a plenary session on August 30, Tsereteli

admitted that the "organized democracy" faced a difficult task in
ending the "confusion in the ranks of the popular

mass e s ,

"10 and

Skobelev expressed the general opinion by noting that a tactical shift
to the Left was essential to the restoration of order.H
Major socialist newspapers had already arrived at the same
conclusion.

On August 30 Delo Naroda observed that the Provisional

Government could provide effective rule only if it "depended fully"
upon the revolutionary democracy and prophetically added that there
was no other reliable route to the Constituent Assembly.12
on the following day, was more explicit.

Izvestiia,

It called for a halt to

those reforms that had promoted counterrevolution, demanded that the
government become "clearly and consistently revolutionary in both its
program and policy," and urged complete reliance upon the "democratic
masses."13

The Kornilovshchina had evidently diminished the

ideological inhibitions of the Menshevik and SR parties and they
appeared disposed to assume primary direction of the revolution.

But

their intervention implied the abandonment of a balanced coalition,
the termination of cabinet independence, and the renunciation of GreatPower status.
Prompt adoption of the socialist formula might well have

IQlzvestiia, August 31. 1917. P» 5»
Hlbid.
12pelo Naroda. August 30, 1917, p. 1.
13lzvestiia. August 31, 1917, p. 1.
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prevented the Bolshevik insurrection of October.

It is necessary to

remember that in the last days of August radicalism did not yet mean
Bolshevism, and because the Constituent Assembly would soon meet, class
rule did not mean unrestrained class tyranny.

The Soviet was still

committed to the minimum objectives of provisional mile, and a govern
mental displacement to the Left might have perpetuated that commitment.
The timing was also propitious, for the Right, demoralized by the rapid
collapse of counterrevolution, was incapable of serious obstructionism.
In sum, the Komilovshchina provided a unique opportunity to sweep
away the detritus of the broken class truce and to erect in its place
a viable political order.
In the greatest miscalculation of his political career, Kerensky
negated that possibility at the very moment of its appearance.

While

the Minister-President was quite reticent about his decision— he
succeeded, after all, only in intensifying the firestorm that was
raging on the Left— -he evidently thought that vigorous political
manipulation could forestall a radical resurgence.

Relying upon the

resiliency of moderation and the weakness of extremism, he attempted
to exploit the Kornilov revolt in order to duplicate the conditions
of July 8; in the resulting confusion, he hoped to refurbish his
reputation as the guardian of the revolution, to resurrect the class
truce, and to preserve the firm policies of the Second Coalition.
Since Kerensky intended to recreate the July settlement, his
tactics paralleled those of that period.

He had then acquired a marked

advantage by attributing the disorders to German money and Bolshevik
treason, by selectively regulating the scope and intensity of
reprisals, and by extracting significant concessions from the alarmed
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and intimidated Star Chamber.

His temporary gains— control over the

previously fractious Left and the restraint of the Right— dissipated
during the Second Coalition, for they had been based upon an ephemeral
power vacuum.

But the Minister-President, purblind to the causes of

political imbalance, saw no reason to alter his previous methods.
Acting rapidly to forestall untimely socialist interference,1^ he
sought an advantageous accord with the Cadets at the same time that he
moved against the "clique of adventurers" gathered about Kornilov.^5
Kerensky chose a bold line, one that conceded little to past reverses
or present difficulties.

The inauguration of that strategy on

August 26 marked the point at which state recovery became impossible.
While the Minister-President clung tenaciously to his program
for several days, he encountered difficulties from the outset.

The

possession of extraordinary authority was essential to his plans;
socialists could not be restrained unless they deferred to his lead in
the liquidation of counterrevolution, and liberals would accede to his
demands only if they could rely upon his protection.-*-6 Yet Kornilov's
ascendancy had undermined his prestige, and in the very midst of the
Komilovshchina he was forced to seek assurances of freedom of action
from both the cabinet and the Petrograd Soviet.

Although Kerensky

devoted the evening of August 26 and the morning of August 27 to that
end, the results were equivocal.

A turbulent night session of the

l^Izvestiia, September 15, 1917, p. 3*
15VVP, August 29, 1917, p. 1.
l^B. Savinkov, K delu Kornilova (Paris, 1919), p. 29; see
Kerensky's speech cited in Izvestiia, September 15, 1917, p. 3«
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ministerial council produced an abortive liberal revolt on the part of
Kokoshkin and Iurenev,!? and the subsequent resolution that the
Minister-President be invested with dictatorial powers appeared to be
an expression of cabinet paralysis rather than a vote of confidence.
In fact, it was not clear on August 26 whether the Cadets had resigned
in protest or simply placed their portfolios at Kerensky9s disposal.
By the morning of August 27 the regrouped ministers agreed to the
latter interpretation.

Yet it is entirely likely that Kerensky's

decision to admit Nekrasov and Tereshchenko into a Triumvirate,
ostensibly motivated by a desire to accumulate a "harmonious group" to
deal with the present crisis,^9 was really an oblique commentary on the
unreliability of his liberal colleagues.
The socialist response, if less strained, was also less
comforting than that of the ministerial council.
received general expressions of support

While Kerensky

from the TsIKonthe morning

of August 27, it was evident even then that they

wouldnotaccept a

subordinate role in the defense of the revolution.20

The formal

Soviet resolution, passed in plenary session on the evening of
August 27, verified that conclusion; Kerensky was encouraged to form
a government able to resist Kornilov, but no reference was made to his
request for dictatorial authority.21

Undeterred by the tepid socialist

l?Russkie Vedomosti, September 1,

1917, p. 4.

18Russkie Vedomosti, September 1,

1917, p. 4.

19lnterview with Nekrasov, Rech', August 30, 1917, p. 2.
20Russkie Vedomosti. September 1, 1917, p. 2.
21lzvestiia, August 28, 1917, p* 3-

199
stand, the Minister-President chose to believe that he had been granted
adequate latitude.22

But even Tsereteli, who later attempted to place

a favorable interpretation on the matter, was forced to admit that the
August 27 resolution was primarily distinguished by its ambiguity. ^
With his hands at least partially freed, Kerensky turned to the
next phase of his program— the rehabilitation of the non-socialist
forces in the eyes of the aroused populace.

Of necessity, the military

aspects of that problem claimed his immediate attention.

As the Stavka

was in revolt, the Right could not be distinguished from rebellion
unless the army leadership was associated with the act of repression.
The Minister-President waged that necessary campaign with dramatic
flair.

An eloquent public repudiation of Kornilov was followed on the

night of August 2? by the appointment of Savinkov as Governor-General
of the Petrograd Military District^ and an offer to General Alekseev
of the post of Supreme Commander.25 While both reacted with visible
ill grace— Alekseev initially refused to cooperate, assuming the lesser
position of Chief of Staff on August 30 only in order to limit
bloodshed^— their attitudes were of little importance.

As Kerensky

was convinced that the rebellion would collapse without aimed
conflict,2? he was satisfied with passive compliance; a simple

22yyp. August 29, 1917, p. 1.
23lzvestiia, September 1, 1917, p. 1.
2%VP. August 29, 1917, p. 2.
25Novoe Vremia, October 4, 1917, p. 3*
26yyp, September 13, 1917, p. 2.
27lzvestiia, August 27, 1917, p. 6.
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adherence to the government cause was quite sufficient to demonstrate
the basic reliability of the higher command.
the Minister-President was proven correct.

In this case, at least,
The conspiratorial nature

of the Kornilov revolt precluded a wide circle of accomplices, and the
vast majority of officers, caught by surprise, did remain passive.
Under those circumstances, Kerensky was able to release to the press
extended lists of prominent commanders who declared solidarity with
the government.28

Thus, without seriously testing the mettle of the

Officer Corps, he was able to develop an impressive argument for
Kornilov1s "isolation from the rest of the active army and navy."29
Unfortunately, he was unable to demonstrate Kornilov's isolation
from the Cadets.

Their sympathies lay with the rebellious general, and

so long as the revolt appeared viable party stalwarts such as Miliukov
and Vasilii Maklakov pressed for governmental concessions.30

Kerensky

was consistently frustrated in his efforts to moderate liberal
hostility.

His sharp condemnation of Kornilov on August 27, motivated

in part by a desire to discourage the compromising behavior of the
Cadets,31 provoked a barrage of vituperation that was especially
focused upon his assumption of dictatorial powers. While the more
blatant accusations of jealousy and Bonapartism were confined to
hurriedly issued pamphlets, they were hinted at in a Rech8 editorial

28Russkie Vedomosti. August 29, 1917, p. 3; VVP, August 29,
1917, p. 1.
29VVP, August 29, 1917, p. 1.
30d . A. Chugaev, et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii
v Avgust 1917; razgrom Komilovskogo miatezha (Moscow, 1959), p. **-52.
3lKerensky, Catastrophe. p. 323*
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of August 29.

The Triumvirate, Rech1 charged bitterly, had adopted an

"arrogant stance" that falsely equated "self-defense of the government"
with "defense of the country."

In its "obsession with phantoms," it

lost sight of the fact that Kornilovism was the true source of national
order.32

That broadside stopped short of outright identification with

Kornilov and, strictly interpreted, remained within the bounds of
legitimate political criticism.

But it also provided additional proof,

if any were needed, of the Cadet affinity with counterrevolution.
Liberal resistance slackened with the visible failure of the
Komilovshchina. but even then extraordinary methods were required to
produce cooperation.

On the morning of August 30 V. T. Lebedev, an

editor of Volia Naroda (The People1s Will), provided Kerensky with
evidence that Miliukov had planned an editorial endorsement of Kornilov
just prior to his defeat; armed with that incriminating information,
the Minister-President demanded that the Cadets come to terms.

V. D.

Nabokov and M. M. Vinaver, representing their Central Committee, proved
to be difficult negotiators.

In response to threats of exposure, they

agreed to participate in a new coalition and to remove Miliukov from
all posts of party responsibility.33

But in exchange Kerensky was

forced to dismiss Nekrasov, admit military experts into the projected
cabinet, and treat Kornilov with consideration.34 The MinisterPresident 1s counterstroke, b o m of long brooding in Kornilov1s

32Rech1, August 29, 1917, p. 1.
33A. Kerensky, Russia and History^ Turning Point (New York,
1965), p. 407.
34Russkie Vedomosti, September 1, 1917, p. 4.
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disturbing shadow and nourished by a mistaken conception of the stamina
of the Russian people, would have failed in any case.

But if the

possibility of success had existed, it surely would have foundered on
the reefs of Cadet intransigence.
Yet until September 1 Kerensky thought that effective political
stabilization was within reach.

To external appearances, and within

the limits of his mechanistic formula, his desired goals had been
realized.

Overt treason had teen confined to a snail area centered

about the Stavka while the Right, albeit reluctantly, had rededicated
itself to the techniques of compromise.

The Minister-President was

confident of his ability to translate those accomplishments into
tangible advantages; his exposure of Kornilov had again demonstrated
his value to the revolution and his mandate from the Soviet and the
ministerial council, while somewhat tempered, offered a method for the
exploitation of his anticipated popularity.35

Kerensky's optimism was

evident in a conversation with Savinkov on August 30*

In response to

the former terrorist1s assertion that governmental provocation of the
Kornilov revolt had destroyed the cohesion of the armed forces and
undermined the revolution, he replied that nothing was further from
the truth.

Victory over counterrevolution, he insisted, had removed

the last barriers to national unity.

Freed of internal threats, the

country could now present a common front to the external

f o e . 36

The cabinet negotiations of August 30-31 reflected Kerensky's
determination to dictate the future expression of that unity.

While

35Those conclusions are implied in Kerensky, Russia, p. 405*
36savinkov, p. 2 9 .
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he respected the niceties of coalition politics, the Minister-President
refused to consider the presence within the government of potentially
disruptive personalities; he intended to keep the Chernovs, Kokoshkins
and Miliukovs of previous regimes at a safe distance.

Kerensky

approached A. A. Buryshkin, a Moscow industrialist, strictly because
he represented commercial interests.37

But he offered sensitive

positions only to those whom he could dominate or who had proven their
reliability in past conflicts.

In that respect, the conciliationist

Cadets N. M. Kishkin, S. A. Smirnov, and V. A. Kartashev and the
departmental functionaries M. V. Bernatskii and A. V. Liverovskii were
included in the first catagory; the loyalists N. D. Avksent'ev, A. V.
Peshekhonov, and V. A. Arkhangelskii qualified for the second.38

The

military members of the projected cabinet were also known for their
moderate views.

Rear Admiral D. V. Verderevskii, the former commander

of the Baltic fleet, and General A. I. Verkhovskii, Savinkov1s
predecessor as the commander of the Petrograd Military District, had
accepted the necessity of revolutionary reforms and were not expected
to present difficulties.39 while Kerensky's efforts at governmental
reconstruction were prematurely disrupted, they had advanced
sufficiently to reveal his purpose.
the path of national regeneration.

There was to be no deviation from
Under his unchallenged leadership,

a third coalition would redeem the blighted promise of the second.

3?Rech', September 3. 1917, p° 1»
38Lists of considered ministers can be found in Russkie
Vedomosti. September 1, 1917, p. 4, and Birahevye Vedomosti,
September 1, 1917, P- 3»
39a . Kerenskii, "Otchislenie Gen. Verkovskogo,n Izdaleka,
pp. 193-19^; VVP, October 10, 1917, p. 2.
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Those plans were shattered on September 1, when the VTsIK placed
Kerensky under its authority, forbade Cadet participation in the
government, and announced that a Democratic Congress would preside over
the reconstruction of the cabinet.^

Kerensky later claimed that the

VTsIK resolution, which effectively voided his formula for state
stabilization, was entirely unexpected.^1

Yet that event was only the

logical sequel to his previous actions, for he had courted the wrath
of the socialist forces from the outbreak of the Stavka revolt.

The

TsIK and VTsIK debates of August 30-31, which convincingly demonstrated
that the Left regarded the party of Miliukov as the party of treason,
provided clear warnings of approaching conflict.

Already alarmed by

Kerensky's laxity in the treatment of mutineers^ and his apparent
reliance upon the counsel of Alekseev and Savinkov,^ they strenuously
condemned his political overtures to the Cadets.^
Initially, the Minister-President sought to dampen socialist
hostility through indirect methods.

While Skobelev and Avksent1ev

defended his tactics before the socialist

l e a d e r s h i p , ^3

he tried to

kindle popular enthusiasm for the projected government by announcing
that it would have a republican form.^6

But Kerensky was unable to

^QIzvestiia, September 3. 1917, p. 7*
^iKerensky, Russia, p. 410.
42izvestiia, August 31, 1917, p. 1.
^3PeIo Naroda, August 31, 1917, p. 1.
^Brizhevye Vedomosti. September 1, 1917, p. 3*
^5Kerensky, Russia, p. 408; VVP, September 2, 1917, p. 1.
^Izvestiia, September 2, 1917, p. 2.
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discourage his critics.

On the evening of August 31 Gots and Zenzinov,

representing their Executive Committee, formally notified him that
Cadet participation would provoke a SR boycott of the cabinet.
to issue a direct reply, Kerensky chose to defy his party.

Forced

The head

of a national government, he claimed, was not subject to the will of
individual groups.

Since the welfare of the country demanded the

formation of a representative cabinet, the Cadet appointments would
stand unchanged.^7

With the alternatives so starkly outlined, the

VTsIK resolution of September 1 was virtually predetermined; the Left,
naturally refusing to surrender its newly regained powers, chose
instead to bridle Kerensky.

Through that act, an intensified form of

dual power came into being.
The VTsIK fiat immediately caused the Minister-President to
alter his tactics.

The issue had shifted from governmental strength

to cabinet independence, and he abandoned the Cadets in order to defend
that essential principle.

Kerensky's counterattack, which spanned the

first two days of September, proceeded on the assumption that the
VTsIK would not hold to its original intent.

Noting that the

September 1 resolution revealed a certain disinclination to exercise
a strenuous supervisory role over cabinet affairs,**^ Kerensky brought
Verkhovskii and Verderevskii into the Triumvirate, which he renamed the
Directory.

While he justified that maneuver on the innocuous grounds

of administrative efficiency,^9 it was really a preliminary step toward

^/Izvestiia, September 2, 1917, p. 3.
^SiEyestiia, September 3, 1917, p. 7.
fr9VVP, September 3, 1917, p. 1.
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an independently reconstructed cabinet.50

on September 2, the

Minister-President opened cautious negotiations with the Moscow TradeIndustrialists;51 ironically, the party he tried to use against
Miliukov in July was now enlisted in the struggle against the VTsIK.
Kerensky suspended those activities on September 3 in the face of a
new socialist assault, but they foreshadowed the course that he would
follow until October.

He was determined to preserve the national

complexion of the Provisional Government; when the radical revolution
faltered, it could then serve as a rallying point for moderates.
Kerensky's exercise in prudence was a week late.

The basic

thrust of his earlier maneuvers had escaped general notice in the
turmoil of the Komilovshchina. but his persistent courtship of the
Cadets provoked a re-evaluation of those activities. The first
consequences of that increased scrutiny appeared in the September 3
issue of Delo Naroda. Several editorials, penned by Chernov and
unified by a common theme, placed Kerensky's role in the Kornilov
affair in a disturbing perspective.

The Minister-President's behavior,

Chernov observed, had been very suspicious.

The appointments of

Savinkov and Alekseev to positions of authority, the consorting with
traitorous Cadets, and the summoning of the Third Cavalry Corps to
Petrograd might have a rational explanation, but he, personally, was
unable to imagine what it could be . 52

in the inflamed atmosphere of

September those insinuations, echoed and elaborated upon in the party

50Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 322.
5lRech1, September 3. 1917. p. 3*
52pelo Naroda, September 3, 1917, pp. 1-2.
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presses and organisations of the Left, severely damaged Kerensky in
the eyes of the radicalised

p o p u l a c e . 53

His political eclipse was

startlingly rapid; by September 5, even the Moscow Soviet, previously
a strong advocate of his policies, condemned his "vacillation" and
"accommodation with counterrevolution."54
While the denigration of Kerensky's reputation brought his
political effectiveness to a close, it did not automatically mean the
abandonment of the February settlement.

So long as the charges

against him remained within the bounds set by the Moscow Soviet, his
allies on the Left possessed the capability to moderate the impact of
extremism.

The accusations of weakness and incompetence directed

against Kerensky could not be broadened to include the leaders of the
Petrograd Soviet, for their performance during the Stavka revolt had
been beyond reproach.

The Bolsheviks played an important part in the

defense of the revolution,55 but the entire Left recognized that their
forces had been organized and directed to victory by Menshevik and
SR chieftains.56

Furthermore, the VTsIK resolution of September 1

represented a determined bid to secure that ascendancy.

By renouncing

the embarrassing relationship with Kerensky that had existed since
July 6, assuring the continued isolation of the Cadets, and reducing

53Pelo Naroda. October 15, 1917, p* 1. Chernov1s inflammatory
editorials were deliberately misleading, for he had participated in
the cabinet decision that directed the Third Cavalry Corps to Petro
grad. See Izvestiia, September 15, 1917, p. 4.
54d . A. Chugaev, et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii
v Sentiabre 1917; obshchenatsional'nye krizis (Moscow, 1961), p. 144.
55lzvestiia, August 29, 1917, p. 6.
56izvestiia, September 2, 1917, p* 3*
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the powers of the compromised government, the traditional socialist
leaders opened a valuable distance between themselves and the taint
of Komilovism.
Unfortunately, those defenses proved inadequate against the full
consequences of Kerensky’s actions.

In the anarchic aftermath of the

Komilovshchina. the tenuous distinctions that allowed the simultaneous
waging of war and revolution were obliterated; by the first week of
September the soldiers and workers of Petrograd were convinced that
strong rule for any purpose meant counterrevolution.

Seen in that

harsh light, the Minister-President *s actions during the rebellion
condemned him as decisively as his former Supreme Commander.

The

Stavka uprising, according to the radical interpretation, was preci
pitated by a difference over means rather than ends.

Whereas Kerensky

wished to strangle the soviets through a gradual process of attrition,
Kornilov wanted their suppression by force of arms.57

The counter

revolutionary plot, then, extended at least to the beginning of the
Second Coalition and perhaps even to the Government to Save the
Revolution.

Since Kerensky had been hand in glove with Kornilov until

the last week of August, he could not be accused of either weakness or
vacillation.

That lesser charge applied to the socialist leadership

that had allowed treason to develop.58
The importance of the radical critique did not lie in its impact
upon the Provisional Government, for Kerensky’s disgrace had already
determined the fate of that unfortunate institution.

Rather, its

57See the discussions in Izvestiia, September 22, 1917, p. 4;
Delo Naroda, October 15, 1917, p. 1.
58chugaev, Sentiabre, p. 148.
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significance lay in its ruinous effect upon the prestige of the
traditional socialist leadership and the unity of the revolutionary
democracy.

The veterans of the TsIK and the VTsIK, who had humbled

Kerensky in order to assume command of the revolution, suddenly found
the political ground cut from under their feet.

The immediate result

was the crippling of the SR and Menshevik parties and the disinte
gration of the moderate bloc in the Petrograd Soviet.

Kerensky's

nominal party split into fragments, with an expanding left wing that
sought his expulsion,59 a rapidly shrinking right wing that vainly
tried to defend coalition,60 and a bewildered center incapable of
determined action.61

The Mensheviks suffered a similar fate, for

their Central Committee held diminishing authority over a radicalized
following that was increasingly drawn either to L. Martov's MenshevikInternationalists or to the Bolsheviks.62

But the major blow to the

moderate leadership occurred in the Petrograd Soviet.

On September 9

59Pelo Naroda, September 8, 1917, p. 1. Two leftist articles,
"The Problems of Power and the People1s Assembly" and "Our differences
with the Bolsheviks in the State Duma" called Kerensky an "obstacle"
to "the realization of the democratic revolution." The articles also
attached a "dictatorial" label to the Provisional Government.
6QDelo Naroda, September 8, 1917, p. 1. V. Lunkevich, speaking
for the Right, inserted an article entitled "A Forced Answer." In it,
he protested against the defamation of Kerensky, upheld the validity of
coalition, and urged the right wing to close ranks against the extreme
Left.
6lpelo Naroda. September 9, 1917, p. 1. Editorials expressing
the confusion of the center revealed the impact of the radical
critique. The predominant sentiment was "what are we to do?"
62The confusion afflicting the Mensheviks is brilliantly
described in N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917; Eyewitness
Account, trans. Joel Carmichael, 2 vols. (New York, 1962), II, 25k.
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Tsereteli, Dan, Gots, Chernov, Skobelev, and Chkheidze were removed
from the TsIK^3 and their places taken by a Bolshevik-dominated
committee headed by L. D. Trotsky.
Those developments were decisive to the further course of the
revolution.

The deepening radicalism of the masses, which the

Bolsheviks both inflamed and profited from, was incompatible with the
notion of dual power or the aims of the February settlement; their
slogan was "All Power To The Soviets," and their dominant sentiment
was hostility to the Provisional Government and its works.

The

moderate socialists, confined to increasingly insecure party presidiums
and their temporary stronghold in the VTsIK, were placed in a wholly
untenable position.

Desirous of regaining control over their alienated

followers yet compromised by their relationship to a detested and
obstinate regime, they were forced to pursue mutually exclusive
policies.

The ultimate results were the breakdown of their influence

over the populace and the unrestrained intensification of the radical
revolution.

More immediately, the dissolution of the moderate forces

assured in advance the Democratic Conference's failure to effect a
meaningful reconstitution of the Provisional Government.
Yet the Democratic Conference convened on September 14, despite
the fact that its 1,492 socialist d e l e g a t e s ^ were presided over by a
partially-repudiated leadership dedicated to the rejuvenation of a
discredited regime.

The proceedings reflected the disorganization and

63lzvestiia, September 10, 1917, p. 4.
6%)elo Naroda, September 27, 1917, p* 1.
65lzvestiia. September 20, 1917, p. 5*
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confusion that existed within the socialist ranks.

On September 19,

after five days of angry debate, the delegates agreed to coalition by
a slender margin of seventy-eight votes. But that decision was
effectively reversed by the adoption, by an enormous majority, of an
amendment prohibiting a Cadet presence in the new cabinet.66

The

VTsIK, rightly acknowledging that "within the democracy there exists
no agreement, no unity of will,"6? proposed a way out of the impasse:
the creation of a smaller Democratic Council, composed of 215 repre
sentatives from the various party central committees, empowered to
form a new government based on socialist principles.6®

With the

adoption of that resolution on September 20, the Democratic Conference
disbanded.69
On September 23, the Democratic Council imposed a ritualistic
settlement on Kerensky.

As an unavoidable concession to the principle

of coalition, Cadets personally uninvolved with Komilovism were
allowed into the cabinet.

But the government was ordered to adopt an

exclusively socialist platform.

The terms, which were cast in

unequivocal language, included: the convocation of an interallied
conference for the revision of war aims; government-regulated prices
for industrial products; increased taxation of the propertied classes;
and immediate implementation of Chernov's land program.

Also, the

principle of national self-determination had to be recognized and the
66izVestiia.

September20, 1917, p. 6.

67lzvestiia,

September20, 1917, p. 7*

68iZVestija,

September21, 1917, p. 2.

6 9lzvestiia,

September21, 1917, p.

Officer Corps purged of Komilovist sympathizers.7°

Finally, the

Democratic Council authorized the creation of a Preparliament, composed
predominantly of socialists, to which the Provisional Government would
be responsible.71

Predictably, no one was satisfied with the outcome.

Dan, who read the final resolution to the assembled delegates,
confessed that it was "unsuitable both in substance and in form."72
Trotsky, speaking for the Bolshevik Party, condemned the Democratic
Council for exceeding its authority in concluding an agreement with
the proscribed Cadets, labeled the results an "incitement to civil
war," and urged the creation of an all-socialist government.73

The

most astute assessment came from the editors of Rech1. Speaking for
the disenfranchised Right, they declared that the settlement was
"wholly incompatible" with the establishment of state authority.7^
The results of the Democratic Conference and its sequel served only to
emphasize the salient characteristics of the post-Kornilov period:
that the government and its moderate allies were locked into a mutually
destructive relationship, and that the vital forces of the country, at
least for the present, lay on the extreme Left.

If consolation could

be drawn from the events from September 14 to September 25, it
consisted in the fact that with the emergence of the Third Coalition a
technical center of government again existed.

70jzvestiia, September 24, 1917, p. 4.
71Chugaev, Sentiabre, p. 236.
72izvestiia, September 24, 1917, p. 4.
73lzvestiia, September 24, 1917, p. 3*
74chugaev, Sentiabre, p. 256.
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The new cabinet, composed of Left liberals, Right socialists,
and non-party loyalists, was similar to the one Kerensky had attempt®!
to establish on August 31.75

The three Cadet ministers, N. M. Kishkin,

A. V. Kartashev, and S. A. Smirnov, had broken with the majority in
the Cadet Central Committee and were inclined to accept Kerensky's
lead in policy

d e c i s i o n s . 76

The only notable socialist in the

ministerial council, the Menshevik K. A. Gvozdev, was also isolated
from the main currents of his party; a socialist equivalent of the
conciliationist Cadets, he was firmly committed to the techniques of
class compromise.77

Had that configuration appeared in May, when

Kerensky's reputation was still intact and the possibilities for class
compromise still existed, it would have contributed substantially to
his mastery of the revolution.

But as it was fortuitously produced in

the backwash of the radical resurgence, it was a further indication of
governmental weakness.
The cabinet declaration of September 25 offered evidence of
Kerensky's determination to redeem that situation.

He refused to

75yyp, September 28, 1917. p. 1. The membership of the cabinet
was as follows: Kerensky, Minister-President and Supreme Commander; A.
I. Verkhovskii, Minister of War; D. V. Verderevskii, Minister of Navy;
A. M. Nikitin, Minister of Post and Telegraph and Minister of Interior;
Tereshchenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs; S. N. Prokopovich, Minister
of Food; M. N. Bernatskii, Minister of Finance; S. S. Salazkin,
Minister of Education; A. V. Liverovskii, Minister of Transportation;
A. I. Konovalov, Minister of Trade and Industry; N. M. Kishkin,
Minister of Welfare; P. N. Maliantovich, Minister of Justice; K. A.
Gvozdev, Minister of Labor; S. L. Maslov, Minister of Agriculture; A.
V. Kartashev, Minister of Confessions; S. A. Smirnov, State Controller;
S. N. Tret'iakov, Chairman of the Economic Council.
76m . Visniak, Dan9 proshlomu (New York, 195^). P» 312.
7?Chugaev, Sentiabre, p. 217.
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ascribe the new platform to the Democratic Council; the reversal of
previous policies was attributed solely to the "national exhaustion"
brought about by Kornilovist treachery.

The Minister-President then

proceeded to undermine the terms of the September 23 settlement.

The

government did pledge itself to the convocation of an interallied
conference for the revision of war aims.

But while "striving for

peace," it would still defend the common allied cause.

Thus, the

emphasis was shifted from the attainment of an early democratic peace
to that of war in union with the Allies. The army, the government
proclamation continued, would follow the "democratic path." But its
officers would be selected for their "technical ability to meet the
problems of war" as well as for their devotion to the revolution.
Land committees were promised increased authority so long as their
actions did not violate the "existing forms of land ownership." Tax
reform was promised, yet no mention was made of a graduated income
tax, and an increased property tax was referred to in deliberately
vague terms.

Finally, Kerensky renamed the Preparliament the

Provisional Council of the Republic to emphasize its tentative nature
and stated that it would be empowered only to "query the government,
receive answers after a certain time, and deliberate on questions
arising before it." Obviously, the Minister-President had reinter
preted the decisions of the Democratic Council to his own satisfaction.
If anyone remained in doubt that the cabinet was advancing a claim to
independence, the conclusion of his declaration set those doubts to
rest.

The Provisional Government, Kerensky insisted, remained the
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"spokesman of the will of the revolutionary people."78
The Minister-President was able to extricate the government from
the reluctant grip of the VTsIK, to issue a verbal challenge to left
extremism, and to reaffirm a commitment to traditional national
interests.

But he could not invest the Third Coalition with meaningful

authority.

Kerensky's last regime, which endured precisely four weeks,

met with severe reverses in every sphere of its activity: agrarian and
urban disorders increased; its foreign policy collapsed; and its armies
began to disintegrate.

As Miliukov observed, the Third Coalition was

a passive object at the mercy of forces beyond its control.79
The cabinet's weakness was especially evident in the conduct of
military affairs, for it was wholly unable to arrest the decomposition
of the armed forces in the aftermath of the Kornilovshchina.
Admittedly, Kerensky's official acts revealed an inflexible deter
mination to raise the fighting capacity of the army.

He extended the

authority of front-line divisional commanders over their rear echelons
in hopes of tightening lax discipline,80 reduced the ability of
military committees to interfere with command decisions,®! and estab
lished penal units to control recalcitrant soldiers.®2

He also ordered

?8VVP. September 28, 1917, p. 1.
79P. Milioukov, Ch. Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, Histoire de
Russie: reforms, reaction, revolutions. 3 vols. (Paris, 1933 ), HI,
1279.
80«stavka 25-26 Oktiabria 1917 g.," ARR. VII (1922), 283.
81VVP, October 21, 1917, p. 1.
82»stavka," p. 282.
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"spokesman of the will of the revolutionary

p e o p l e . "78

The Minister-President was able to extricate the government from
the reluctant grip of the VTsIK, to issue a verbal challenge to left
extremism, and to reaffirm a commitment to traditional national
interests.

But he could not invest the Third Coalition with meaningful

authority.

Kerensky’s last regime, which endured precisely four weeks,

met with severe reverses in every sphere of its activity: agrarian and
urban disorders increased; its foreign policy collapsed; and its armies
began to disintegrate.

As Miliukov observed, the Third Coalition was

apassive object at the mercy of

forces beyond its control.79

The cabinet's weakness was especially evident in the conduct of
military affairs, for it was wholly unable to arrest the decomposition
of the armed forces in the aftermath of the Komilovshchina.
Admittedly, Kerensky's official acts revealed an inflexible deter
mination to raise the fighting capacity of the army*

He extended the

authority of front-line divisional commanders over their rear echelons
in hopes of tightening lax discipline,80 reduced the ability of
military committees to interfere with command decisions,81 and estab
lished penal units to control recalcitrant

s o l d i e r s . 82

He also ordered

78yypt September 28, 1917, p® 1.
79P. Milioukov, Ch. Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, Histoire de
Russie: reforms. reaction, revolutions. 3 vols. (Paris, 1933)» H I (
1279.
80"stavk& 25-26 Oktiabria 1917 g.," ARR, VII (1922), 283.
81VVP, October 21, 1917, p. 1.
82"Stavka," p. 282.
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increased efforts for the apprehension of deserters,®3 reduced the
scope of the democratically organized military courts,8^ and ordered
the demobilization of particularly demoralized regiments.85
practical results of those measures were negligible.

But the

By early October

the high command, estimating that over onefifth of the ten million
men under arms had deserted their posts,®6 harbored very serious doubts
that a respectable military force could bekept in the field.
Those anxieties, sharpened by the German capture of the Gulf of
Riga on October 6 ,®® led to an extremely revealing episode: the
forceful repudiation of Kerensky's policies by his chosen assistant,
General Verkhovskii.

The populist-orientated War Minister, who had

rallied to the revolution in its earliest days, had supported the
politics of moderation throughout the political upheavals of August
and September.

But on October 20, without prior consultation with the

ministerial council,89 he reversed his position in testimony before a
closed session of the Committees of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the
Preparliament.

In a move that startled the committee members,

Verkhovskii announced his resignation and offered to speak plainly

83VVP. October 14, 1917, p. 2.
84yvP, October 21, 1917, p. 1.
85d. A. Chugaev, et al., eds*, Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii
nakanune Oktiabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniia. 1-24 Oktiabria 1917 g*
(Moscow, 19*32), p. 204.
86chugaev, Vosstanie. p. 224.
87v. Stankevich, Vospominaniia, 1914-1919 gg. (Berlin, 1920),
p. 256 .
88izvestiia, October 6 , 1917, p. 1.

89Kerenskii, "Otchislenie," p. 193*

about the plight of the army and the country.

His revelations were

uniformly alarming: the government could neither feed nor clothe
sufficient troops to maintain the front; Bolshevism had made such
inroads that the bulk of the soldiery was unreliable; and the present
cabinet policy, rather than alleviating the situation, actually
furthered the chances of a Bolshevik coup.

The only possible solution

Verkhovskii continued, was the negotiation, with the support of the
Allies, of an immediate peace with Germany.

That event would allow

the rapid demobilization of the army and the formation, largely from
the Officer Corps, of elite units able to contain anarchy.

Finally,

he called for the creation of a "strong personal power" to facilitate
state recovery.

In subsequent questioning, the War Minister admitted

that his proposals meant abandonment of the revolution.

"We must

decide what we can afford and what we cannot afford," he insisted.
At the present, he added, the choices were between destruction and
survival.90
Kerensky, whose own alternatives had been reduced to the main
tenance of appearances, was openly dismayed by Verkhovskii1s defection
Fearful that extremists on either the Right or the Left would exploit
the incident,91 he took immediate steps to reduce its impact.

The

Minister-President avoided an official decision on the matter by
declining Verkhovskii's proferred resignation.92

instead, he

90chugaev, Vosstanie. pp. 224-225.
91V. Nabokov, "Vremennoe Pravitel'stvo," ARR, I (1922), 80.
92Kerenskii, "Otchislenie," p. 194.
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attributed the War Minister's "tactlessness" before the Preparliament
to mental exhaustion,93 placed him on sick leave, 9** and "temporarily"
replaced him with General A. A. Manikovskii.95

Apparently, Kerensky

also tried to withhold Verkhovskii1s testimony from the public.

On

October 22 Skobelev and F, Znamenskii, the presiding officers of the
joint committee meeting of October 20 and personal friends of the
Minister-President, issued a curious declaration to the press.

General

Verkhovskii, they correctly stated, had not advocated a separate peace.
But in claiming that he had condemned defeatism in any
implied that he supported a continuance of the war.

form,

96 they

Kerensky's name

was not associated with the misleading committee declaration.

But its

timing so closely coincided with the governmental closure of Obshchee
Delo (The Common Cause).97 the conservative newspaper that had first
published excerpts of the War Minister's
was strongly indicated.

speech,98

that his involvement

Unable to refute the accuracy of Verkhovskii's

assertions, the embattled Minister-President evidently sought to
counter them through obfuscation.
The Verkhovskii incident was preceded by a far more serious one:
an Allied demarche, also provoked by Russia's military decomposition,
that shattered the foreign policy of the Provisional Government.

93lzvestiia. October 21, 1917, p. 5*
9^»Stavka," p . 28395Nabokov,

p.

83-

96pelo Naroda,

October 22, 1917, p. 2.

97Pelo Naroda.

October 26, 1917, p* 2.

98Pelo Naroda.

October 22, 1917, p. 2.
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Kerensky was aware that only victory on the battlefield would bring
success in negotiations with the Allies,99 but it was a measure of his
inexperience in international affairs that he failed to realize the
full diplomatic consequences of military defeat.10°

He had been given

fair warning that Allied patience was exhausted; on September 26 the
French, British, and Italian ambassadors lodged a formal protest
against his toleration of anarchy and made further material aid de
pendent upon the prompt restoration of civil and military authority. 101
As their unprecedented action closely followed the Democratic Council's
demand for aggressive peace initiatives, a seasoned statesman would
have been forewarned of future complications in foreign policy.

But

Kerensky attached very little importance to the Allied remonstrance of
September 26.

According to Buchanan, the doyen of the Petrograd

diplomatic corps, he treated the ambassadors "cavalierly" and dismissed
them with a "Napoleonic touch."102
Convinced that Russia's membership in the Entente guaranteed a
respectful consideration of its views,103 the Minister-President
placed great emphasis on the significance of the impending interallied
conference.

There is no indication that Kerensky actually thought that

the London meeting, scheduled for October 2$, would lead to a

99c. Nabokoff, Ordeal of a Diplomat (London, 1921), p. 142.
100a . Kerenskii, "Orientatsiia na Rossiu," Izdaleka, p. 140.
lOlChugaev, Sentiabre, pp. 236-237®
102sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic
Memories, 2 vols. (London, 1923), II, 193*
103a . Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, trans. G. Kerensky
(Paris, 1936), pp. 3 5 9 ^ 0 .
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negotiated peace with the Central Powers.

He did expect Allied

acknowledgement of the diplomatic principles of the Russian revolution.
Failing that, he could at least establish Russian desires for "peace
and the earliest return to peaceful cooperation among nations" in a
"clear, explicit, and befitting m a n n e r . I n either case, he felt,
the benefits would be substantial.

The government would demonstrate

its devotion to the ideals of the revolution, socialist qualms about
the nature of the war would be stilled, and the morale of the army
would be strengthened.105
Characteristically, Kerensky intended to elicit Allied
cooperation through the dual tactics of moral exhortation and political
compromise.

He actively solicited American support; if Wilsonian

principles were joined to revolutionary idealism, the western European
delegations would be put on the d e f e n s i v e . T h e Minister-President
intended to supplement his ideological offensive with a moderate
political formula combining a technical condemnation of annexations
with a clear recognition of national interests.

Tereshchenko, his

spokesman in the foreign ministry, outlined the government's approach
in a speech before the Preparliament on October 16.

The Russian

delegation, he stated, would demand the "renunciation of foreign
conquests and indemnities imposed on our enemies and a similar
repudiation on the part of our enemies."

Once that problem was

resolved, "progress toward the self-determination of smaller nations"

ICfcvvp, October 8, 1917, p. 3105Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 360.
106chugaev, Vosstanie. p. 200.

221

could commence.

At the same time, Tereshchenko continued, Russia

(and by implication its Allies) would avoid a peace that would
"humiliate her or undermine her vital interests."10?
Tereshchenko's speech was unmistakable.

The thrust of

The Provisional Government

sought a cosmetic agreement that would mask the substance of
imperialism with the flavor of international socialism.

It was

admirably suited to a conference composed of Right socialists and Left
liberals.
The pragmatic war cabinets of David Lloyd George and Georges
Clemenceau lacked that political complexion, and they were disinclined
to accept the dictates of an enfeebled ally.
warning.

Their rebuff came without

On October 16 the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Andrew

Bonar Law, stated that the London Conference would confine itself
strictly to methods of prosecuting the war.

His Majesty's government,

Bonar Law continued under questioning, had at no time addressed itself
to the reconsideration of war aims or to the expectations held by the
Kerensky regime.

On October 18 Jules Cambon, the General Secretary

of the French foreign ministry, completed the destruction of Kerensky's
foreign policy initiative by issuing a similar statement.-^9

The

Minister-President did not respond to the Allied demarche; unless he
were willing to exploit it by seeking a separate peace, any comment
would only magnify his defeat.

But he undoubtedly had that incident in

mind in 1920, when he declared: "In the times of its greatest

10?Rech', October 1?, 191?, p. 2.
108parliamentary Debates (Commons), LCVIII, col. 118?.
l°9New York Times, November 1, 191?, p. 3-
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difficulties, the Russian democracy had no true friends among the
Great Powers of Europe. " H Q
The paralysis of the Third Coalition was as evident in internal
as in military or diplomatic matters.

To a certain extent, its

ineffectiveness was the result of administrative decomposition; denied
the cooperation of the soviets and most revolutionary factions, the
Provisional Government was unable to maintain its machinery in large
parts of the country. H I

Kerensky acknowledged the severity of the

domestic crisis in a speech before the Preparliament on October ?.

The

state, he noted, lacked the present capability to "establish elementary
law and order in Russia" or to "restore industrial production."

Those

essential tasks, he continued, could be undertaken only if a more
popular body mobilized and directed the "energies and initiatives of
the public. "H2

The Minister-President's appeal, which could have

come only from desperation, was fruitless.

The Preparliament, divided

within itselfH3 and estranged from the radicalized populace by its
affiliation with the Kerensky regime, H 4 was unable to render effective
aid.

Forced to rely upon dwindling resources, the government attempted

to counter anarchy through the only
use

means left at itsdisposal: the

of military units detached from the front. H 5

HOKerenskii, "Orientatsiia,"

Buteven that

p. 141.

111a . Dem'ianov, "Moia sluzhba pri Vremennom Pravitel'stve," ARR,
IV (1922), 119.
H2VVP, October 8, 1917, p. 3*
113Russkie Vedomosti, October
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114Ru3skie Vedomosti, October

20, 1917, p. 3*
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option was limited, for so few politically reliable soldiers could be
spared that they were able only to conduct random patrols in especially
disturbed areas.
Yet governmental passivity could not be wholly ascribed to
external circumstances, for the cabinet displayed a narked aversion
to measures that might alleviate popular discontent.

That reluctance

was particularly evident in the field of agrarian reform.

In the four

weeks of its tenure, the ministerial council succeeded only in reaching
a general agreement on the principles governing land transference.
Furthermore, those terms fell decidedly short of Chernov's proposals
and the stipulations of the Democratic Council.

According to S. L.

Maslov's program, state lands were to fail under the jurisdiction of
the land committees, bat private lands worked by the owner's tools
were exempt.

Thus, the capitalized estates of prerevolutionary Russia

were to be p r e s e r v e d . W h i l e the Bolshevik uprising halted further
consideration of the issue, there was no indication of additional
concessions to socialist ideology.
other areas.

A similar trend was evident in

Cabinet work on compulsory arbitration of labor disputes,

an inheritance tax, and the establishment of state monopolies over
specified consumer goods reached only preliminary

stages.

In part, governmental apathy was a result of demoralization. The
radical revolution had a corrosive effect upon those charged with its

H6"Stavka," p. 283.
H ?Delo Naroda, October 18, 191?, p. 1.
U BEkonoraisheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune velikoi Oktiabr1skoi
sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1957), I, 311 •
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containment; Kerensky experienced periods of acute depression during
October,H9 and the morale of the ministerial council was no better
than his own.120

Evidently, there was a strong impulse to defer all

responsibility to the Constituent Assembly, for the only bright spot
in the otherwise dismal record of the Third Coalition was its rapid
progress toward convocation of that long-awaited body.^21

Legislative

timidity was also prompted by fear of another costly interregnum.
Because many ministers felt that a new cabinet crisis would deliver
the country into the hands of extremists, they hesitated to raise
topics that would provoke severe internal dissension. 122
Yet there was also a certain premeditation behind the govern
ment's immobility.

While Kerensky often fell prey to discouragement,

he had not abandoned hope of a return to strong rule; anticipating a
Bolshevik rising, he expected it to suffer the same fate, and to bear
similar consequences as the one in July.

The Minister-President

revealed those convictions to Buchanan on October 12.

While admitting

that the currents of civil and military dissolution were presently
beyond control, he expressed confidence that a radical uprising, which
should materialize "within weeks," would permit a rapid restoration of
state order. 123

Kerensky returned to the same theme on October 2k,

the very day of the Bolshevik insurrection, in a conversation with

H9Kerensky, Russia, p. 1+28; Stankevich, p. 251.
120Dem'ianov, p. 119.
121WP, October 21, 1917, p. 3122pelo Naroda, October 18, 1917, p. 1.
123Buchanan, II, 196.
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Stankevich.

The Bolsheviks, he maintained, were playing into the

hands of the government.

This time, "The Chernovs would not be able

to rescue the Kamenevs and the Zinovievs."124

Kerensky1s refusal to

grant concessions to radical demands was influenced by those
considerations. With a resurgence of the native optimism that had
carried him through so many crises, he looked beyond an uprising to
the reconstruction of the country's forces.

The Provisional Govern

ment, he felt, could best guide that process if it preserved its
reputation as the mainspring of political moderation.125
On October 21 the event that Kerensky would have held a "special
prayer meeting" to witness-^ finally materialized; the Bolshevikcontrolled Petrograd Soviet openly defied the government by granting
its Military Revolutionary Committee (VRK) formal authority over the
capital's garrison.12?

The VRK, a revival of the Soviet's anti-

Kornilov Committee for the People's Struggle against Counterrevolution,
had ostensibly been created on October 9 to protect Petrograd in the
event of a German breakthrough on the Northern front.1^®

But Kerensky,

who rightly considered it an instrument of insurrection,129 recognized

12^Stankevich, p. 258.
prominent Bolsheviks.

L. B. Kamenev and G. E. Zinoviev were

125Kerenskii, "Politika," p. 424.
126fjabokov, p. 36.
12?lzvestiia, October 24, 1917, p. 5«
128d . A. Chugaev, ed., Petrogradskii Voenno-Revoliutsionnyi
Komitet, dokumenty i materialy, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1966), I, 40-41.
129l . Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, trans.
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its bid to control the garrison as the prelude to an armed uprising.3-30
He had already received assurances from Colonel G. P. Polkovnikov, the
Commander of the Petrograd Military District, and General A. V.
Cheremisov, the Coramander-in-Chief of the Northern front, that adequate
defensive measures had been taken to suppress disorder.3-31 Armed with
that encouraging information, he planned to launch an immediate
pre-emptive attack against the VRK and its ruling spirit, the Bolshevik
Party.
Unfortunately, the left wing of the cabinet did not share his
views.

The socialist ministers refused to countenance a major assault

against the VRK simply on the basis of Bolshevik resolutions, and
Polkovnikov's success on October 22 in expelling the VRK commissars
from the garrison132 added force to their arguments.

Kerensky later

attributed the government's inactivity on October 22 to humanitarian
motives.

The VRK, he claimed, had deliberately been allowed time to

"realize its mistake" and "reverse its stand.nl33

Actually, he had

been immobilized by a cabinet majority frightened by the prospect of
civil war and still unconvinced that a direct threat to the state
existed.3-3^ The ministerial council finally sanctioned limited
measures against the Bolsheviks on the night of October 23; in response
to Kerensky's repeated urgings, the Menshevik Minister of Justice,

130lzvestiia, October 25, 1917, p. 2.
13lKerensky, "Gatchina," p. 195.
132lzvestiia, October 25, 1917, p. 5*
133lzvestiia, October 25, 1917, p. 2.
13^Buchanan, II, 204; Vishniak, p. 313*
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Maliantovich, proposed the formation of a commission to investigate
the VRK and authorised the closure of the Bolshevik newspapers Rabochie
Put1 and Rabochii i Soldat.135

But those tentative steps were taken

unwillingly, and the cabinet insisted that further action would have
to be approved by the Preparliament.^-36
Kerensky appeared before the Preparliament at 11:00 a.m. on
October 24 "firmly convinced" that he would gain permission for strong
punitive measures against the Bolsheviks.^37

His timing was

regrettable; as Stankevich recalled, the "streets were totally calm"
that morning, with "no sign of any kind of uprising."138

The Minister-

President1s speech reflected the apparent reality; unable to provide
concrete proof of insurrection, he fell back on the same arguments
that had proven so ineffective with the cabinet.

He claimed that the

abortive takeover of the garrison on October 22 and manifestos by Lenin
and the VRK calling for resistance to the government were adequate
proof of a matured conspiracy.

A "technical" state of insurrection

existed which threatened the convocation of the Constituent Assembly,
encouraged a counterrevolutionary movement "perhaps even more serious
than that of General Kornilov," and undermined the morale of the army.
Kerensky concluded with a request for sufficient authority to direct
the "immediate, final, and definite liquidation" of those groups

135lzvestiia, October 24, 1917, p. 7*
136Rech1, October 25, 1917, p. 2.
137Kerensky, Russia, p. 435*
138stankevich, p. 258.
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attempting to subvert the "free will of the Russian people."139
The Preparliament resolution, adopted that evening after bitter
and prolonged debate, revealed a deep suspicion of Kerensky’s motives
and an earnest desire to placate the restive populace.

It admitted

that the "developing revolutionary movement" was a threat to the
Constituent Assembly and the precarious stability of the army and the
country.

Nevertheless, the resolution continued, discontent was

partially justified by the government's "delay in carrying out urgent
measures." Above all, the country required a decree on the transfer of
land to the land committees and an immediate search for peace.

The

Preparliament did agree that steps should be taken to combat an
outbreak of anarchy.

To achieve that end, it proposed the formation

of a Committee of Public Safety, composed of representatives from
municipal governments and socialist parties, that would act in concert
with the Provisional G o v e r n m e n t . E n r a g e d and astonished by the
resolution, Kerensky threatened resignation on the grounds that it
virtually amounted to a vote of no confidence in the c a b i n e t . A s
that maneuver failed to evoke a suitable response, he icily informed
the Preparliament that the govertiment "had no need of admonitions or
instructions" and would conduct the struggle against the Bolsheviks
under its own auspices.1^2

139lzvestiia, October 25, 1917, p. 3*
140izvestiia, October 25, 1917, P*
l^lStankevich, p. 160; Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 327.
1^2See F. I. Dan's recollections in R. Browder and A. Kerensky,
eds., The Russian Provisional Government. 1917; Documents, 3 vols.
(Stanford, 1961), III, 1783-
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It is impossible to determine whether Kerensky’s acceptance of
the Preparliament1s terms would have permitted the suppression of the
Bolshevik uprising of October 24-25.

But there can be little doubt

that his refusal significantly undermined his position.

During the

three days that the Minister-President vainly sought authority for a
pre-emptive attack, the Bolsheviks were able to mobilize and arm their
Red Guards without serious interference.

Because of Kerensky's self-

imposed isolation from the Preparliament, they were also allowed to
portray rebellion as a protective reaction to counterrevolution, ^ 3 a
fulfillment of Trotsky's pledge that reactionary assaults would be
answered by a "ruthless counteroffensive carried out to the end." 1 ^
Socialist protests against the VRK's "thoughtless adventure" ^ 5
did little to dispel that impression; the uprising was condemned on
the grounds that it would provoke Black Hundred pogroms, jeopardize
the Constituent Assembly, and open the front to the Germans.

But

neither the Mensheviks nor the SRs could actuallybringthemselves
call for an active defense of Kerensky's unpopularregime.-^

to

Onthe

night of October 24 the TsIK, defying its Bolshevik members, mounted a
tardy campaign to effect a rapprochement between the Provisional
Government and the Petrograd populace.

But in advancing land reform,

an active peace policy, and the formation of a Committee of Public
Safety as prerequisites for the re-establishment of governmental

l43chugaev, Komitet, I, 81.
I44izvestiia, October 18, 1917, p. 5*
I45lzvestiia, October 25, 1917, p. 1.
1^6pelo Naroda, October 26, 1917, p. 1; Izvestiia, October 24,
1917, p. 1.
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integrity,1^7 they offered a solution that Kerensky had already
rejected.
The failure of the socialist parties to equate rebellion with
treason probably determined the attitude of the troops charged with
the defense of the Provisional Government.

Commissar Stankevich wryly

recalled a revealing incident that occurred on October 26.

Upon

encountering a detachment of Cossacks near Tsarskoe Selo, he delivered
an impassioned plea for resistance to the Bolsheviks.

After he

concluded, one of the soldiers shrugged his shoulders, spat, and with
a "malicious glance" loudly replied:
I don't know about that. In the beginning everything was clear,
but now no one understands anything. Everyone talks and everyone
is confused. One wants this, another wants that. Everyone has
his program, his party. Everyone's muddled, no one is certain.
The devil take all orators.1^8
Kerensky also noted the close connection between leftist
ambivalence and military demoralization. On the morning of October 2k
he had "firm assurances" of armed backing from several Cossack
regiments stationed within Petrograd, but by October 25 the major
units earmarked for the defense of the capital had chosen a policy of
neutrality. ^ 9

Unable to counter the Bolshevik attack with the slender

forces at his disposal, 150 he left for Pskov in search of aid.^1 The

1^7lzvestiia, October 26, 1917, p. 3»
148stankevich, p. 269 .
1^9Kerensky, "Gatchina," pp. 198-199.
150lzvestiia. October 26, 1917, p. 3» Those forces consisted of
a few Cossack detachments, perhaps 1,000 young cadets from military
schools, and a showcase woman's battalion that had never seen action.
15lDelo Naroda, October 26, 1917, p. 1.
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capital passed under Bolshevik control within hours of his hurried
departure.152
Far more than Petrograd was lost on October 25, for the
commanders of the Northern front showed a remarkable indifference to
the plight of the government.

In part, their attitude reflected

Kerensky's failure to purge the Officer Corps of Komilovist sympa
thizers. 153

But if Commissar Voitinskii's observations were accurate,

General Cheremisov's refusal to follow Kerensky's orders^-5^ was based
on more than personal animosity.

His reaction was symptomatic of a

general disaffection with the Provisional Government and expressed the
feeling, prevalent among the Left as well as the Right,155 that the
struggle against Bolshevism should be conducted by other principals
and under other

auspices.

156

Thus, the Minister-President's policy of class mediation in an
environment of class warfare yielded its ultimate consequences.
Having alienated every important political force in revolutionary
Russia, he was nearly as isolated as Nicholas II had been eight months
before.

Since July, Kerensky had resisted enormous pressure in his

152izvestiia, October 26, 1917, p. 3- For detailed accounts of
the actual course of the Bolshevik uprising, see: Eduard Burdzhalov,
Vtoraia Russkaia revoliutsiia, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1967-71), I; R. V.
Daniels, Red October, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (New York,
1967), chapters 8 and 9153Pelo Naroda, October 23, 1917, p. 3»
W s t a v k a , " p. 3(&.
155Pelo Naroda, October 28, 1917, p« 1.
156w. S. Woytinsky, Stormy Passage; a Personal History Through
Two Russian Revolutions to Democracy and Freedom, 1905-1960
(New York, 1961), p. 382.
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vain attempts to restore the vanished balance of the February revo
lution.

He succeeded only in hopelessly dividing the anti-Bolshevik

forces at a time when their coordination was imperative.
Nevertheless, the confusion surrounding the Bolshevik coup
permitted a final effort to regain Petrograd by storm.

Still unaware

that the socialist parties "had broken off relations with the govern
ment, " Voitinskii persuaded General P. N. Krasnov to move elements of
the Third Cavalry Corps to the Minister-President1s aid.157

Krasnov's

“risky campaign"158 proved to be little more than a defiant gesture.
With great difficulty, he did manage to move a small mixed force of
Cossacks and artillary past Tsarskoe Selo on October 30.159

But he

was hampered by the lack of infantry support, and after an inconclusive
skirmish at the Pulkovo heights near Petrograd he withdrew to Gatchina,
the historic stronghold of Paul 1.160

it was at that site, the

hereditary estate of the last tsar to be deposed by a political coup,
that Kerensky1s own deposition took place.
Yet as late as October 31 it appeared that something could be
salvaged from the wreckage of the Provisional Government.

The Petro

grad SRs, on their own initiative, had attempted to dislodge the
Bolsheviks on October 29; meeting with an unexpectedly sharp defeat,
their newly-formed Committee of Salvation belatedly authorized active

157woytinsky, p. 371158Kerenskii, "Gatchina,“ p. 209.
159p. N. Krasnov, "Na vnutrennem fronte," ARR. I (1922), 177.
I60chugaev, Komitet, I, 438.
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support of Kerensky's efforts.161

As several members of the SR Central

Committee, including Gots, Chernov, and Avksent'ev, were canvassing
the front for additional forces, the Krasnov venture promised to gain
renewed impetus.162

Kerensky certainly held that conviction; in a

fresh display of energy, he ordered General Baranovskii to replace
Cheremisov as Commander-in-Chief of the Northern front!63 and called a
"war council" to determine future tactics.164

The Minister-President's

decisions, reached after consultations with Krasnov, Savinkov, and
Stankevich, were in keeping with the perceived opportunities.

He chose

to initiate armistice negotiations with the VRK in order to gain time
for the mobilization of additional forces,165 and as a token of good
faith to the Committee of Salvation, he proposed the formation of a new
government drawn from the democratic organs of Petrograd.166

in the

midst of civil war, Kerensky finally admitted the need for a drastic
political shift to the Left.
Those concessions came too late, for the negotiations of
November 1 led to the complete disintegration of the government forces.
P. E. Dybenko, the principal VRK representative at the Gatchina
Conference, skillfully played on the Cossacks' awareness of their
military isolation and won their approval for Kerensky's and Krasnov's
l6lpeio Naroda, November 2, 1917, p. 2.
162$tankevich, pp. 272-273*
163Woytinsky, p. 385*
164-Kerenskii, "Gatchina," p. 200.
1655tankevich, p. 280.
l66pelo Naroda, November 2, 1917, p. 2.
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arrests.167

Forewarned of his peril, Kerensky escaped from Gatchina

in a sailor's uniform and disappeared in the forests near

Luga.168

His

precipitant flight marked the formal end of the Russian Provisional
Government.169
The denouement at Gatchina also reduced Kerensky's status to
that of a state criminal and ended his effective participation in the
political life of his country.

During the Winter of 1917-1918, his

withdrawal was almost total; apart from arranging publication of his
testimony on the Kornilov affair,170 his sole public contribution was
an open letter to Delo Naroda urging continued opposition to Bolshevik
rule.

But that episode further illustrated his political isolation,

for the editors felt compelled to insert a covering article entitled
"The Fate of Kerensky" that carefully dissociated him from the current
activities of the SR party.171

The former Minister-President's attempt

to gain entrance to the Constituent Assembly in January of 1918
prompted an even sharper rebuff from his former associates.

Zenzinov,

Kerensky's contact with the SR Executive Committee, refused to provide
the necessary credentials on the grounds that his appearance at the
Tauride Palace, besides entailing a serious personal risk, would
accomplish nothing of value.172

The message was clear; Kerensky's

I67chugaev, Komitet, I, 519*
l6%erenskii, "Gatchina," p. 223.
l69Delo Naroda, November 12, 1917, p. 4.
170p. Sorokin, Leaves from a Russian Diary (New York, 192*0,
p. 143.
17lDelo Naroda, November 22, 1917, p. 1.
172Kerensky, Russia, p. 467.
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intrusion, by exacerbating old wounds, would hinder attempts to rebuild
party unity.
Zenzinov was surely correct, for so long as the radical revo
lution was in progress, Kerensky's participation in political events
would only spread dissension in socialist ranks.

Also, from a personal

standpoint his enforced passivity had a beneficial effect.

Sorokin,

who met him in Moscow at the beginning of May, was struck by the extent
of his recovery.

The former head of state, Sorokin recalled, had lost

all traces of nervousness and irritability.

Improbably disguised by a

beard, long hair, and "thick blue spectacles," he spoke in a "quiet and
simple" manner that befitted a "teacher or a preacher. "-*-73 The mental
and physical exhaustion of the October daysl74 had vanished, and
Kerensky was capable of renewed endeavors.
A limited opportunity soon appeared, for the disastrous treaty
of Brest-Litovsk, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, and the
spreading Red terror produced a revival of interest in united
cooperation among the opponents of Bolshevism.

The most promising of

those efforts, the Union of Regeneration, won Kerensky's full
allegiance.

His reaction was certainly understandable: in advocating

a national coalition, the restoration of the German front, and the
reconvocation of the Constituent Assembly, the Union adhered to the
basic principles of the defunct Provisional Government.175

Because it

173Sorokin, p. 143.
174stankevich, p. 251.
175Telegram from the Quai d'Orsay to the Russian Embassy in
Paris, the V. A. Maklakov Archive of the Russian Embassy in Paris,
1917-1924, 4 boxes, collection of the Hoover Institute at Stanford
University, box 1, accession no. 26003-927*
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promised an effective revival of nadpartiinost*, Kerensky quickly
agreed to a proposal, probably extended by Sorokin and N. I. Astrov,
to solicit material and diplomatic aid for the Union from the West.^ 6
In late May of 1918, in his first trip beyond the boundaries of Russia,
Kerensky departed from Murmansk for conferences with the Allies.1??
The new emissary's arrival in western Europe caused considerable alarm
in Communist circles; in a telegraphic conversation with Stalin,
Trotsky described him as "one of the chief agents-provocateurs working
on behalf of foreign Imperialism."178
Trotsky's anxieties were unfounded, for Kerensky's mission on
behalf of the Union of Regeneration was singularly unsuccessful.

To

a certain extent, that was a reflection of his inexperience in the
conduct of diplomatic affairs.

Constantine Nabokov, the Russian Charge

d'Affairs in London, noted that Kerensky comported himself as if he
were a fully accredited ambassador of a stable government,179 and his
telegrams to the Union of Regeneration do convey an exaggerated sense
of importance.1®0

Thus, it is not surprising that the Allied govern

ments , faced with Kerensky's brusque demands for Russian representation
at future peace conferences and his insistence that they refrain from
l?6rhe Times (London), June 27, 1918, p. 7.
177Kerensky, Russia, p. 494.
178l . Trotskii, The Trotsky Papers. 1917-22, ed. Jan Meijer,
2 vols. (The Hague, 1964-71), I, 313-315179Nabokoff, Ordeal, p. 258.
180Telegram from Kerensky to Moscow by the Quai d'Orsay,
Maklakov Archive, box 1, accession no. 26003-937.
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interference in the internal politics of national
react with deep misgivings.182

regimes,

181 would

But his failure was due more to

internal developments in Russia than to diplomatic maladroitness. The
various anti-communist national fronts broke down in the heat of civil
war, and as they gave way to dictatorships Kerensky's tenuous influence
dwindled.183
K o l c h a k , 184

Finally discouraged by Allied support of Admiral A. V.

who forcibly dispersed the democratic Directorate at Omsk,

Kerensky abandoned his diplomatic efforts in favor of journalistic
ones. 185
Freed from the constraints of political responsibility, Kerensky
reverted to the style of polemical advocacy so natural to him.

As the

editor of a succession of populist-orientated journals, of which the
most notable was the Berlin-based Dni (Days). he defended interclass
cooperation and Russian national interests throughout the civil
war.186

Upon its conclusion, he established a reputation as an acute

critic and informed observer of the Soviet Union.

Through articles,

memoirs, and association with emigre organizations, Kerensky remained
an articulate spokesman of Russian democratic ideals and a leading
advocate of political freedom until his death in 1970.

18lThe Times (London), October 33, 1918, p. 8.
182j(erenskii, "Mir soiuznikov v Rossii," Izdaleka, p. 121.
183Bureau d 1informations Baltique, no. 47, Maklakov Archive,
box 1, accession no. 26003-937.
184Kerenskii, "Vse roalo," Izdaleka, p. 83.
185The Times (London), June 25, 1919, P» 12.
186sorokin, p. 309 .

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Alexander Kerensky's political career, which extended from his
election to the State Duma in 1912 to the Bolshevik seizure of power
in October of 1917, covered a crucial phase in the history of his
country.

In turn, those years witnessed the enfeeblement and collapse

of tsarism, the open struggle for power among the claimants to state
leadership, and the emergence of the Bolshevik Party from relative
obscurity to a position of dominance.

In the process, the basic frame

work was established for the future course of the nation.

An active

participant in those significant events, Kerensky had a growing, and
at times decisive, influence upon their outcome.

As could be expected,

his activities were often dictated by ideological considerations; no
less than other politically active figures, he attempted to shape
developments according to personally held values and convictions.
While Kerensky's public impact was comparatively minor until the
February revolution of 1917, his predilections were revealed by his
political maneuvers while a deputy within the Fourth State Duma.
Indeed, without the perspectives gained by an examination of his Duma
activities, it would be very difficult to discern the thrust of his
policies during the revolution.

Although he gained a radical

reputation because of his determined opposition to tsarism, Kerensky
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was a consistent advocate of interparty cooperation for the attainment
of national and social objectives.

The leader of a small populist

party, the Tmidoviks, he actually occupied an amorphous area between
socialism and liberalism.

Fully dedicated to populist conceptions of

social justice, he nonetheless wished to achieve them by adopting, as
a transitional measure, a non-partisan attitude toward the major
problems facing the country.
In part, Kerensky adhered to that approach because of a senti
mental affinity with Russian liberalism.

His formative years had been

spent in privileged, professional surroundings and he was very much at
ease with the jurists, physicians, and academicians who dominated the
Cadet Party.

But his solicitude for the moderate Right also had a

programmatic basis.

To his mind the value of liberalism, its

irreplaceable contribution to the Russian political process, was its
unswerving commitment to nationalistic ideals.

With liberal partici

pation, Kerensky felt, the social transformation of the state could
proceed along populist lines without the sacrifice of its power or
position in the international arena.^

That belief, more than any other

factor, explains how Kerensky could be a moderate and, at the same
time, a revolutionary.

Above all, the future Minister-President was

a nationalist, with an exalted sense of the special destiny of Russia.
His fervent nationalism blended easily with a tendency, common to all
populists, to idealize the people; as a result, his expectations
regarding the future of his country were suffused with an emotional

iFor example, see Kerensky's speech in GD, session 5, meeting 20,
February 15, 1917, col. 1359; A. Kerenskii, "Ocherednaia zadacha,"
Izdaleka, sbomik statei (Paris, 1922), p. 47.

240
intensity that was almost mystical in nature.

Since those feelings

were accompanied by strong humanistic impulses, also derived from the
populist tradition, he was naturally drawn to a course of action that
furthered democratic, egalitarian aims while avoiding unnecessary
political dislocation.
Kerensky's Duma colleagues, misled by the polemical, inter
nationalist flavor that opposition to tsarism lent to his public state
ments and political acts, were inadequately aware of his fundamental
orientation.

His hostility to the Central Powers and his encouragement

in May of 1915 of special councils, composed of Duma members and
tsarist officials, to facilitate the war effort were illuminating
examples of his desire to reconcile national and revolutionary needs.
Yet to socialist and non-socialist deputies alike, those superficially
incongruous actions seemed more the product of a tempestuous
disposition than of a well-defined, carefully considered policy.
Within the relatively stratified environment of the State Duma,
Kerensky's attempts to create a broad, multi-party revolutionary move
ment failed to arouse real enthusiasm even when he was taken seriously.
Liberals, regardless of their own tendency to praise the virtues of

nonpartisanship,2 were unwilling to immolate themselves in its service.
Their hesitation was understandable, for they could scarcely be
sympathetic to a form of moderation that exploited their patriotism
while denying the validity of their political programs. Furthermore,
the major populist party, the SRs, had boycotted the elections to the
Fourth State Duma; as a result, most Left deputies were Marxists.

2v. Maklakov, Iz vospominanii (New York, 1954), p. 308.
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Kerensky's particular interpretation of nadpartiinost', which would
have struck a responsive chord in many Right SRs, was alien to Marxist
politicians like Chkheidze and Skobelev.

They appreciated his

oratorical gifts, his hostility to autocracy, and his obstructionist
talents, but they viewed his anti-party arguments with a mixture of
skepticism and puzzlement.3 Within the confines of the State Duma,
Kerensky had a sustained effect only upon the Left-Center— individuals
such as S. Znamenskii and Nekrasov, who vacillated between liberalism
and radicalism.^

In sum, Kerensky's proposals appealed to a

numerically insignificant portion of the Duma membership.

If the

revolution had not intervened, he would probably have remained an
ineffectual advocate of politically sterile tactics.
But when the February revolution did occur, no one was better
prepared than Kerensky to exploit its unique possibilities.

Because

of his recognized opposition to tsarism, which had recently been empha
sized in a series of daring and dramatic Duma speeches, he possessed
an immense following that was disposed to accept his will as a valid
expression of revolutionary goals.

That heightened popularity,

combined with Kerensky's own enthusiasm and the confusion that affected
the liberal and socialist leaders during the collapse of the old
regime, permitted a drastic expansion of his influence.
He responded immediately with attempts to bridge the differences
between the socialist and non-socialist parties. In all probability,

3n . N. Sukhanov, Zapiski o revoliutsii. 7 vols. (Berlin, 1922),
I, 63 -68 .
^+5. I. Shidlovskii, Vospominaniia, 2 vols (Berlin, 1923),
II, 127.
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the State Duma and the Petrograd Soviet would have reached a temporary
accommodation without Kerensky's intercession.

Nevertheless, the

Duma's promptness in accepting an active role in the transfer of power,
the rapidity with which the vexing problem of the monarchy was solved,
and much of the authority that the first Provisional Government
possessed in the eyes of the revolutionary populace were due to his
strenuous efforts.

To his bitter disappointment, Kerensky failed to

create a broad coalition of liberal and socialist forces.

But in

entering the cabinet as a self-proclaimed hostage of the democracy, he
blunted the disruptive impact of dual power and laid the groundwork
for a future multi-party alliance.
Most of Kerensky's efforts within the first cabinet were devoted
to extending the precarious class truce that had been struck on
March 2.

Despite the initial flush of revolutionary enthusiasm that

affected virtually the entire country, there can be little doubt that,
left to themselves, the liberals in the government would have come into
violent conflict with the Petrograd Soviet.

As the negotiations

between the Temporary Committee of the State Duma and the Soviet had
revealed, each was deeply suspicious of the other.

In fact, the

emergence of the new regime under the anxious gaze of the TsIK
signified an armed truce rather than a genuine agreement to fulfill
common objectives.
Kerensky's attempts to moderate that dangerous situation assumed
two forms.

First of all, he tried to reassure the Right that the

revolution would not rage out of control, that possibilities for
coexistence were present, and that a Red terror was not in the offing.
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His cautious conduct of the governmental inquiry into the actions of
tsarist officials, his appeals for discipline within the armed forces,
and his speeches assuring professional and industrial organizations
that their interests would be protected were examples of that tactic.
He also tried to diminish tensions by prompting timely governmental
concessions to popular demands. Kerensky *s sponsoring of measures for
land reform and his insistence that the language of diplomacy adapt
itself to socialistic formulas expressed the second part of his
approach.

Thus, the basic pattern that Kerensky would follow through

out the course of the February revolution was established at the very
outset.

Assuming that the nation was predisposed toward his methods,

he intended to promote political cooperation through a combination of
moral exhortation and cabinet maneuvers.
An unexpected consequence of Kerensky's mediative policy, his
conflict with Miliukov over the expression of war aims, was probably
the seminal event of the February revolution.

Because of the Justice

Minister's clumsy attempts in April to moderate the tone of Miliukov's
diplomatic correspondence, the Allies assumed that Russia was prepared
to surrender its claims to Constantinople and the Straits.

As a

direct result, succeeding cabinets were forced into an overly aggres
sive stance toward the war in order to regain the diplomatic leverage
necessary to the protection of Russia's vital interests.
Yet the controversy produced other ramifications as well.

Since

it evolved as a series of clashes within the cabinet as well as between
the government and the Petrograd Soviet, it was accompanied by compro
mises at almost every stage of its progress.

Thus, quite fortuitously
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and somewhat paradoxically, the prolongation of the conflict between
Kerensky and Miliukov over foreign policy reduced its severity and
allowed a temporary resolution without a decisive break between
liberals and socialists.

Furthermore, because of Miliukov’s abrupt

resignation (an event that Kerensky forced by cabinet maneuvers), the
government occupied an ambiguous position.

Partly rehabilitated in

the eyes of the aroused populace, it nonetheless was incapable of
maintaining order in the aftermath of the April Days.

Under those

difficult and unforeseen circumstances, and in response to Kerensky's
repeated urgings, the Petrograd Soviet reluctantly agreed to socialist
participation in a coalition cabinet.
Kerensky viewed the appearance of the First Coalition as a vital
step toward the realization of his political program.

The nation, he

claimed, had finally marshalled its "living, creative forces" under a
single banner.^

He was badly mistaken; although he headed a powerful

voting bloc within the ministerial council, he had not forged a Union
Sacrse able simultaneously to pursue Great Power objectives and bring
an egalitarian social order in Russia.

The Cadets, in particular, had

no intention of passively accepting the role of a loyal opposition.
Led by Miliukov, whose defeat only stiffened his partisan attitude,
they intended to bolster their deteriorating position within the revo
lutionary state by parliamentary maneuvers or, failing that, by
obstructionism.

The leading socialist ministers within the cabinet

also retained a pronounced class outlook; bound to the wills of their

5a . Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky's Own Story of the
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927), p. 141.
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party organizations, they were obliged to resist the Cadet demand that
social experimentation be exclusively conducted by the Constituent
Assembly.

The fundamental differences between the socialist and the

non-socialist forces had not been erased on May 5«

Because of

political exigencies, dual power had simply been transferred from the
public view to the ministerial council.
Thus, the First Coalition, which did enjoy popular confidence but
was badly divided within itself, was ill equipped to withstand the
serious strains that were inherent in a policy of national resurgence.
In retrospect, it is obvious that the cabinet should have adopted a
policy of guarded military retrenchment and concentrated upon the swift
convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

But for a combination of

reasons— a moral obligation to resist the Central Powers, revolutionary
idealism, a belief that victory in battle would promote internal
stabilization, and, above all, a desire to protect Russia's inter
national standing— it chose instead to expend its strength upon tasks
that were beyond its ability to accomplish.

That rash decision,

exemplified by the cabinet1s approval of a major military offensive
directed by Kerensky, was decisive to the further course of the
revolution.
The results were fatal to the political balance struck in
February.

Despite Kerensky's brilliant efforts to raise the fighting

capacity of the Russian armies within the framework of democratic
reforms, he succeeded only in establishing the cohesion necessary to
strict revolutionary defensism.

Furthermore, the shattering defeat of

the midsummer offensive erased even those modest gains. In various
ways, the efforts required to launch the ill-fated Russian offensive
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promoted the disintegration of the First Coalition in July.

The

Cadets, already antagonized by Chernov's agrarian proposals, were
infuriated by Kerensky's tactical concessions to Ukrainian separatism.
Convinced that their presence in the cabinet only provided the
socialists with a front behind which to pursue strictly partisan
policies, they resigned in protest and demanded the formation of a
government that would uphold national interests.

At the same time

the Petrograd garrison, especially alarmed by the war ministry's
efforts to activate its units and therefore increasingly inclined to
the Bolshevik position, .joined the Petrograd workers in a series of
bloody riots. Because the June offensive collapsed in the midst of
civil disorder and governmental decomposition, the basis of interparty
cooperation was destroyed.
Until July, Kerensky's impact upon the February revolution had
generally been constructive in nature.

While his patriotic sentiments

contributed to the government's tendency to overreach itself, he had
successfully promoted a considerable degree of interclass cooperation
through cabinet manipulations; the first and second provisional
regimes, imperfect though they were, owed much of their effectiveness
to his political skills.
But after the July Days, the period of Kerensky1s beneficent
influence came to an end.

At the very moment the political Right,

judging that the revolution had become a threat to the survival of the
nation, withdrew all toleration for compromise, Kerensky decided to
implement his version of nadpartiinost1. Taking advantage of a
temporary political vacuum following his suppression of the July
uprising, he supplanted Prince L'vov with the aid of the socialistic
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Star Chamber and assumed technical leadership of the government.
After unilaterally instituting vital populist reforms, he forced the
creation of a Second Coalition and called upon the Right for aid in
stabilizing the endangered country.

That crucial decision, which

relied upon a desperate and disenchanted group for the salvation of
the state and the revolution, was the prelude to his political
destruction.
The entire course of the Second Coalition demonstrated the
futility of utilizing the Right as an agent of change and consolidation
in an atmosphere of class conflict.

The socialist leadership,

weakened by the abortive radical uprising of July, uneasily stood
behind Kerensky's efforts to reorganize the state and the army.

But

the liberal and monarchist forces demanded an unabashedly anti
socialist policy.

When Kerensky refused to compromise the revolution,

they deserted him and, in their search for a strong national govern
ment, rallied behind the new Supreme Commander, General Kornilov.
That dangerous process, which culminated in the ill-fated Kornilov
revolt in late August, ended all possibilities for moderate rule.

In

the wake of Komilovist treason the radical revolution, checked in
February, April, and July, regained its lost initiative.
By providing governmental sanction for a turn to the Right in
July, Kerensky had inadvertently increased the impact of Right
extremism.

In his efforts to preserve the disciplinary gains of July

and August in the immediate aftermath of the Stavka revolt, he
alienated the Left, sundered the bonds between the traditional
socialist leaders and their radicalized followers, and helped to
increase the force of the radical revolution.

From September to the

Bolshevik rising of October, his presence within the Provisional
Government was actually an obstacle to the reconstitution of central
authority.

Discredited in the eyes of both the Right and the Left,

Kerensky was unable to retard the disintegration of the army or check
the spread of anarchy in the cities and the countryside.

From its

formation on September 25 until its overthrow a month later, Kerensky'
Third Coalition was exposed to liquidation.
Yet, throughout the final weeks of provisional rule, Kerensky
refused to abandon his moderate position.

Persuaded that extremism

was a transient phenomenon that would soon be rejected by the Russian
people, he tried to preserve the government as the nucleus of a future
national revival.

His insistence upon the necessity of coalition

policies in the midst of the radical resurgence was the final factor
that propelled the Bolsheviks into power.

Because neither the Right

nor the Left was willing to come to the defense of a government that
would not adopt a partisan stance, a coordinated defense against the
Bolshevik coup of October 25 proved to be impossible. Although it
resulted from a planned uprising instead of a spontaneous mass move
ment, the "Red October" bore a startling resemblance to the February
Days.

As in the case of tsarism, Kerensky's regime was not overthrown

by the application of overwhelming force.

It suffered defeat because

all major elements of Russian society refused to come to its aid.
Kerensky's fate, and that of the Provisional Government which he
headed, provides an example of moderate policies producing immoderate
results.

By artificially extending the February balance beyond its

term, he distorted the interplay of political forces within Russia,
magnified the violence of their reactions, and facilitated the triumph

2^9
of the very party to which he had been most opposed» While Kerensky's
decisions inflamed the class antagonisms that he wished to dampen,
they were derived from impeccable motives <» The Minister-President
acted sincerely, for the good of his native land and in conformity with
nationalistic, democratic, and humanitarian principles.

The funda

mental cause of his defeat was not the unpopularity of his ideals; with
the exception of continued Russian participation in the war, his
aspirations were not incompatible with those of the majority of his
countrymen.

Nor did he fail through personal weakness or the lack of

a strong party base.

He demonstrated adequate firmness during the

July Days and the Kornilov revolt, and until September the support of
the traditional socialist leadership provided him with a sufficient
hold on the Left.

Rather, he was repudiated because he refused to

reduce his expectations of what the revolution could accomplish.
In the first months of the revolution, Kerensky's doctrinal
rigidity was not a handicap to interim rule.

His policy of interparty

mediation for the realization of national and populist aims was quite
suited to a limited government operating during a limited span of time.
But the difficult environment produced by the war and the revolution
demanded that moderate policies be accompanied by moderate goals.

The

inordinate ambitions of the First Coalition, which brought the
relationship between socialists and liberals to the breaking point and
the state to the brink of disaster, reinforced the necessity for
curtailed governmental activities.

After July, Kerensky might have

brought the country to a condition of relative stability only by
choosing between statism and populism.

It was no longer possible to

preserve a strong state and wage the revolution.
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Since Kerensky could not disentangle his nationalistic and his
populist ideals, he was unable to respond adequately to the changed
situation.

His populist belief in the patience and good will of the

Russian masses precluded the conclusion that the class truce was
permanently ruptured.

Also, by persistently identifying liberalism

with patriotism, he refused to accept the possibility that the Right
would abandon the Provisional Government in a time of crisis.

Unaware

that the dynamics of the revolution had altered, he acted on the
assumption that the situation could be stabilized by controlling the
leadership of the major parties through political manipulations at the
apex of the political structure.

In the fervid environment of class

warfare, that inadequate approach only intensified the difficulties
facing the government and the country.

In the final analysis Kerensky,

and the cause of moderation in general, was discredited because he
overestimated the restraint of a populace unused to political freedom
and subjected to enormous pressures, and because he underestimated the
insidious power of class interests.

In trying to accomplish too

much with inadequate means, he only succeeded in subverting the values
that he defended.
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